I have submitted my final assignment, hopefully I have made a respectable fist of answering the question!
I have also joined the OUDCE Oxford Philosophical Society, which should keep me in the loop.
http://oxfordphilsoc.org/index.html
Maybe I will be able to particpate in a course next term, but work commitments make this quite challenging during January to March. In the meantime I will also have a look for other online courses as I would very much like to continue with some formal study in philosophy.
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
Authenticity
When Prichard says that real life is clearly better than a Brain In Vat ('BIV') life, my immediate reaction was no, perhaps in fact it doesn't matter, at least perhaps not for the reason given. It could only matter to someone who is outside of the scenario. If my life is actually a BIV or 'Matrix' type setup then I'm not sure I really mind! The simulation is so good that I have no complaints.
It is not authenticity that turns me off the BIV scenario, it is the possibility of deception or manipulation and the quality of the copy or simulation. If governments decided that it was preferable to turn all citizens into BIVs, lack of authenticity is fairly low down the list of reasons why I would be uncomfortable.
If BIV was the only option - the only game in town so to speak, then it would be silly to "mind" that life wasn't "real", again we would not reject it for lack of authenticity.
Going back to Prichard's example of the two books (one a copy and one the original) - in many ways it is silly to prefer the original book, just as it is a bit silly to pay tens of millions for a work of art when you can purchase an indistinguishable copy for much less. Again, I think it is the deception or manipulation involved in copies which is the issue. Is it really rational to prefer the authentic book if it is completely indistinguishable from the original, and always will be?
It is not authenticity that turns me off the BIV scenario, it is the possibility of deception or manipulation and the quality of the copy or simulation. If governments decided that it was preferable to turn all citizens into BIVs, lack of authenticity is fairly low down the list of reasons why I would be uncomfortable.
If BIV was the only option - the only game in town so to speak, then it would be silly to "mind" that life wasn't "real", again we would not reject it for lack of authenticity.
Going back to Prichard's example of the two books (one a copy and one the original) - in many ways it is silly to prefer the original book, just as it is a bit silly to pay tens of millions for a work of art when you can purchase an indistinguishable copy for much less. Again, I think it is the deception or manipulation involved in copies which is the issue. Is it really rational to prefer the authentic book if it is completely indistinguishable from the original, and always will be?
Friday, November 23, 2012
Wittgenstein and solipsism
In Philosophical Investigations W. says:
"But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear" (Certainly; but it can also talk.)
But the fairy tale only invents what is not the case: it does not talk nonsense. - It is not as simple as that. Is it false or nonsensical to say that a pot talks?"
"What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel? Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention to feelings in myself? That I recognise that there is something there (in me) which I can call "pain" without getting into conflict with the way other people use this word? -I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants etc.....
...Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains."
So W. might be saying that we cannot say that a zombie experiences pain, it is either false or meaningless. But I think that depends on whether we judge a zombie to be a fictional entity. I do, and in this sense I would say that it is either false or nonsense to talk about zombie's having feelings if it is meant to be a non-fictional account of reality. But zombie's do, in many respects "behave like humans" and people who do not believe that they are fictional entities could therefore talk of them feeling pain in a non-false or a sensical manner.
So I think the key question is whether we believe that zombies are fictional or real, and for me that is a scientific question. As I have said it is not really worthy of much serious consideration because we know why the concept was "created", how it is used in what contexts, and of course we have no evidence for their existence.
People who do believe in zombies do not fully appreciate how the concept was created, why it is used and in what contexts, and have not mastered the basics of the scientific method.
"But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear" (Certainly; but it can also talk.)
But the fairy tale only invents what is not the case: it does not talk nonsense. - It is not as simple as that. Is it false or nonsensical to say that a pot talks?"
"What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel? Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention to feelings in myself? That I recognise that there is something there (in me) which I can call "pain" without getting into conflict with the way other people use this word? -I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants etc.....
...Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains."
So W. might be saying that we cannot say that a zombie experiences pain, it is either false or meaningless. But I think that depends on whether we judge a zombie to be a fictional entity. I do, and in this sense I would say that it is either false or nonsense to talk about zombie's having feelings if it is meant to be a non-fictional account of reality. But zombie's do, in many respects "behave like humans" and people who do not believe that they are fictional entities could therefore talk of them feeling pain in a non-false or a sensical manner.
So I think the key question is whether we believe that zombies are fictional or real, and for me that is a scientific question. As I have said it is not really worthy of much serious consideration because we know why the concept was "created", how it is used in what contexts, and of course we have no evidence for their existence.
People who do believe in zombies do not fully appreciate how the concept was created, why it is used and in what contexts, and have not mastered the basics of the scientific method.
Zombies and the problem of other minds
How dow we know that zombies don't exist? How do we tell the difference between zombies and humans?
Almost no-one with a decent education seriously believes that there are zombies roaming the streets, unless perhaps you happen to come across the filming of a science fiction movie or it's Halloween.
If I were to encounter someone who tried to argue for the existence of zombies I would treat their arguments in the same way as I treat the arguments for the existence of god(s). They are impossible to completely disprove, but there is no good reason to believe that they are true. Furthermore, if someone did believe in zombies (or BIV as a true picture of reality) then I would assess their reasoning skills as deficient. Hume's rejection of miracles tells us that they are probably under a misapprehension.
Such beliefs are a good touch-stone for assessing whether someone has mastered the scientific method. It also tells us whether they have "grown up" in rational terms and moved on from pre-historic theist or deist myths.
I concede however that I am not really addressing the question of what criteria I use to judge that zombies don't exist.
I suspect that the reason I do not believe in zombies is inherent in what we mean by "zombie". A "zombie" is not a real entity, at least as far as I am concerned. The origin of zombie as a word seems to go back to West Indian origins and is now often associated with Haitian voodoo beliefs. As with all religious stories, they were invented to scare the credulous into submitting to the power of priests.
So the criteria I use to judge if zombies exist is the same criteria I use for all beliefs in the supernatural. In a sense I don't need any criteria, the default position is that they don't exist and I am unlikely to give any serious consideration to the possibility that they do exist.
Almost no-one with a decent education seriously believes that there are zombies roaming the streets, unless perhaps you happen to come across the filming of a science fiction movie or it's Halloween.
If I were to encounter someone who tried to argue for the existence of zombies I would treat their arguments in the same way as I treat the arguments for the existence of god(s). They are impossible to completely disprove, but there is no good reason to believe that they are true. Furthermore, if someone did believe in zombies (or BIV as a true picture of reality) then I would assess their reasoning skills as deficient. Hume's rejection of miracles tells us that they are probably under a misapprehension.
Such beliefs are a good touch-stone for assessing whether someone has mastered the scientific method. It also tells us whether they have "grown up" in rational terms and moved on from pre-historic theist or deist myths.
I concede however that I am not really addressing the question of what criteria I use to judge that zombies don't exist.
I suspect that the reason I do not believe in zombies is inherent in what we mean by "zombie". A "zombie" is not a real entity, at least as far as I am concerned. The origin of zombie as a word seems to go back to West Indian origins and is now often associated with Haitian voodoo beliefs. As with all religious stories, they were invented to scare the credulous into submitting to the power of priests.
So the criteria I use to judge if zombies exist is the same criteria I use for all beliefs in the supernatural. In a sense I don't need any criteria, the default position is that they don't exist and I am unlikely to give any serious consideration to the possibility that they do exist.
The argument from Analogy
Q - Why do you think that the argument from analogy doesn’t work? In particular why is it a bad inductive argument?
The argument from analogy is used to justify our belief in the existence of other minds apart from our own.
The argument from analogy runs as follows: I infer from the fact that certain mental states of my mind accompany physical states of my body that my mind and body are 'connected' i.e. there is a "symbiotic" link between my mental states and my bodily behaviour. I can observe other bodies behaving in a similar fashion to my own, I therefore infer that those other bodies have minds which are similarly connected with those bodies.
The argument is inductive by nature, it infers the existence of other minds from the similarity of bodily behaviour. From the specific case of my own nature I make a generalisation about other people's nature.
There are a number of potential weaknesses with the argument from analogy:
1. Challenges based on dualism - how we know that my mind and body are both distinct but "mine". We cannot experience anything other than mental states - physical entities cannot be experienced directly, only indirectly (the indirect realism argument). Therefore, if we cannot be sure of the existence of our own bodies, we cannot infer the existence of other people's minds from the un-knowable relationship between my own mind and body.
2. Challenges based on the supposed weakness of the form of inductive arguments (as discussed in the previous module). Why should we suppose that other people are the same as we are?
3. Radical scepticism about the existence of an external world. We cannot prove that an external world exists at all, therefore we cannot prove that other people exist at all. The Brain In Vat argument is an example of this form of challenge. This argument is similar in nature to 1.
The argument from analogy is used to justify our belief in the existence of other minds apart from our own.
The argument from analogy runs as follows: I infer from the fact that certain mental states of my mind accompany physical states of my body that my mind and body are 'connected' i.e. there is a "symbiotic" link between my mental states and my bodily behaviour. I can observe other bodies behaving in a similar fashion to my own, I therefore infer that those other bodies have minds which are similarly connected with those bodies.
The argument is inductive by nature, it infers the existence of other minds from the similarity of bodily behaviour. From the specific case of my own nature I make a generalisation about other people's nature.
There are a number of potential weaknesses with the argument from analogy:
1. Challenges based on dualism - how we know that my mind and body are both distinct but "mine". We cannot experience anything other than mental states - physical entities cannot be experienced directly, only indirectly (the indirect realism argument). Therefore, if we cannot be sure of the existence of our own bodies, we cannot infer the existence of other people's minds from the un-knowable relationship between my own mind and body.
2. Challenges based on the supposed weakness of the form of inductive arguments (as discussed in the previous module). Why should we suppose that other people are the same as we are?
3. Radical scepticism about the existence of an external world. We cannot prove that an external world exists at all, therefore we cannot prove that other people exist at all. The Brain In Vat argument is an example of this form of challenge. This argument is similar in nature to 1.
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