Module 2 has a lot of content - it includes Moral Truth, Justice and Free Will. This is probably too much for one week, but I have done my best to keep up.
I covered Free Will in the Introduction to Philosophy and the Metaphysics courses (although each looked at different philosophers' views). My views about Free Will have not changed significantly having done some more reading and thinking. In summary, I am a libertarian and believe that intellectually mature humans have free will.
I do not believe that compatibilism is logically consistent, I think compatibilists should get off the fence and choose.
I don't believe that determinism is consistent with our understanding of what it is to be human. I don't fully "understand" what determinism is because it does not explain the way the world is. Determinism is not an explanation of how humans behave, it is a reductio ad absurdum based on false premises. I believe that the arguments in favour of determinism are often confused, and do not take into account the role of rationality and consciousness. Everybody behaves as though libertarianism is true, without free will there can be no moral responsibility and in fact there can be no morality. Given that, for me, morality exists, I have to conclude that libertarianism is true.
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Sunday, May 26, 2013
Friday, February 22, 2013
Sam Harris on free will
Harris presents his arguments fairly well, but on this topic I don't agree with him at all.
His basic argument is hard determinism re-hashed. He says every event is either caused by a prior chain of cause and effect, or it's random.
I am still intrigued by why a determinist would believe in randomness, it seems completely contradictory to me. And he gives no justification in the lecture for why the only other option is physical cause and effect. He just accepts this as a given, missing the entire point of the argument for free will. Harris seems to look upon the brain as merely a physical machine, taking no account of consciousness and the power of reason at all.
It's a shame that Christopher Hitchens is no longer with us, he could point us in the direction to the most intelligent way of looking at the problem....
Thursday, February 21, 2013
Free will vs. determinism
What I believe (is obviously true) is that there is interaction between the mental world, where we have free will and the physical world, where the mental act leads us to influence the physical world. Once the physical world starts "moving", then laws of causation apply.
So if I decide to scratch my nose, I send signals to the muscles in my arm which raise my hand to my nose. If my hand then brushes a fly away, it's flight path is subject to the laws of cause and effect.
My free decision to scratch my nose was not pre-determined, it is not random, and it is the result of a free choice which is the origin of a string of cause and effect.
Hard determinists must find it impossible to discipline their children. If they have no free will then how can they blame them for bad behaviour?
The truth is that no-one really believes in hard determinism, they can't. That I think is why Peter Strawson starts his essay with the admission that he does not really understand what determinism is.
Philosophers who defend determinism often resort to a fallacious argument along the lines of "everything must have a physical cause" and then use a regress argument to show that free will cannot be the original cause. They come across like Berkeley did arguing for idealism, using rules they make up themselves (B.'s ideas must resemble their cause) to justify their chain of reasoning and ending up with a result which is contrary to common sense and denies the very nature of humanity.
So if I decide to scratch my nose, I send signals to the muscles in my arm which raise my hand to my nose. If my hand then brushes a fly away, it's flight path is subject to the laws of cause and effect.
My free decision to scratch my nose was not pre-determined, it is not random, and it is the result of a free choice which is the origin of a string of cause and effect.
Hard determinists must find it impossible to discipline their children. If they have no free will then how can they blame them for bad behaviour?
The truth is that no-one really believes in hard determinism, they can't. That I think is why Peter Strawson starts his essay with the admission that he does not really understand what determinism is.
Philosophers who defend determinism often resort to a fallacious argument along the lines of "everything must have a physical cause" and then use a regress argument to show that free will cannot be the original cause. They come across like Berkeley did arguing for idealism, using rules they make up themselves (B.'s ideas must resemble their cause) to justify their chain of reasoning and ending up with a result which is contrary to common sense and denies the very nature of humanity.
Wednesday, February 20, 2013
Strawson and compatibilism
P.F. Strawson makes a case for a kind of compatibilism in his 1962 essay 'Freedom and Resentment". Strawson argues that, for any discussion of human morality, determinism is in effect not significant.
In order to be treated as moral agents, we need to be said to have free will, otherwise we remain blameless for our bad actions and gain no credit for good actions.This is in fact how we all behave (unless we are mentally abnormal).
Strawson admits that he does not understand exactly what is meant by determinism, but takes the view that if it is true, it is not significant for any debate about human freedom. Hence he is in effect taking a psuedo-compatibilist stance.
One of Strawson's key points is that there are reasons for regarding praise or blame as inappropriate attitudes for people to hold about other people, but the truth of determinism is not one of those reasons and hence determinism is not significant. Determinism is never a reason for suspending our "reactive attitudes" and we cannot imagine having no reactive attitudes at all.
So in effect Strawson's approach is not to attempt to prove or disprove determinism, but to show that it is irrelevant to the discussion of human behaviour.
I agree with the thrust of Strawson's argument but he is only a psuedo-compatibilist. He does not reject determinism, he bypasses it.
In order to be treated as moral agents, we need to be said to have free will, otherwise we remain blameless for our bad actions and gain no credit for good actions.This is in fact how we all behave (unless we are mentally abnormal).
Strawson admits that he does not understand exactly what is meant by determinism, but takes the view that if it is true, it is not significant for any debate about human freedom. Hence he is in effect taking a psuedo-compatibilist stance.
One of Strawson's key points is that there are reasons for regarding praise or blame as inappropriate attitudes for people to hold about other people, but the truth of determinism is not one of those reasons and hence determinism is not significant. Determinism is never a reason for suspending our "reactive attitudes" and we cannot imagine having no reactive attitudes at all.
So in effect Strawson's approach is not to attempt to prove or disprove determinism, but to show that it is irrelevant to the discussion of human behaviour.
I agree with the thrust of Strawson's argument but he is only a psuedo-compatibilist. He does not reject determinism, he bypasses it.
Free Will
My initial view is that as humans we (effectively) have free will. Having free will is part of the core definition of a human, so if I voted otherwise I would be claiming that we are not in fact human.
I do believe in universal laws, such as gravity and the speed of light in a vacuum. But there is a point where the human brain can decide to act in a certain way that is not predetermined.
I accept that the choices we make (the vast majority of which are subconscious) are influenced by our environment, but we are not machines subject to the absolute rule of causality. The brain is much much too complicated for this, and the influence of random events is influential in deciding the way we behave.
I do believe in universal laws, such as gravity and the speed of light in a vacuum. But there is a point where the human brain can decide to act in a certain way that is not predetermined.
I accept that the choices we make (the vast majority of which are subconscious) are influenced by our environment, but we are not machines subject to the absolute rule of causality. The brain is much much too complicated for this, and the influence of random events is influential in deciding the way we behave.
Sunday, June 17, 2012
George Soros and Free Will
In a recent speech on the economic crisis George Soros makes some interesting comments about the cause of the financial crisis.
http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/
It's interesting to read his remarks in the light of the debate on free will, for example:
"Scientific method needs an independent criterion, by which the truth or validity of its theories can be judged. Natural phenomena constitute such a criterion; social phenomena do not. That is because natural phenomena consist of facts that unfold independently of any statements that relate to them. The facts then serve as objective evidence by which the validity of scientific theories can be judged. That has enabled natural science to produce amazing results. Social events, by contrast, have thinking participants who have a will of their own. They are not detached observers but engaged decision makers whose decisions greatly influence the course of events. Therefore the events do not constitute an independent criterion by which participants can decide whether their views are valid. In the absence of an independent criterion people have to base their decisions not on knowledge but on an inherently biased and to greater or lesser extent distorted interpretation of reality. Their lack of perfect knowledge or fallibility introduces an element of indeterminacy into the course of events that is absent when the events relate to the behavior of inanimate objects. The resulting uncertainty hinders the social sciences in producing laws similar to Newton’s physics."
Soros thereby gives us two reasons why he thinks determinism does not apply to the social sciences: incomplete knowledge and fallibility. When human beings make decisions they base these decisions on an incomplete picture and they sometimes make mistakes, they do not assess complex situations correctly.
I think most people will accept that both of these statements are true - and I think this is a good basis to argue for lack of determinism in human actions. Could it be that by "free will" what we actually mean is that we do not, and cannot, ever know all of the facts relevant to a situation and also that our human judgement is sometimes faulty?
If we did have perfect knowledge and never made mistakes then it seems much more plausible that free will might not exist, but can we accept that neither of these conditions is likely ever to persist?
http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/
It's interesting to read his remarks in the light of the debate on free will, for example:
"Scientific method needs an independent criterion, by which the truth or validity of its theories can be judged. Natural phenomena constitute such a criterion; social phenomena do not. That is because natural phenomena consist of facts that unfold independently of any statements that relate to them. The facts then serve as objective evidence by which the validity of scientific theories can be judged. That has enabled natural science to produce amazing results. Social events, by contrast, have thinking participants who have a will of their own. They are not detached observers but engaged decision makers whose decisions greatly influence the course of events. Therefore the events do not constitute an independent criterion by which participants can decide whether their views are valid. In the absence of an independent criterion people have to base their decisions not on knowledge but on an inherently biased and to greater or lesser extent distorted interpretation of reality. Their lack of perfect knowledge or fallibility introduces an element of indeterminacy into the course of events that is absent when the events relate to the behavior of inanimate objects. The resulting uncertainty hinders the social sciences in producing laws similar to Newton’s physics."
Soros thereby gives us two reasons why he thinks determinism does not apply to the social sciences: incomplete knowledge and fallibility. When human beings make decisions they base these decisions on an incomplete picture and they sometimes make mistakes, they do not assess complex situations correctly.
I think most people will accept that both of these statements are true - and I think this is a good basis to argue for lack of determinism in human actions. Could it be that by "free will" what we actually mean is that we do not, and cannot, ever know all of the facts relevant to a situation and also that our human judgement is sometimes faulty?
If we did have perfect knowledge and never made mistakes then it seems much more plausible that free will might not exist, but can we accept that neither of these conditions is likely ever to persist?
Friday, May 25, 2012
Philosophy of language
I am struggling to understand what Schopenhauer could mean by his definition of free will. Unfortunately, he doesn't give examples or put the way he uses the term in context, so I suspect Wittgenstein would have some difficulty accepting that it is truly meaningful.
I have recently been watching the excellent videos on the philosophy faculty website:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/general_philosophy
In part 5 Peter Millican touches on free will a few times, in particular in relation to the mind / body dualism debate. He makes a very interesting analogy. If we try and think about ourselves in terms of a computer, we have hardware (which explains our physical actions in terms of cause and effect) which extends to the physical and chemical constituents of our brains. We also we have software, which is analogous to our minds.
We cannot fully explain our minds by just talking about physical properties or causation. Using this analogy I would maintain that our minds are programmed in such a way that we are free to make moral choices and decisions. I can't explain why this is the case, but I certainly do believe that it is the case.
I think looking at the way we use the words "free will" helps, but Schopenhauer seems to be looking for a metaphysical explanation of what free will is, whereas explaining the terms by how they are used seems to be edging towards an epistemological explanation.
Is it possible to answer metaphysical questions by looking at the philosophy of language?
I have recently been watching the excellent videos on the philosophy faculty website:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/general_philosophy
In part 5 Peter Millican touches on free will a few times, in particular in relation to the mind / body dualism debate. He makes a very interesting analogy. If we try and think about ourselves in terms of a computer, we have hardware (which explains our physical actions in terms of cause and effect) which extends to the physical and chemical constituents of our brains. We also we have software, which is analogous to our minds.
We cannot fully explain our minds by just talking about physical properties or causation. Using this analogy I would maintain that our minds are programmed in such a way that we are free to make moral choices and decisions. I can't explain why this is the case, but I certainly do believe that it is the case.
I think looking at the way we use the words "free will" helps, but Schopenhauer seems to be looking for a metaphysical explanation of what free will is, whereas explaining the terms by how they are used seems to be edging towards an epistemological explanation.
Is it possible to answer metaphysical questions by looking at the philosophy of language?
Monday, May 21, 2012
Schopenhauer and murder
Schopenhauer says we are free to act according to motive (which seems to be self evident) but we are not free to choose our motives because these are determined. His argument is very circular and I guess that is the point since he is trying to prove that we cannot establish free will by introspection.
Whether he is a determinist or not (he could be a soft determinist), I certainly reject the idea that all motives are "caused" by something. I think some motives are "willed". This is not to say that there aren't reasons why we have different motives, again that seems to me to be self evident.
Maybe I am redefining will in terms of "reason for acting" rather than "cause for acting". If we look at it that way, we can see how some actions are not "caused" but are the result of a rational process.
If we take an example - someone asks you "why did you kill that fly?"
There are two ways of looking at this question:
1. what is your motive for killing that fly?
2. what is your reason for killing that fly?
On the first interpretation, I accept that the motive is that I found the fly irritating.
However, my reason for killing the fly is not that I found the fly irritating. My reason (in a moral sense) is that I found the fly irritating and I made a moral assessment that I was entitled to end the fly's life because I don't believe that killing flies is wrong in the current circumstances.
My choice to kill the fly was a moral choice, an exercise of free will and it involved reason as well as motive. Anyone who says it isn't, and is just motive, doesn't seem to be capturing what is going on. They stop their analysis too soon.
Whether he is a determinist or not (he could be a soft determinist), I certainly reject the idea that all motives are "caused" by something. I think some motives are "willed". This is not to say that there aren't reasons why we have different motives, again that seems to me to be self evident.
Maybe I am redefining will in terms of "reason for acting" rather than "cause for acting". If we look at it that way, we can see how some actions are not "caused" but are the result of a rational process.
If we take an example - someone asks you "why did you kill that fly?"
There are two ways of looking at this question:
1. what is your motive for killing that fly?
2. what is your reason for killing that fly?
On the first interpretation, I accept that the motive is that I found the fly irritating.
However, my reason for killing the fly is not that I found the fly irritating. My reason (in a moral sense) is that I found the fly irritating and I made a moral assessment that I was entitled to end the fly's life because I don't believe that killing flies is wrong in the current circumstances.
My choice to kill the fly was a moral choice, an exercise of free will and it involved reason as well as motive. Anyone who says it isn't, and is just motive, doesn't seem to be capturing what is going on. They stop their analysis too soon.
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Schopenhauer
There are a number of reasons why I am not willing to agree with Schopenhauer. The fact that I am not willing to agree is, ipso fact, proof that I have free will!
Perhaps there are three types of reasons why I don't agree with Schopenhauer.
The first set of reasons has to do with the logic of determinism. The fact that we can predict an action, even with almost complete certainty, doesn't necessarily mean that the action is determined. I don't accept that, because at the point of action the subject could not have acted differently, determinism is true. If there is a formal possibility of the agent to act in a number of ways prior to the action, then there is the possibility of a non-deterministic explanation. We can envisage a sate of affairs where the agent acted differently.
The second set of reasons is based on what we mean by the term "free will". Schopenhauer says we can "act what we will" but we cannot "will what we will". This is just wrong in my view. My counter argument is effectively that we can "will what we will". We can will what we will because that is what we mean by the term "will". For you to prove that determinism is true you would need to prove to me that humans don't make choices - for me that is the essence of what I mean by determinism, and Schopenhauer has not proved that this is the case.
Of course you can redefine what I mean by free will and then say that reality doesn't accord with that definition, but all you have achieved is to play semantics with the definition.
The final set of reasons is to do with my conception of what it is to be an independent person or conscience. Schopenhauer has come up with one way of looking at human behaviour, but it doesn't cohere with my conception. Following an action back to its cause seems a very odd way of looking at human actions. When we talk about moral or normative human actions we use the concept of choice, we talk about blame and praise and human responsibility. I don't accept that all of these concepts are either meaningless or mistaken. I don't think the concept of causation (on its own) works very well in the realm of human actions. Human behaviour is not mechanistic, that is the essence of being human. What Schopenhauer is doing from my perspective is redefining what it is to be human.
Perhaps there are three types of reasons why I don't agree with Schopenhauer.
The first set of reasons has to do with the logic of determinism. The fact that we can predict an action, even with almost complete certainty, doesn't necessarily mean that the action is determined. I don't accept that, because at the point of action the subject could not have acted differently, determinism is true. If there is a formal possibility of the agent to act in a number of ways prior to the action, then there is the possibility of a non-deterministic explanation. We can envisage a sate of affairs where the agent acted differently.
The second set of reasons is based on what we mean by the term "free will". Schopenhauer says we can "act what we will" but we cannot "will what we will". This is just wrong in my view. My counter argument is effectively that we can "will what we will". We can will what we will because that is what we mean by the term "will". For you to prove that determinism is true you would need to prove to me that humans don't make choices - for me that is the essence of what I mean by determinism, and Schopenhauer has not proved that this is the case.
Of course you can redefine what I mean by free will and then say that reality doesn't accord with that definition, but all you have achieved is to play semantics with the definition.
The final set of reasons is to do with my conception of what it is to be an independent person or conscience. Schopenhauer has come up with one way of looking at human behaviour, but it doesn't cohere with my conception. Following an action back to its cause seems a very odd way of looking at human actions. When we talk about moral or normative human actions we use the concept of choice, we talk about blame and praise and human responsibility. I don't accept that all of these concepts are either meaningless or mistaken. I don't think the concept of causation (on its own) works very well in the realm of human actions. Human behaviour is not mechanistic, that is the essence of being human. What Schopenhauer is doing from my perspective is redefining what it is to be human.
Saturday, May 19, 2012
Schopenhauer and Free Will
There seem to be two types of argument going on. The first is an argument from causality and is almost a reductio ad absurdum. If you accept in principle that everything must have a cause, then you can follow the chain back ad infinitum and never find a starting point. This strikes me as similar to arguments over the existence of the universe and whether something can come from nothing. Although it's an interesting argument, it doesn't really help because I don't look upon free will as a problem of mechanics. I don't accept that all thoughts have to have a single "cause", the process is far too complex to be suitable to that kind of simplistic reasoning.
The second argument redefines free will in terms of human motivations, Schop. says that we choose to do what motivates us most, and that as we don't choose our motivations, we don't in effect have freedom of choice. I also find this argument very unsatisfactory.
My take on free will is that it is neither a question of cause or of motives but is an issue of absence of limitations on our choices. I accept that we all have motivations, but we are also able to have a rational discussion about these and reach a conclusion, and there seems to be nothing to stop us from doing this, other than facing the consequences of those choices.
No doubt most choices are predetermined in the sense that they stem from motivations, but we seem to have the ability to influence our motivations by lending more weight to some than others. We are not just influenced by motivations, we also take into account what the consequences will be and make a rational judgement about the implications of making one choice or another. For me, free will is a conceptual framework which captures this process using two words.
For there to be free will under Schop.'s definition we would need to be able to break the chain of cause and effect or change the laws that govern the universe and I'm not sure anyone really thinks this can happen or indeed is really what we mean by free will.
It seems that there must be a way to define 'free will' not in terms of the cause or motivation for an action, but instead in terms of the ability to assess the consequences of different choices and attribute moral value to those choices. When we couple this with the lack of constraint on this process, we end up with free will. If a rational person or persons make a normative choice which could have been otherwise (i.e. we can easily conceive of them making a different choice) then that choice has a moral value, it is in effect a case of "free will".
The second argument redefines free will in terms of human motivations, Schop. says that we choose to do what motivates us most, and that as we don't choose our motivations, we don't in effect have freedom of choice. I also find this argument very unsatisfactory.
My take on free will is that it is neither a question of cause or of motives but is an issue of absence of limitations on our choices. I accept that we all have motivations, but we are also able to have a rational discussion about these and reach a conclusion, and there seems to be nothing to stop us from doing this, other than facing the consequences of those choices.
No doubt most choices are predetermined in the sense that they stem from motivations, but we seem to have the ability to influence our motivations by lending more weight to some than others. We are not just influenced by motivations, we also take into account what the consequences will be and make a rational judgement about the implications of making one choice or another. For me, free will is a conceptual framework which captures this process using two words.
For there to be free will under Schop.'s definition we would need to be able to break the chain of cause and effect or change the laws that govern the universe and I'm not sure anyone really thinks this can happen or indeed is really what we mean by free will.
It seems that there must be a way to define 'free will' not in terms of the cause or motivation for an action, but instead in terms of the ability to assess the consequences of different choices and attribute moral value to those choices. When we couple this with the lack of constraint on this process, we end up with free will. If a rational person or persons make a normative choice which could have been otherwise (i.e. we can easily conceive of them making a different choice) then that choice has a moral value, it is in effect a case of "free will".
Thursday, May 17, 2012
Free Will by Sam Harris
Philosophy News has posted a relatively short review of Sam Harris' new book 'Free Will' by Paul Pardi. The article goes through some of the key issues which are discussed in the background reading to this week's topic, so I think it may be of interest.
http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2012/05/15/An-Analysis-of-Sam-Harris-Free-Will.aspx
On the whole I am prone to reject philosophical arguments which claim that widely used terms are "meaningless" or "incoherent". My natural reaction is to challenge the author to sharpen their pencil and go back and try a bit harder to understand what we do in fact mean when we use a concept.
I agree with the author of the review that is seems inconsistent to say both that a term is meaningless and that it is false, if that is indeed what Mr. Harris does in his book.
Lawrence
http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2012/05/15/An-Analysis-of-Sam-Harris-Free-Will.aspx
On the whole I am prone to reject philosophical arguments which claim that widely used terms are "meaningless" or "incoherent". My natural reaction is to challenge the author to sharpen their pencil and go back and try a bit harder to understand what we do in fact mean when we use a concept.
I agree with the author of the review that is seems inconsistent to say both that a term is meaningless and that it is false, if that is indeed what Mr. Harris does in his book.
Lawrence
Wednesday, May 16, 2012
Free Will - initial thoughts
Do we have free will?
Yes. There is a significant element of 'nature and nurture' in the way we lead our lives, but we still fundamentally have the ability to make choices between alternative actions. There are laws and conventions which prevent us from taking certain actions - but we can, if we want, break the law or defy convention and then face the consequences.
With respect to which kinds of things do we have freedom?
We are free to decide who we spend our lives with, where we live and what we do for a living. We are free to try and complete our education and to take advantage of the opportunities that are presented to us (which admittedly are not equal). We are free to interact with people in the way we choose - for example we can be polite or rude, respectful or disrespectful, inquisitive or incurious.
There seem to be various types of freedom. The main ones that spring to mind are political, social, economic, religious, moral.
How do we know we have freedom?
Because at a human level I feel free to choose.
At a societal level I live in a relatively free society (in some respects society has become less free over time, in other respects it has become more free). I can weigh up the pros and cons and use rational processes to decide on a course of action. I can reflect on my beliefs and feelings and make a non-instinctive response.
What are the consequences, if any, of our freedom?
We can't always blame external factors when we make the wrong choice if we are free. Freedom brings moral responsibility and accountability. We should therefore educate ourselves to be in a position to try and make the right choices.
Yes. There is a significant element of 'nature and nurture' in the way we lead our lives, but we still fundamentally have the ability to make choices between alternative actions. There are laws and conventions which prevent us from taking certain actions - but we can, if we want, break the law or defy convention and then face the consequences.
With respect to which kinds of things do we have freedom?
We are free to decide who we spend our lives with, where we live and what we do for a living. We are free to try and complete our education and to take advantage of the opportunities that are presented to us (which admittedly are not equal). We are free to interact with people in the way we choose - for example we can be polite or rude, respectful or disrespectful, inquisitive or incurious.
There seem to be various types of freedom. The main ones that spring to mind are political, social, economic, religious, moral.
How do we know we have freedom?
Because at a human level I feel free to choose.
At a societal level I live in a relatively free society (in some respects society has become less free over time, in other respects it has become more free). I can weigh up the pros and cons and use rational processes to decide on a course of action. I can reflect on my beliefs and feelings and make a non-instinctive response.
What are the consequences, if any, of our freedom?
We can't always blame external factors when we make the wrong choice if we are free. Freedom brings moral responsibility and accountability. We should therefore educate ourselves to be in a position to try and make the right choices.
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