In Philosophical Investigations W. says:
"But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear" (Certainly; but it can also talk.)
But the fairy tale only invents what is not the case: it does not talk nonsense. - It is not as simple as that. Is it false or nonsensical to say that a pot talks?"
"What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel? Is it that my education has led me to it by drawing my attention to feelings in myself? That I recognise that there is something there (in me) which I can call "pain" without getting into conflict with the way other people use this word? -I do not transfer my idea to stones, plants etc.....
...Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pains."
So W. might be saying that we cannot say that a zombie experiences pain, it is either false or meaningless. But I think that depends on whether we judge a zombie to be a fictional entity. I do, and in this sense I would say that it is either false or nonsense to talk about zombie's having feelings if it is meant to be a non-fictional account of reality. But zombie's do, in many respects "behave like humans" and people who do not believe that they are fictional entities could therefore talk of them feeling pain in a non-false or a sensical manner.
So I think the key question is whether we believe that zombies are fictional or real, and for me that is a scientific question. As I have said it is not really worthy of much serious consideration because we know why the concept was "created", how it is used in what contexts, and of course we have no evidence for their existence.
People who do believe in zombies do not fully appreciate how the concept was created, why it is used and in what contexts, and have not mastered the basics of the scientific method.
Showing posts with label epistemology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label epistemology. Show all posts
Friday, November 23, 2012
The argument from Analogy
Q - Why do you think that the argument from analogy doesn’t work? In particular why is it a bad inductive argument?
The argument from analogy is used to justify our belief in the existence of other minds apart from our own.
The argument from analogy runs as follows: I infer from the fact that certain mental states of my mind accompany physical states of my body that my mind and body are 'connected' i.e. there is a "symbiotic" link between my mental states and my bodily behaviour. I can observe other bodies behaving in a similar fashion to my own, I therefore infer that those other bodies have minds which are similarly connected with those bodies.
The argument is inductive by nature, it infers the existence of other minds from the similarity of bodily behaviour. From the specific case of my own nature I make a generalisation about other people's nature.
There are a number of potential weaknesses with the argument from analogy:
1. Challenges based on dualism - how we know that my mind and body are both distinct but "mine". We cannot experience anything other than mental states - physical entities cannot be experienced directly, only indirectly (the indirect realism argument). Therefore, if we cannot be sure of the existence of our own bodies, we cannot infer the existence of other people's minds from the un-knowable relationship between my own mind and body.
2. Challenges based on the supposed weakness of the form of inductive arguments (as discussed in the previous module). Why should we suppose that other people are the same as we are?
3. Radical scepticism about the existence of an external world. We cannot prove that an external world exists at all, therefore we cannot prove that other people exist at all. The Brain In Vat argument is an example of this form of challenge. This argument is similar in nature to 1.
The argument from analogy is used to justify our belief in the existence of other minds apart from our own.
The argument from analogy runs as follows: I infer from the fact that certain mental states of my mind accompany physical states of my body that my mind and body are 'connected' i.e. there is a "symbiotic" link between my mental states and my bodily behaviour. I can observe other bodies behaving in a similar fashion to my own, I therefore infer that those other bodies have minds which are similarly connected with those bodies.
The argument is inductive by nature, it infers the existence of other minds from the similarity of bodily behaviour. From the specific case of my own nature I make a generalisation about other people's nature.
There are a number of potential weaknesses with the argument from analogy:
1. Challenges based on dualism - how we know that my mind and body are both distinct but "mine". We cannot experience anything other than mental states - physical entities cannot be experienced directly, only indirectly (the indirect realism argument). Therefore, if we cannot be sure of the existence of our own bodies, we cannot infer the existence of other people's minds from the un-knowable relationship between my own mind and body.
2. Challenges based on the supposed weakness of the form of inductive arguments (as discussed in the previous module). Why should we suppose that other people are the same as we are?
3. Radical scepticism about the existence of an external world. We cannot prove that an external world exists at all, therefore we cannot prove that other people exist at all. The Brain In Vat argument is an example of this form of challenge. This argument is similar in nature to 1.
Saturday, October 20, 2012
virtue epistemology
Virtue epistemology addresses the question of how we rationally justify knowledge. The way we justify knowledge is expressed in terms of intellectual or cognitive virtues, these virtues are normatively valuable, they warrant our approval.
By moving discussion about justification to a normative debate, virtue epistemologists reject a purely cognitive or positive approach to the problem of knowledge. Intellectual agents and groups of agents become the important source of epistemic value and therefore of knowledge justification, as opposed to reliance on, for example, sense perception or a priori truths.
There are a number of different schools of thought within virtue epistemology, the different approaches placing a greater or lesser emphasis on different cognitive or intellectual traits and epistemic norms.
Reliabilism concentrates on cognitive faculties which result in knowledge. Beliefs are warranted if they are formed by a process that generally produces true beliefs rather than false ones. A reliabilist approach tends to focus on the outcome of the process, if it is generally successful (reliable) then it is a good way to acquire to knowledge.
Responsibilism concentrates on intellectual character traits such as attentiveness, fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, intellectual tenacity, and courage. Responsibilists tend to concentrate on the approach taken by the agent to acquire knowledge. If the agent demonstrates laudable epistemic intellectual character traits then the result can be justified as knowledge.
For Sosa, intellectual virtue / virtue epistemology can be used as a way to reconcile or overcome the issues raised by Agrippa's trilemma. For example, virtue epistemology can overcome the objection to a purely coherentist approach where there could be a disconnect between a set of coherent beliefs and the external world.
By moving discussion about justification to a normative debate, virtue epistemologists reject a purely cognitive or positive approach to the problem of knowledge. Intellectual agents and groups of agents become the important source of epistemic value and therefore of knowledge justification, as opposed to reliance on, for example, sense perception or a priori truths.
There are a number of different schools of thought within virtue epistemology, the different approaches placing a greater or lesser emphasis on different cognitive or intellectual traits and epistemic norms.
Reliabilism concentrates on cognitive faculties which result in knowledge. Beliefs are warranted if they are formed by a process that generally produces true beliefs rather than false ones. A reliabilist approach tends to focus on the outcome of the process, if it is generally successful (reliable) then it is a good way to acquire to knowledge.
Responsibilism concentrates on intellectual character traits such as attentiveness, fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, intellectual tenacity, and courage. Responsibilists tend to concentrate on the approach taken by the agent to acquire knowledge. If the agent demonstrates laudable epistemic intellectual character traits then the result can be justified as knowledge.
For Sosa, intellectual virtue / virtue epistemology can be used as a way to reconcile or overcome the issues raised by Agrippa's trilemma. For example, virtue epistemology can overcome the objection to a purely coherentist approach where there could be a disconnect between a set of coherent beliefs and the external world.
Monday, October 8, 2012
what is knowledge?
A few more thoughts on what we are doing when we do philosophy, particularly in the context of trying to describe/understand/define propositional knowledge.
There seem to be two key questions about knowledge:
1. What is knowledge?
2. What can we know (and conversely what can't we know)?
Question 2 gets into the realm of scepticism, which is coming up later in the course so I will hold my fire for now.
On question 1, so far in the discussion we have tried to define which characteristics of knowledge are both necessary and sufficient. We largely agree that for a proposition about the world to be counted as knowledge it has to be true belief. We then added the requirement for justification. We then saw that perhaps we can have justified true belief that does not count as knowledge and considered what else is necessary beyond JTB.
The justification arm of the definition seemed to me to be the most interesting at first. There are lots of theories about what counts as justification, I for one am reluctant to rule any of them out.
Discussions on epistemology are interesting because the very act of trying to define knowledge by necessity involves assessing and deploying the very concepts we are trying to define. We say things such as "knowledge requires justification for it to count as knowledge" but then someone could quite reasonably say "justify why knowledge requires justification". We seem to be trapped in some kind of loop. We are then struck with the is/ought reversal.
There are two main threads which I am beginning to see emerge from the conversations. My initial reaction to the question 'what is knowledge?' was that to be counted as knowledge, a proposition had to describe or somehow match something that is true about the world. This might tend us towards a foundationalist account. If knowledge is "fixed" then the role of the philosopher is not only to be very clear about the definition but to explain how it is fixed.
But we saw that what counts as knowledge changes over time. For me this tends us towards a coherentist account (which allows us to fix the leaks in the ship as we proceed) and also brings in normative considerations. We still need to be very clear about the definition, but we also need to consider what we ought to count as knowledge under different circumstances.
In laying down the rules we need to be logically consistent. An argument is not a proper argument if it's logically flawed. But what are the truths of logic truths of? Why is knowledge only knowledge if it is based on logically sound arguments? Is it just a question of being meaningful and playing by the rules (i.e. our language has to make sense) or is there some kind of transcendental truth which, amongst other things, makes logic logical.
So I have come back full circle and am now back considering what we mean by truth....
There seem to be two key questions about knowledge:
1. What is knowledge?
2. What can we know (and conversely what can't we know)?
Question 2 gets into the realm of scepticism, which is coming up later in the course so I will hold my fire for now.
On question 1, so far in the discussion we have tried to define which characteristics of knowledge are both necessary and sufficient. We largely agree that for a proposition about the world to be counted as knowledge it has to be true belief. We then added the requirement for justification. We then saw that perhaps we can have justified true belief that does not count as knowledge and considered what else is necessary beyond JTB.
The justification arm of the definition seemed to me to be the most interesting at first. There are lots of theories about what counts as justification, I for one am reluctant to rule any of them out.
Discussions on epistemology are interesting because the very act of trying to define knowledge by necessity involves assessing and deploying the very concepts we are trying to define. We say things such as "knowledge requires justification for it to count as knowledge" but then someone could quite reasonably say "justify why knowledge requires justification". We seem to be trapped in some kind of loop. We are then struck with the is/ought reversal.
There are two main threads which I am beginning to see emerge from the conversations. My initial reaction to the question 'what is knowledge?' was that to be counted as knowledge, a proposition had to describe or somehow match something that is true about the world. This might tend us towards a foundationalist account. If knowledge is "fixed" then the role of the philosopher is not only to be very clear about the definition but to explain how it is fixed.
But we saw that what counts as knowledge changes over time. For me this tends us towards a coherentist account (which allows us to fix the leaks in the ship as we proceed) and also brings in normative considerations. We still need to be very clear about the definition, but we also need to consider what we ought to count as knowledge under different circumstances.
In laying down the rules we need to be logically consistent. An argument is not a proper argument if it's logically flawed. But what are the truths of logic truths of? Why is knowledge only knowledge if it is based on logically sound arguments? Is it just a question of being meaningful and playing by the rules (i.e. our language has to make sense) or is there some kind of transcendental truth which, amongst other things, makes logic logical.
So I have come back full circle and am now back considering what we mean by truth....
Friday, October 5, 2012
Moorean shift
I have been struck when looking at some of the reading on knowledge that GE Moore yet again provides a very valuable insight into "common sense" approaches to philosophy. In my previous Introduction to Philosophy course I was taken by the "Moorean shift" response to scepticism, and again Moore expresses some important points on epistemology.
By common sense he doesn't just mean "what is commonly believed", it is a little more sophisticated....
Wikipedia explains the "common sense" response well;
"The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions. When one tries to support one’s assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions. Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not assume those things that are most obvious: the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts.
"Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur. Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or "I am conscious and alive right now". These are all the absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up common sense.
This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism. In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny.
If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted. They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense. They can get around Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no infinite regress or circle of reasoning, because the buck stops with (see also idiom) the principles of common sense."
By common sense he doesn't just mean "what is commonly believed", it is a little more sophisticated....
Wikipedia explains the "common sense" response well;
"The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions. When one tries to support one’s assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions. Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not assume those things that are most obvious: the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts.
"Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur. Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or "I am conscious and alive right now". These are all the absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up common sense.
This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism. In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny.
If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted. They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense. They can get around Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no infinite regress or circle of reasoning, because the buck stops with (see also idiom) the principles of common sense."
the problem of the criterion
I find the problem of the criterion very interesting. My take on the problem is that we have a concept of "knowledge" which most people seem to understand. The question is how do we come to understand what we mean when we use the term "knowledge". Can we understand the meaning without resorting to instances?
When we develop language I think it is fair to say that basic concepts are "taught" by pointing to examples and saying "that is an example of x". The subject then begins to recognise what is common between all of the different instances and thereby how to use the term in meaningful language.
If we accept that there is a definition of knowledge which comprises several other concepts such as belief, truth and justification, then is it the case that our understanding of these concepts must precede our understanding of knowledge?
Could there in fact be a concept of knowledge which exists independently of any cases of knowledge or independently of language?
It does seem odd that we have a gut feeling that the term "knowledge" is something more than just a label.
I realise I am asking a lot more questions than I am answering!
When we develop language I think it is fair to say that basic concepts are "taught" by pointing to examples and saying "that is an example of x". The subject then begins to recognise what is common between all of the different instances and thereby how to use the term in meaningful language.
If we accept that there is a definition of knowledge which comprises several other concepts such as belief, truth and justification, then is it the case that our understanding of these concepts must precede our understanding of knowledge?
Could there in fact be a concept of knowledge which exists independently of any cases of knowledge or independently of language?
It does seem odd that we have a gut feeling that the term "knowledge" is something more than just a label.
I realise I am asking a lot more questions than I am answering!
Monday, September 24, 2012
Is a society based on myhts and conventions inferior to one based on knowledge?
A society based on myths and conventions is not necessarily bad, but human nature being what it is, it is very likely that such a society would lack human dignity and freedom. Those with power will use their power for selfish reasons and then we get into the realm of propaganda, secrecy and oppression.
Borrowing again from Richard Dawkins, the best reason to believe that something is true is evidence and not tradition, authority or revelation. Pre-Enlightenment societies maintained their conventions not on scientific enquiry and openness but on tradition and authority.
There is something valuable in being confident that what you assert is in fact true. This means also that you need to admit that you don't know everything! By placing a value on the truth this emancipates members of society, since anyone with a brain and the power to reason can draw their own conclusions about what to believe and what not to believe based on the evidence.
Furthermore, for markets to work efficiently the market participants need to have knowledge, which in turn necessitates that what they know is true. An economic system based on lies and misconceptions is doomed to failure (there are plenty of examples).
Borrowing again from Richard Dawkins, the best reason to believe that something is true is evidence and not tradition, authority or revelation. Pre-Enlightenment societies maintained their conventions not on scientific enquiry and openness but on tradition and authority.
There is something valuable in being confident that what you assert is in fact true. This means also that you need to admit that you don't know everything! By placing a value on the truth this emancipates members of society, since anyone with a brain and the power to reason can draw their own conclusions about what to believe and what not to believe based on the evidence.
Furthermore, for markets to work efficiently the market participants need to have knowledge, which in turn necessitates that what they know is true. An economic system based on lies and misconceptions is doomed to failure (there are plenty of examples).
Friday, September 21, 2012
The instrumental value of true belief
To what extent is knowledge (true belief) instrumentally valuable? Is it always instrumentally valuable or is this not the case?
Knowledge has instrumental value when it serves a purpose, in philosophical terms this would be expressed in terms of 'teleos'.
I will first look at the question from a practical standpoint and then consider some other arguments for and against the intrinsic value of knowledge.
On a practical level, there may be cases where having knowledge can be counter-productive. Prichard gives the example of someone needing to jump across a ravine to get to safety. If they have the knowledge that they are unlikely to make it then they are less likely to succeed if they hesitate as a result of having this knowledge. However, I think this example is an exception which needs further examination. In almost all cases it would be better to know if you were able to jump the ravine. Furthermore, if the knowledge of your slim chance of success was also accompanied by a knowledge of the psychological effect that this knowledge causes, then it is possible that the person could overcome their nerves. This is to argue that knowledge is not harmful if it is accompanied by sufficient additional knowledge. Furthermore, if they really had complete insight they would never have got themselves into the dangerous situation in the first place!
The phrase 'Ignorance is bliss' expresses the thought that it is sometimes better not to know. If one takes a utilitarian view of life in terms of the Greatest Happiness Principle, then it is apparent that some knowledge is better to be left undiscovered. Both on a personal level and on a societal level we can all think of examples of knowledge which detracts from the sum of total happiness. It might be thought that mankind would be better off in the long run if it never acquired the ability to destroy the world - for example the knowledge required to manufacture nuclear warheads and to convert fossil fuels into energy on a massive scale.
I also think that it can be argued on a deeper level that not all knowledge is intrinsically valuable. Learning for learning's sake expresses the view that there is some value in acquiring knowledge for its own sake. It could however be the process of acquiring knowledge that is useful and not the knowledge itself.
It seems to be human nature to want to acquire knowledge, whether this is driven by 'nature' or 'nurture' it seems to be part of the human condition that we value knowledge over ignorance. There are however cases where knowledge is not valued. It could be argued that many religious beliefs are very highly valued but are the antithesis of knowledge, since they cannot on the whole be classified as justified true beliefs.
In order to adequately answer the question of whether all knowledge has instrumental value I believe it is first necessary to agree what is the purpose of life. This is of course an almost impossible question. My own view is that life does not have a purpose, over and above any purpose we ascribe to it. Richard Dawkins expresses this view very elegantly. He asks why we suppose that life should have a purpose any more than why a mountain or the colour blue has purpose.
Knowledge has instrumental value when it serves a purpose, in philosophical terms this would be expressed in terms of 'teleos'.
I will first look at the question from a practical standpoint and then consider some other arguments for and against the intrinsic value of knowledge.
On a practical level, there may be cases where having knowledge can be counter-productive. Prichard gives the example of someone needing to jump across a ravine to get to safety. If they have the knowledge that they are unlikely to make it then they are less likely to succeed if they hesitate as a result of having this knowledge. However, I think this example is an exception which needs further examination. In almost all cases it would be better to know if you were able to jump the ravine. Furthermore, if the knowledge of your slim chance of success was also accompanied by a knowledge of the psychological effect that this knowledge causes, then it is possible that the person could overcome their nerves. This is to argue that knowledge is not harmful if it is accompanied by sufficient additional knowledge. Furthermore, if they really had complete insight they would never have got themselves into the dangerous situation in the first place!
The phrase 'Ignorance is bliss' expresses the thought that it is sometimes better not to know. If one takes a utilitarian view of life in terms of the Greatest Happiness Principle, then it is apparent that some knowledge is better to be left undiscovered. Both on a personal level and on a societal level we can all think of examples of knowledge which detracts from the sum of total happiness. It might be thought that mankind would be better off in the long run if it never acquired the ability to destroy the world - for example the knowledge required to manufacture nuclear warheads and to convert fossil fuels into energy on a massive scale.
I also think that it can be argued on a deeper level that not all knowledge is intrinsically valuable. Learning for learning's sake expresses the view that there is some value in acquiring knowledge for its own sake. It could however be the process of acquiring knowledge that is useful and not the knowledge itself.
It seems to be human nature to want to acquire knowledge, whether this is driven by 'nature' or 'nurture' it seems to be part of the human condition that we value knowledge over ignorance. There are however cases where knowledge is not valued. It could be argued that many religious beliefs are very highly valued but are the antithesis of knowledge, since they cannot on the whole be classified as justified true beliefs.
In order to adequately answer the question of whether all knowledge has instrumental value I believe it is first necessary to agree what is the purpose of life. This is of course an almost impossible question. My own view is that life does not have a purpose, over and above any purpose we ascribe to it. Richard Dawkins expresses this view very elegantly. He asks why we suppose that life should have a purpose any more than why a mountain or the colour blue has purpose.
Sunday, June 17, 2012
Realism
Is the statement that "we cannot abstract out our own perspective from our view of the external world" a fatal blow to realism?
Even if the statement were true, it would not speak "conclusively" to truth or falsity of an external world. The statement is not a metaphysical statement but an epistemological statement. It says "we cannot know if an external world exists", rather than "an external world does not exist". I do not believe it is possible to reach such a fundamental metaphysical conclusion based on this epistemological proposition.
I also believe that the statement is incorrect. I believe it is possible, in one very important sense, to abstract our own perspective from our view of the external world.
What we think we know about the world is not just taken from our own experience or perspective. Our knowledge of the world is built from the shared experiences of millions of people, written down and recorded over history. The process of scientific discovery is by its very nature the process of abstracting our own perspective from our view of the external world.
We don't just passively experience things in real-time through our five senses and then later recall these experiences via our memory. We are also blessed with the power of reason. I think that by our powers of reason we provide structure to the external world and that the only coherent explanation of why and how this works is that the external world must have structure and exist independently of us.
I think a realist approach is the only credible and coherent approach to take - I look upon rejections of realism as somewhat "trivial" attempts to twist logic and reason into reaching an absurd conclusion.
It is my view that the burden of proof lies with those that reject realism - is there any good reason to think that the external world does not exist? The subjectivity of secondary qualities is easily explained, and rather than casting doubt on the existence of things in themselves, it lends support to the common-sense realist approach that the external world does exist.
Even if the statement were true, it would not speak "conclusively" to truth or falsity of an external world. The statement is not a metaphysical statement but an epistemological statement. It says "we cannot know if an external world exists", rather than "an external world does not exist". I do not believe it is possible to reach such a fundamental metaphysical conclusion based on this epistemological proposition.
I also believe that the statement is incorrect. I believe it is possible, in one very important sense, to abstract our own perspective from our view of the external world.
What we think we know about the world is not just taken from our own experience or perspective. Our knowledge of the world is built from the shared experiences of millions of people, written down and recorded over history. The process of scientific discovery is by its very nature the process of abstracting our own perspective from our view of the external world.
We don't just passively experience things in real-time through our five senses and then later recall these experiences via our memory. We are also blessed with the power of reason. I think that by our powers of reason we provide structure to the external world and that the only coherent explanation of why and how this works is that the external world must have structure and exist independently of us.
I think a realist approach is the only credible and coherent approach to take - I look upon rejections of realism as somewhat "trivial" attempts to twist logic and reason into reaching an absurd conclusion.
It is my view that the burden of proof lies with those that reject realism - is there any good reason to think that the external world does not exist? The subjectivity of secondary qualities is easily explained, and rather than casting doubt on the existence of things in themselves, it lends support to the common-sense realist approach that the external world does exist.
Locke and Berkeley
Does Locke or Berkeley give a better account of the primary/secondary property distinction?
I think neither Locke nor Berkeley give a wholly satisfactory explanation of primary and secondary qualities but tend towards Locke having a slightly more coherent view.
In favour of Locke, I can understand the distinction he draws between those qualities which are less prone to subjective "distortion". Physical extension, number, motion and even place in time seem to be "qualities" which are of a somewhat different nature from taste, smell, colour etc. Secondary qualities tend to be highly subjective and depend very much on the "point of view" of the subject.
I reject however, Locke's belief that secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves". There is something (a physical quality) in objects over and above a "power" to produce certain sensations in sentient beings. I believe that our sensations are in fact caused by physical properties of objects and we directly perceive that quality, but the precise nature of our perception depends on the circumstances under which we perceive it.
Locke thinks that a sharp pin having the power to cause the idea of pain is analogous to a tomato having the power to cause the idea of red. I don't think these two example are really comparable in the way Locke does. Pain is not a quality of a pin - sharpness is the quality of the pin which compares to the redness of a tomato.
Berkeley does not make a convincing case for either his epistemological or metaphysical claims. I flatly reject his claim that we cannot abstract qualities. I also reject his proposition that all ideas are entirely dependent on minds. He thinks that ideas are caused by God whereas are more coherent view is that ideas are caused by the external world. Berkeley has no clear conception of what God is, and whether there is only one God or many. Since we cannot have an idea of what God is other than the cause of all ideas I think it makes more sense to replace God with an external world. I accept that in a very strict sense this is an assumption, but feel that the burden of proof lies with those that claim the external world does not exist.
I think neither Locke nor Berkeley give a wholly satisfactory explanation of primary and secondary qualities but tend towards Locke having a slightly more coherent view.
In favour of Locke, I can understand the distinction he draws between those qualities which are less prone to subjective "distortion". Physical extension, number, motion and even place in time seem to be "qualities" which are of a somewhat different nature from taste, smell, colour etc. Secondary qualities tend to be highly subjective and depend very much on the "point of view" of the subject.
I reject however, Locke's belief that secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves". There is something (a physical quality) in objects over and above a "power" to produce certain sensations in sentient beings. I believe that our sensations are in fact caused by physical properties of objects and we directly perceive that quality, but the precise nature of our perception depends on the circumstances under which we perceive it.
Locke thinks that a sharp pin having the power to cause the idea of pain is analogous to a tomato having the power to cause the idea of red. I don't think these two example are really comparable in the way Locke does. Pain is not a quality of a pin - sharpness is the quality of the pin which compares to the redness of a tomato.
Berkeley does not make a convincing case for either his epistemological or metaphysical claims. I flatly reject his claim that we cannot abstract qualities. I also reject his proposition that all ideas are entirely dependent on minds. He thinks that ideas are caused by God whereas are more coherent view is that ideas are caused by the external world. Berkeley has no clear conception of what God is, and whether there is only one God or many. Since we cannot have an idea of what God is other than the cause of all ideas I think it makes more sense to replace God with an external world. I accept that in a very strict sense this is an assumption, but feel that the burden of proof lies with those that claim the external world does not exist.
Friday, May 25, 2012
Philosophy of language
I am struggling to understand what Schopenhauer could mean by his definition of free will. Unfortunately, he doesn't give examples or put the way he uses the term in context, so I suspect Wittgenstein would have some difficulty accepting that it is truly meaningful.
I have recently been watching the excellent videos on the philosophy faculty website:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/general_philosophy
In part 5 Peter Millican touches on free will a few times, in particular in relation to the mind / body dualism debate. He makes a very interesting analogy. If we try and think about ourselves in terms of a computer, we have hardware (which explains our physical actions in terms of cause and effect) which extends to the physical and chemical constituents of our brains. We also we have software, which is analogous to our minds.
We cannot fully explain our minds by just talking about physical properties or causation. Using this analogy I would maintain that our minds are programmed in such a way that we are free to make moral choices and decisions. I can't explain why this is the case, but I certainly do believe that it is the case.
I think looking at the way we use the words "free will" helps, but Schopenhauer seems to be looking for a metaphysical explanation of what free will is, whereas explaining the terms by how they are used seems to be edging towards an epistemological explanation.
Is it possible to answer metaphysical questions by looking at the philosophy of language?
I have recently been watching the excellent videos on the philosophy faculty website:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/general_philosophy
In part 5 Peter Millican touches on free will a few times, in particular in relation to the mind / body dualism debate. He makes a very interesting analogy. If we try and think about ourselves in terms of a computer, we have hardware (which explains our physical actions in terms of cause and effect) which extends to the physical and chemical constituents of our brains. We also we have software, which is analogous to our minds.
We cannot fully explain our minds by just talking about physical properties or causation. Using this analogy I would maintain that our minds are programmed in such a way that we are free to make moral choices and decisions. I can't explain why this is the case, but I certainly do believe that it is the case.
I think looking at the way we use the words "free will" helps, but Schopenhauer seems to be looking for a metaphysical explanation of what free will is, whereas explaining the terms by how they are used seems to be edging towards an epistemological explanation.
Is it possible to answer metaphysical questions by looking at the philosophy of language?
Saturday, May 12, 2012
Mathematical Truth
"The objection I see to Coherentism is that there appear to be some things that won’t change.....2 + 2 will always be 4 regardless of whether we are counting real objects or just imagining them".
This is a really interesting avenue. The "truth" of mathematics is something which I have been pondering. Is pure mathematics something that we discover or is it something that humans invent? If the former, then I can see how mathematics can be taken as a (natural) foundational type belief, if the latter then either coherentist or perhaps rational foundationalist.
If you were to ask most secondary school children who have studied mathematics at a basic level "Is it true or false that the sum of the angles in a triangle always add up to 180 degrees?" I suspect (hope?) most would say it was true. For them, this knowledge would be similar to 2+2=4 in terms of never changing, in a sense it would be a foundational belief.
However, when you draw a triangle on a curved surface, the sum of the angles do not add up to 180 degrees. Imagine drawing a triangle on the surface of a globe, with one corner at the north pole, and the other two corners on the equator. In this case the sum of the angles is not 180°. It turns out that the sum of the angles of any triangle is less than 180° if the geometry is hyperbolic, equal to 180° if the geometry is Euclidean, and greater than 180° if the geometry is elliptic.
In this sense is is it not therefore conceivable that mathematical knowledge is not always unchanging?
I'm currently reading a biography of Paul Dirac by Graham Farmelo called 'The Strangest Man'. Dirac was a British theoretical physicist who some regard as the successor to Einstein. Dirac was a genius. He was also probably autistic, according to Farmelo, and was not apt to pontificate on philosophical questions, or at least not until the end of his life. I get the impression from the book that, from a relatively young age Dirac held the view that any satisfactory explanation of the way the world is, in mathematical terms, needs to be elegant or beautiful because that is the way the world is. He would reject mathematical theories that he did not regard as beautiful largely on the grounds of their lack of aesthetic appeal.
Dirac therefore seems to have held a foundational type belief that the laws that govern the world are not random or inconsistent or inexplicable or ugly. He also believed that it was inconceivable that mankind would not continue to progress.
For all of these foundational type beliefs I remain largely skeptical because I want to ask the question "how do you know that it's true?"
This is a really interesting avenue. The "truth" of mathematics is something which I have been pondering. Is pure mathematics something that we discover or is it something that humans invent? If the former, then I can see how mathematics can be taken as a (natural) foundational type belief, if the latter then either coherentist or perhaps rational foundationalist.
If you were to ask most secondary school children who have studied mathematics at a basic level "Is it true or false that the sum of the angles in a triangle always add up to 180 degrees?" I suspect (hope?) most would say it was true. For them, this knowledge would be similar to 2+2=4 in terms of never changing, in a sense it would be a foundational belief.
However, when you draw a triangle on a curved surface, the sum of the angles do not add up to 180 degrees. Imagine drawing a triangle on the surface of a globe, with one corner at the north pole, and the other two corners on the equator. In this case the sum of the angles is not 180°. It turns out that the sum of the angles of any triangle is less than 180° if the geometry is hyperbolic, equal to 180° if the geometry is Euclidean, and greater than 180° if the geometry is elliptic.
In this sense is is it not therefore conceivable that mathematical knowledge is not always unchanging?
I'm currently reading a biography of Paul Dirac by Graham Farmelo called 'The Strangest Man'. Dirac was a British theoretical physicist who some regard as the successor to Einstein. Dirac was a genius. He was also probably autistic, according to Farmelo, and was not apt to pontificate on philosophical questions, or at least not until the end of his life. I get the impression from the book that, from a relatively young age Dirac held the view that any satisfactory explanation of the way the world is, in mathematical terms, needs to be elegant or beautiful because that is the way the world is. He would reject mathematical theories that he did not regard as beautiful largely on the grounds of their lack of aesthetic appeal.
Dirac therefore seems to have held a foundational type belief that the laws that govern the world are not random or inconsistent or inexplicable or ugly. He also believed that it was inconceivable that mankind would not continue to progress.
For all of these foundational type beliefs I remain largely skeptical because I want to ask the question "how do you know that it's true?"
Coherentism v Foundationalism contd.
My latest post follows from the following reply I received following yesterday's discussion:
"On the other hand, I suspect that so-called strong atheism can be a foundationalist belief since if I am not mistaken a strong atheist (in contrast to a weak atheist) would claim that he knows with complete certainty that God or some god does not exist."
This is a fair point. If an atheist were to say that they "know for sure" that God doesn't exist, it does seem to have a foundationalist flavour.
Are you saying that people who tend towards coherentism cannot be "strong atheists"? I think I would be happy with that position. I think the argument also works the other way round as well. People who who are fundamental in positive religious belief would probably by necessity be foundationalist in their knowledge about God.
I would accept that it is technically impossible to prove a negative and, in that sense, I wouldn't regard my atheism as "fundamentalist". I do think it is "true" that God doesn't exist, but I would accept that it is not technically possible to prove. I think my disbelief in God or Gods is not based on any foundational beliefs, i.e. ones that we obtain non-inferentially.
A possible philosophical argument would run as follows:
If my approach to knowledge is based on coherentism not foundationalism, then should someone come up with an explanation for God(s) that made sense and was coherent and supported by some evidence then I would happily change my position. Until they do, I will continue to believe that the statement that "God doesn't exist" is true.
Perhaps it would be useful to read some Kant at this stage because I have a nagging suspicion that, whilst I have just admitted the possibility of my belief changing, it is not that simple....
For me to believe in the existence of God I would need to do some major rebuilding of my core beliefs about the world. This is perhaps why I come across as being "fundamentalist". I am almost entirely convinced that God doesn't exist, so changing my mind on this fact would require quite a seismic shift in the way I look at the world. It may in fact be the case that the glue of coherence that binds my beliefs together is so strong that it couldn't conceivably be broken.
No doubt the religious amongst us will object to being labelled as (by definition) either "fundamentalist" or "incoherent". That is not what I am saying. I think it is quite possible for people to base their belief in God on a coherentist approach. They could infer the existence of God based on what they perceive to be the evidence, in a way that was coherent to them.
"On the other hand, I suspect that so-called strong atheism can be a foundationalist belief since if I am not mistaken a strong atheist (in contrast to a weak atheist) would claim that he knows with complete certainty that God or some god does not exist."
This is a fair point. If an atheist were to say that they "know for sure" that God doesn't exist, it does seem to have a foundationalist flavour.
Are you saying that people who tend towards coherentism cannot be "strong atheists"? I think I would be happy with that position. I think the argument also works the other way round as well. People who who are fundamental in positive religious belief would probably by necessity be foundationalist in their knowledge about God.
I would accept that it is technically impossible to prove a negative and, in that sense, I wouldn't regard my atheism as "fundamentalist". I do think it is "true" that God doesn't exist, but I would accept that it is not technically possible to prove. I think my disbelief in God or Gods is not based on any foundational beliefs, i.e. ones that we obtain non-inferentially.
A possible philosophical argument would run as follows:
If my approach to knowledge is based on coherentism not foundationalism, then should someone come up with an explanation for God(s) that made sense and was coherent and supported by some evidence then I would happily change my position. Until they do, I will continue to believe that the statement that "God doesn't exist" is true.
Perhaps it would be useful to read some Kant at this stage because I have a nagging suspicion that, whilst I have just admitted the possibility of my belief changing, it is not that simple....
For me to believe in the existence of God I would need to do some major rebuilding of my core beliefs about the world. This is perhaps why I come across as being "fundamentalist". I am almost entirely convinced that God doesn't exist, so changing my mind on this fact would require quite a seismic shift in the way I look at the world. It may in fact be the case that the glue of coherence that binds my beliefs together is so strong that it couldn't conceivably be broken.
No doubt the religious amongst us will object to being labelled as (by definition) either "fundamentalist" or "incoherent". That is not what I am saying. I think it is quite possible for people to base their belief in God on a coherentist approach. They could infer the existence of God based on what they perceive to be the evidence, in a way that was coherent to them.
Friday, May 11, 2012
Descartes' epistemology
I would like to comment on the question of whether I would reject Descartes' epistemology based on the failure of his individual arguments or on the overall approach he takes to epistemology.
Having looked a bit further into the foundationalism vs. coherentism debate, I am most convinced by the rejection of foundationalism which argues that the acquisition of knowledge isn't a linear process. Under this approach, knowledge is not obtained by a chain of inferential reasoning which needs a non-inferential starting point. This linear process seems to be very much the approach that Descartes takes, he wants to follow the chain back to beliefs that are indubitable by virtue of being so clear and distinct.
The alternative view which most strikes a chord with me is the the "holistic" view of knowledge. Neurath's boat metaphor expresses this beautifully - by which our beliefs are analogous to a ship which requires continuous replacement of any worn or broken parts to remain seaworthy.
Presumably philosophers have much bigger and better maintained ships than non-philosophers!
Despite being a fan of Russell, I am not convinced by the acquaintance argument for non-inferential belief. I would reject it on two grounds. Firstly, I don't believe that this gives us enough of a basis for developing the infinite number of justified beliefs that we hold. Secondly, I'm not sure it even makes sense to refer to the kind of knowledge that we get by acquaintance as true in a philosophical sense.
Having looked a bit further into the foundationalism vs. coherentism debate, I am most convinced by the rejection of foundationalism which argues that the acquisition of knowledge isn't a linear process. Under this approach, knowledge is not obtained by a chain of inferential reasoning which needs a non-inferential starting point. This linear process seems to be very much the approach that Descartes takes, he wants to follow the chain back to beliefs that are indubitable by virtue of being so clear and distinct.
The alternative view which most strikes a chord with me is the the "holistic" view of knowledge. Neurath's boat metaphor expresses this beautifully - by which our beliefs are analogous to a ship which requires continuous replacement of any worn or broken parts to remain seaworthy.
Presumably philosophers have much bigger and better maintained ships than non-philosophers!
Despite being a fan of Russell, I am not convinced by the acquaintance argument for non-inferential belief. I would reject it on two grounds. Firstly, I don't believe that this gives us enough of a basis for developing the infinite number of justified beliefs that we hold. Secondly, I'm not sure it even makes sense to refer to the kind of knowledge that we get by acquaintance as true in a philosophical sense.
Foundationalism v Coherentism
On the whole I am tending more and more towards coherentism and to challenge this position I have been trying to think of any truths that I would regard as foundational.
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy defines foundationalism as "The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief."
One argument for foundationalism is given as the infinite regress of non-inferential belief:
"If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other proposition justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3 which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so if all justification were inferential no-one would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be non-inferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification."
I don't accept this argument. I believe that our way of understanding the world is built up from inference. As we mature, we begin to understand a logical and consistent framework in which we can assess evidence and reason through a test of coherence. We begin to understand language in terms of what we mean by true or probable or tautologous and this is done using coherentism as the key measure, not any foundational beliefs.
I would also support the argument against foundationalism that states that once we get past “self-referential” propositions, propositions whose very subject matter encompasses the fact that they are believed, it is hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of infallible beliefs.
I'm still looking for a convincing argument for foundationalism and would welcome any suggestions.
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy defines foundationalism as "The foundationalist's thesis in short is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief."
One argument for foundationalism is given as the infinite regress of non-inferential belief:
"If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other proposition justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3 which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so if all justification were inferential no-one would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be non-inferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification."
I don't accept this argument. I believe that our way of understanding the world is built up from inference. As we mature, we begin to understand a logical and consistent framework in which we can assess evidence and reason through a test of coherence. We begin to understand language in terms of what we mean by true or probable or tautologous and this is done using coherentism as the key measure, not any foundational beliefs.
I would also support the argument against foundationalism that states that once we get past “self-referential” propositions, propositions whose very subject matter encompasses the fact that they are believed, it is hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of infallible beliefs.
I'm still looking for a convincing argument for foundationalism and would welcome any suggestions.
Monday, May 7, 2012
Descartes - stages of doubt
Week two's topic is knowledge (continues for week three also) and we start by reading chapter 1 of Blackburn and then Chapters 1 and 2 of Guttenplan et al. The first set task was not particularly enlightening so our tutor has set some alternative questions. My initial thoughts are as follows:
(i) Examine the various stages of doubt in Descartes' full argument. Say whether you think each stage or kind of doubt is a reasonable one.
(ii) if you think it is reasonable, support your position with examples and an argument.
(ii) if you think it is unreasonable, support your position with counter-examples and an argument.
Firstly, Descartes states that as a child he believed things which have subsequently been shown to be untrue - this establishes the possibility that so-called knowledge may be based on unsound foundations.
Descartes then explains that it is not possible to doubt everything, but this is not necessary, he only needs to establish that some things cannot be known for certain to call into question some fundamental beliefs. Unless something is "completely certain and indubitable" it can be doubted.
Next, Descartes explores what, if anything, we can know that cannot be doubted. He does this by introducing a number of possible reasons why we might think that some beliefs are not completely certain and indubitable. The steps are:
1. We are sometimes deceived by our senses therefore we cannot be sure that we are not being deceived at any particular time.
I think this is a flawed argument. Whilst it is true that at any one time we may be deceived by our senses, i.e. under an illusion or misapprehension, in the vast majority of these cases we subsequently understand what leads to the illusion or misapprehension. So for me, this argument fails on a metaphysical level. If I sense something that is 'impossible', i.e. does not accord with my understanding of the world, then I don't really believe it is true, i.e. I am not 'taken in' and I believe that there must be a rational explanation. Admittedly there are some things which we cannot explain, but this is not the same as accepting that we are actually deceived by our senses and believe things that are 'impossible'.
2. Mad people believe things that are not true
Descartes rejects this argument himself as he is confident that he isn't mad.
3. Dreaming can lead to deceptive experiences and we cannot be sure if we are awake or dreaming at any particular time.
I reject this as a reason for doubting all knowledge since my experience of dreaming is very different from my experience of being awake. When I wake up I can tell the difference.
Nevertheless, the dreaming argument does have a lot of philosophical merit and very neatly challenges our notion of existence. I accept that in the strictest sense we cannot prove that we aren't dreaming at any particular time or even that the whole of life isn't a dream and in this respect the argument is an important step in any serious attempt to enquire into what we know about existence.
My initial reaction however is to say that we have no indication that it is true that everything is just a kind of dream. It seems to be such a remote possibility that it isn't very helpful in understanding the way the world is. Unless Descartes can provide some support for why we should believe that everything is a dream, in the form of a coherent argument that makes sense, then the natural reaction to this argument is to reject it.
4. We cannot rely on God's omnipotence and goodness to ensure that we are not deceived as it is apparent that we are sometimes deceived.
I agree with this. If there is a God then it seems clear that he hasn't arranged things so that we are never deceived or under misapprehensions, at least in the sense that Descartes is using "deceived".
From a personal perspective I don't have the remotest concept of what 'God' could be, so to base any argument on what 'God' does or doesn't do is literally nonsensical.
5. We cannot be sure that a malicious demon is not deceiving us while we are awake.
As with the dreaming argument, I think we can see that logically this has something going for it, but on a personal level I don't believe in malicious demons so I would reject it as being impossible. For me to accept this argument it seems to me that I would need to admit the existence of malicious demons first.
Give your over-all opinion on Descartes' requirement for certainty in order for us to claim that we are justified in believing something about the world.
Do you think he is being reasonable?
Finally, what do you think of the cogito argument?
Whilst I don't think Descartes' arguments in favour of doubting everything are bullet-proof, I do very much admire the philosophical method which he sets out. Descartes' insistence that truth must be certain and indubitable is a valuable yard-stick and his clarity of thought and willingness to 'start from the beginning' is admirable.
I have found this exercise very challenging. Descartes arguments are difficult to reject outright. Although on the whole I tend to reject his conclusions, the method by which he constructs his arguments is clever and not entirely unconvincing.
The cogito marks a major stepping-stone in philosophy. Like many others, I tend to think that Descartes stretches the argument too far. Whilst I accept that "there is thinking going on" is true, the question remains what does Descartes mean by "I".
(i) Examine the various stages of doubt in Descartes' full argument. Say whether you think each stage or kind of doubt is a reasonable one.
(ii) if you think it is reasonable, support your position with examples and an argument.
(ii) if you think it is unreasonable, support your position with counter-examples and an argument.
Firstly, Descartes states that as a child he believed things which have subsequently been shown to be untrue - this establishes the possibility that so-called knowledge may be based on unsound foundations.
Descartes then explains that it is not possible to doubt everything, but this is not necessary, he only needs to establish that some things cannot be known for certain to call into question some fundamental beliefs. Unless something is "completely certain and indubitable" it can be doubted.
Next, Descartes explores what, if anything, we can know that cannot be doubted. He does this by introducing a number of possible reasons why we might think that some beliefs are not completely certain and indubitable. The steps are:
1. We are sometimes deceived by our senses therefore we cannot be sure that we are not being deceived at any particular time.
I think this is a flawed argument. Whilst it is true that at any one time we may be deceived by our senses, i.e. under an illusion or misapprehension, in the vast majority of these cases we subsequently understand what leads to the illusion or misapprehension. So for me, this argument fails on a metaphysical level. If I sense something that is 'impossible', i.e. does not accord with my understanding of the world, then I don't really believe it is true, i.e. I am not 'taken in' and I believe that there must be a rational explanation. Admittedly there are some things which we cannot explain, but this is not the same as accepting that we are actually deceived by our senses and believe things that are 'impossible'.
2. Mad people believe things that are not true
Descartes rejects this argument himself as he is confident that he isn't mad.
3. Dreaming can lead to deceptive experiences and we cannot be sure if we are awake or dreaming at any particular time.
I reject this as a reason for doubting all knowledge since my experience of dreaming is very different from my experience of being awake. When I wake up I can tell the difference.
Nevertheless, the dreaming argument does have a lot of philosophical merit and very neatly challenges our notion of existence. I accept that in the strictest sense we cannot prove that we aren't dreaming at any particular time or even that the whole of life isn't a dream and in this respect the argument is an important step in any serious attempt to enquire into what we know about existence.
My initial reaction however is to say that we have no indication that it is true that everything is just a kind of dream. It seems to be such a remote possibility that it isn't very helpful in understanding the way the world is. Unless Descartes can provide some support for why we should believe that everything is a dream, in the form of a coherent argument that makes sense, then the natural reaction to this argument is to reject it.
4. We cannot rely on God's omnipotence and goodness to ensure that we are not deceived as it is apparent that we are sometimes deceived.
I agree with this. If there is a God then it seems clear that he hasn't arranged things so that we are never deceived or under misapprehensions, at least in the sense that Descartes is using "deceived".
From a personal perspective I don't have the remotest concept of what 'God' could be, so to base any argument on what 'God' does or doesn't do is literally nonsensical.
5. We cannot be sure that a malicious demon is not deceiving us while we are awake.
As with the dreaming argument, I think we can see that logically this has something going for it, but on a personal level I don't believe in malicious demons so I would reject it as being impossible. For me to accept this argument it seems to me that I would need to admit the existence of malicious demons first.
Give your over-all opinion on Descartes' requirement for certainty in order for us to claim that we are justified in believing something about the world.
Do you think he is being reasonable?
Finally, what do you think of the cogito argument?
Whilst I don't think Descartes' arguments in favour of doubting everything are bullet-proof, I do very much admire the philosophical method which he sets out. Descartes' insistence that truth must be certain and indubitable is a valuable yard-stick and his clarity of thought and willingness to 'start from the beginning' is admirable.
I have found this exercise very challenging. Descartes arguments are difficult to reject outright. Although on the whole I tend to reject his conclusions, the method by which he constructs his arguments is clever and not entirely unconvincing.
The cogito marks a major stepping-stone in philosophy. Like many others, I tend to think that Descartes stretches the argument too far. Whilst I accept that "there is thinking going on" is true, the question remains what does Descartes mean by "I".
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
epistemology and æsthetics
Before proceeding with further considerations on the meaning of 'philosophy', I need to define epistemology, which is a term that appears frequently in philosophical writing.
Given that Wikipedia is down today, in protest at the United States' 'Stop Online Piracy' and 'Protect Intellectual Property' Bills, I turn to the Stamford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry."
Andrew Seth argues in Britannica that there is frequently confusion between psychology and the theory of knowledge. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is credited with first clearly making the distinction between the two, repeatedly insisting that his Critique of Pure Reason was not to be taken as a psychological enquiry. He defined his problem as the quid juris or the question of the validity of knowledge, not its quid facti, or the laws of the empirical genesis and evolution of intellection.
Britannica has a wonderful paragraph which brings this all together as follows:
"Appearing thus, first, as the problem of perception (in Locke and his English successors), widening its scope and becoming, in Kant's hands, the question of the possibility of experience in general, epistemology may be said to have passed with Hegel into a completely articulated "logic," that claimed to be at the same time a metaphysic, or an ultimate expression of the nature of the real. This introduces us to the second part of the question we are seeking to determine, namely, the relation of epistemology to metaphysics".
"These are ultimately two sides of the same enquiry. But it is not every thinker that can see his way with Hegel to assert in set terms the identity of thought and being. Hence the theory of knowledge becomes with some a theory of human ignorance."
I think this brings us neatly back to Wittgenstein.
Now I move on to æsthetics, which, according to Britannica may be treated as a department of psychology or physiology, which is the most frequent mode of treatment in England.
To what peculiar excitation of our bodily or mental organism, it is asked, are the emotions due which make us declare an object beautiful or sublime?
From Britannica:
The remaining sections of the Britannica article which I have not commented on relate to ethics, or moral philosophy as it tends to be referred to in modern times. There is clearly a huge amount of thinking to be done on moral questions such as what is good, the principle of duty, the issue of free will and ultimately the laws of morality. I am very much looking forward to exploring these questions.
You may want to check out the excellent video series 'Justice' recorded at Harvard University with Michael Sandel for an introduction to some of the questions addressed by moral philosophy.
Given that Wikipedia is down today, in protest at the United States' 'Stop Online Piracy' and 'Protect Intellectual Property' Bills, I turn to the Stamford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry."
Andrew Seth argues in Britannica that there is frequently confusion between psychology and the theory of knowledge. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is credited with first clearly making the distinction between the two, repeatedly insisting that his Critique of Pure Reason was not to be taken as a psychological enquiry. He defined his problem as the quid juris or the question of the validity of knowledge, not its quid facti, or the laws of the empirical genesis and evolution of intellection.
Britannica has a wonderful paragraph which brings this all together as follows:
"Appearing thus, first, as the problem of perception (in Locke and his English successors), widening its scope and becoming, in Kant's hands, the question of the possibility of experience in general, epistemology may be said to have passed with Hegel into a completely articulated "logic," that claimed to be at the same time a metaphysic, or an ultimate expression of the nature of the real. This introduces us to the second part of the question we are seeking to determine, namely, the relation of epistemology to metaphysics".
"These are ultimately two sides of the same enquiry. But it is not every thinker that can see his way with Hegel to assert in set terms the identity of thought and being. Hence the theory of knowledge becomes with some a theory of human ignorance."
I think this brings us neatly back to Wittgenstein.
Now I move on to æsthetics, which, according to Britannica may be treated as a department of psychology or physiology, which is the most frequent mode of treatment in England.
To what peculiar excitation of our bodily or mental organism, it is asked, are the emotions due which make us declare an object beautiful or sublime?
From Britannica:
- A mere reference of these emotions to the mechanism and interactive play of our faculties cannot be regarded as an account of the nature of the beautiful
- In the case of a beautiful object, the resultant pleasure borrows its specific quality from the presence of determinations essentially intellectual in their nature, though not reducible to the categories of science
- We have a prima facie right, therefore, to treat beauty as an objective determination of things
- The question of æsthetics would then be formulated - What is it in things that make them beautiful, and what is the relation of this aspect of the universe to its ultimate nature, as that is expounded in metaphysics
The remaining sections of the Britannica article which I have not commented on relate to ethics, or moral philosophy as it tends to be referred to in modern times. There is clearly a huge amount of thinking to be done on moral questions such as what is good, the principle of duty, the issue of free will and ultimately the laws of morality. I am very much looking forward to exploring these questions.
You may want to check out the excellent video series 'Justice' recorded at Harvard University with Michael Sandel for an introduction to some of the questions addressed by moral philosophy.
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