Epiphenomenalism is the view that some ideas are epiphenomenal - that some ideas come about in the brain but have no effect on the physical world. This is closely related to the debate between materialists and idealists.
According to Stanford, "The central motivation for epiphenomenalism lies in the premise that anything that can causally contribute to a physical event must itself be a physical event. If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/
The original argument that Jackson devised in Mary's room (explained in the Philosophy Bites podcast 'What Mary Knew') to show that materialism is inadequate to explain the way the world is concerned Mary, who even though she knew everything about the colour red in physical terms without actually having perceived it, would in effect not know what seeing red was actually like.
So the perception of red, or at least the qualia red, is a mental activity which is unrelated to physics in a sense.
So the red rose isn't really red at all (under a physicalist view), it is only when we perceive it that we get the qualia red in our mind (the idea). To tie this into Locke, under an epiphenomenalist view the rose doesn't cause the perception of red as Locke argued.
Showing posts with label Locke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Locke. Show all posts
Friday, February 8, 2013
Saturday, October 27, 2012
Primary and secondary qualities
The distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects was an important theme within British empiricist philosophy, the three key proponents being John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume.
Locke sets out the distinction in his 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding'. The distinction applies to the "simple" ideas we receive from sensation.
Primary qualities are properties objects have that are independent of any observer and include such properties as solidity, extension, motion, number and figure. They exist in the thing itself, can be determined with certainty, and do not rely on subjectivity. Secondary qualities are properties that produce sensations in the observer, such as colour, taste, smell, and sound. They are effects things have on people. Knowledge that comes from secondary qualities does not provide objective facts about things.
Locke argues that secondary qualities are somehow caused by the arrangements of matter, matter has the power to cause the ideas of secondary qualities. He believes that there is scientific support for his theory based on Boyle's new 'corpuscular hypothesis'.
Locke supports his theory by the use of examples. I will quote directly from Chapter VIII of Book II:
"Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.
...Secondary qualities of bodies. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. These I call secondary qualities. To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers; though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency, in wax or clay,- by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before,- by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts."
Locke's theory of perception is a 'mediated theory of perception'. Accordingly, we do not have direct access to the world around us, but rather this access is mediated through our ideas.
Locke sets out the distinction in his 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding'. The distinction applies to the "simple" ideas we receive from sensation.
Primary qualities are properties objects have that are independent of any observer and include such properties as solidity, extension, motion, number and figure. They exist in the thing itself, can be determined with certainty, and do not rely on subjectivity. Secondary qualities are properties that produce sensations in the observer, such as colour, taste, smell, and sound. They are effects things have on people. Knowledge that comes from secondary qualities does not provide objective facts about things.
Locke argues that secondary qualities are somehow caused by the arrangements of matter, matter has the power to cause the ideas of secondary qualities. He believes that there is scientific support for his theory based on Boyle's new 'corpuscular hypothesis'.
Locke supports his theory by the use of examples. I will quote directly from Chapter VIII of Book II:
"Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.
...Secondary qualities of bodies. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. These I call secondary qualities. To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers; though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call qualities, but for distinction, secondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency, in wax or clay,- by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before,- by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts."
Locke's theory of perception is a 'mediated theory of perception'. Accordingly, we do not have direct access to the world around us, but rather this access is mediated through our ideas.
Sunday, June 17, 2012
Locke and Berkeley
Does Locke or Berkeley give a better account of the primary/secondary property distinction?
I think neither Locke nor Berkeley give a wholly satisfactory explanation of primary and secondary qualities but tend towards Locke having a slightly more coherent view.
In favour of Locke, I can understand the distinction he draws between those qualities which are less prone to subjective "distortion". Physical extension, number, motion and even place in time seem to be "qualities" which are of a somewhat different nature from taste, smell, colour etc. Secondary qualities tend to be highly subjective and depend very much on the "point of view" of the subject.
I reject however, Locke's belief that secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves". There is something (a physical quality) in objects over and above a "power" to produce certain sensations in sentient beings. I believe that our sensations are in fact caused by physical properties of objects and we directly perceive that quality, but the precise nature of our perception depends on the circumstances under which we perceive it.
Locke thinks that a sharp pin having the power to cause the idea of pain is analogous to a tomato having the power to cause the idea of red. I don't think these two example are really comparable in the way Locke does. Pain is not a quality of a pin - sharpness is the quality of the pin which compares to the redness of a tomato.
Berkeley does not make a convincing case for either his epistemological or metaphysical claims. I flatly reject his claim that we cannot abstract qualities. I also reject his proposition that all ideas are entirely dependent on minds. He thinks that ideas are caused by God whereas are more coherent view is that ideas are caused by the external world. Berkeley has no clear conception of what God is, and whether there is only one God or many. Since we cannot have an idea of what God is other than the cause of all ideas I think it makes more sense to replace God with an external world. I accept that in a very strict sense this is an assumption, but feel that the burden of proof lies with those that claim the external world does not exist.
I think neither Locke nor Berkeley give a wholly satisfactory explanation of primary and secondary qualities but tend towards Locke having a slightly more coherent view.
In favour of Locke, I can understand the distinction he draws between those qualities which are less prone to subjective "distortion". Physical extension, number, motion and even place in time seem to be "qualities" which are of a somewhat different nature from taste, smell, colour etc. Secondary qualities tend to be highly subjective and depend very much on the "point of view" of the subject.
I reject however, Locke's belief that secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves". There is something (a physical quality) in objects over and above a "power" to produce certain sensations in sentient beings. I believe that our sensations are in fact caused by physical properties of objects and we directly perceive that quality, but the precise nature of our perception depends on the circumstances under which we perceive it.
Locke thinks that a sharp pin having the power to cause the idea of pain is analogous to a tomato having the power to cause the idea of red. I don't think these two example are really comparable in the way Locke does. Pain is not a quality of a pin - sharpness is the quality of the pin which compares to the redness of a tomato.
Berkeley does not make a convincing case for either his epistemological or metaphysical claims. I flatly reject his claim that we cannot abstract qualities. I also reject his proposition that all ideas are entirely dependent on minds. He thinks that ideas are caused by God whereas are more coherent view is that ideas are caused by the external world. Berkeley has no clear conception of what God is, and whether there is only one God or many. Since we cannot have an idea of what God is other than the cause of all ideas I think it makes more sense to replace God with an external world. I accept that in a very strict sense this is an assumption, but feel that the burden of proof lies with those that claim the external world does not exist.
Monday, January 23, 2012
Hume's Treatise contd.
So far, we have discovered that Hume is intending to employ an empirically based and reasoned approach to his investigation of human nature, or "the ultimate principles of the soul". Hume recognises at the outset that this is not going to be easy. Many others have set out on the same road, only to realise the impossibility the task. Indeed, it may be more prudent not to attempt such an enquiry, and thereby "avoid falling into error"; but we clearly get the impression by this point that Hume is quite willing to give it a try, or even perhaps believes that he has solved the problem.
It seems evident to Hume that we cannot "go beyond experience, or establish any principles that are not founded on that authority" (i.e. experience). Here we have a clear statement of empiricism. It will be interesting to see why Hume thinks this is self evident, and what conclusions he draws even allowing for such limitations.
Book 1 - Of the Understanding
In Section 1 - Of the Origin of our Ideas, Hume begins to lay the groundwork and first draws a key distinction between two different types of perception: impressions and ideas. The difference between these two types of perception is "the degree of force or liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness."
It is interesting to me that, by starting at this point in his first book on philosophy, Hume has already taken quite a lot for granted. Unlike Descartes in Discourse on the Method, Hume hasn't questioned the concept of self or indeed of perception. It seems to be taken for granted that there is someone who perceives and something being perceived.
Further, we may need to go on to investigate if this distinction between impressions and ideas is the same, or similar, to philosophical dualism; for example, the Cartesian dualism between essence and existence which can be seen in Descartes' writings.
For Hume, impressions are the more vigorous type of perception, and include sensations, passions and emotions. Ideas are described as "fainter images" of these and include thinking and reasoning.
Hume says "I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction." I'm not sure I entirely agree that we can just accept this - a number of objections immediately spring to mind. For example, it is not always the case that emotions strike us more forcefully than reflective thoughts. Also, we have the case of dreams, where the distinction between Hume's impressions and ideas is much less clear-cut. For the time being however, I shall give Hume the benefit of the doubt and move on.
Hume then immediately recognises that the two counter-arguments above may be raised in objection, but concludes that it is nevertheless true that ideas and impressions are "in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads".
Next, Hume draws a distinction between simple and complex perceptions (both ideas and impressions). "Simple perceptions ...are such as admit of no distinction or separation. The complex are the contrary to these." For example, the idea of an apple is complex as it comprises a number of components. The components of the idea of an apple such as smell, taste and colour are simple perceptions.
Again, I think we can see what Hume is getting at, but I'm not convinced that our perceptions can be so clearly categorised. Indeed, objections to this theory can be quite extreme, such as the "compositionally nihilist" view, which renounces the literal existence of complex perceptions*.
Hume does not recognise any other possible distinction between impressions and ideas other than the degree of force and vivacity by which they are perceived. He says the two are remarkably similar in all other respects, indeed many (simple) impressions are subsequently perceived as ideas when we reflect upon or recall them. This lack of flexibility is a little alarming, but just because it doesn't at first pass the "smell test" doesn't necessarily make it unhelpful, we shall see.
In Hume's defence, I think we can all recognise the difference between a 'sense perception' and a 'thought'. If this distinction proves to be useful in formulating a theory of human nature, we should probably give Hume some leeway before rejecting his conclusions as being based on dodgy foundations.
Hume claims next that every simple idea has a simple impression that resembles it and vice versa, but this is not necessarily true for complex ideas and complex impressions.
Hume's "general proposition" which will be more fully examined in the Treatise is stated as follows: "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."
From this we take it that all simple ideas are preceded by (and later we find also caused by) a corresponding simple impression.
With regards to this proposition, Hume challenges us to come up with an exception to prove him wrong. I am slightly cheating here because I remember from my student days one exception which Hume examines next, namely the case of the missing shade of blue. If someone has seen lots of different shades of blue, but not one particular shade, it is argued that they could form an idea of this missing shade of blue, even if that they have not previously perceived that shade via a corresponding impression.**
Hume does not find this exception to be fatal, indeed he manages to convince himself that in a way it is the 'exception that proves the rule'. Ideas "produce the images of themselves" in new ideas, but "as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions". Hume believes therefore that his proposition still stands, because in the very rare case where a simple idea is not caused by a corresponding simple impression, that simple idea is in fact caused by copying another simple idea, which in turn was caused by a simple impression.
In the conclusion of section 1, Hume is confident that he has dispensed with any notion of innate ideas***.
I will continue with Section 2 tomorrow.
* See 'Hume on the Individuality of Complex Perceptions' by Jani Hakkarainen (2011) for an analysis of this issue.
** See 'Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed' by John O. Nelson in Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989)
*** Innatism is a philosophical doctrine that holds that the mind is born with ideas/knowledge, and that therefore the mind is not a 'blank slate' at birth, as early empiricists such as John Locke claimed. It asserts therefore that not all knowledge is obtained from experience and the senses. (from Wikipedia)
It seems evident to Hume that we cannot "go beyond experience, or establish any principles that are not founded on that authority" (i.e. experience). Here we have a clear statement of empiricism. It will be interesting to see why Hume thinks this is self evident, and what conclusions he draws even allowing for such limitations.
Book 1 - Of the Understanding
In Section 1 - Of the Origin of our Ideas, Hume begins to lay the groundwork and first draws a key distinction between two different types of perception: impressions and ideas. The difference between these two types of perception is "the degree of force or liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness."
It is interesting to me that, by starting at this point in his first book on philosophy, Hume has already taken quite a lot for granted. Unlike Descartes in Discourse on the Method, Hume hasn't questioned the concept of self or indeed of perception. It seems to be taken for granted that there is someone who perceives and something being perceived.
Further, we may need to go on to investigate if this distinction between impressions and ideas is the same, or similar, to philosophical dualism; for example, the Cartesian dualism between essence and existence which can be seen in Descartes' writings.
For Hume, impressions are the more vigorous type of perception, and include sensations, passions and emotions. Ideas are described as "fainter images" of these and include thinking and reasoning.
Hume says "I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction." I'm not sure I entirely agree that we can just accept this - a number of objections immediately spring to mind. For example, it is not always the case that emotions strike us more forcefully than reflective thoughts. Also, we have the case of dreams, where the distinction between Hume's impressions and ideas is much less clear-cut. For the time being however, I shall give Hume the benefit of the doubt and move on.
Hume then immediately recognises that the two counter-arguments above may be raised in objection, but concludes that it is nevertheless true that ideas and impressions are "in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads".
Next, Hume draws a distinction between simple and complex perceptions (both ideas and impressions). "Simple perceptions ...are such as admit of no distinction or separation. The complex are the contrary to these." For example, the idea of an apple is complex as it comprises a number of components. The components of the idea of an apple such as smell, taste and colour are simple perceptions.
Again, I think we can see what Hume is getting at, but I'm not convinced that our perceptions can be so clearly categorised. Indeed, objections to this theory can be quite extreme, such as the "compositionally nihilist" view, which renounces the literal existence of complex perceptions*.
Hume does not recognise any other possible distinction between impressions and ideas other than the degree of force and vivacity by which they are perceived. He says the two are remarkably similar in all other respects, indeed many (simple) impressions are subsequently perceived as ideas when we reflect upon or recall them. This lack of flexibility is a little alarming, but just because it doesn't at first pass the "smell test" doesn't necessarily make it unhelpful, we shall see.
In Hume's defence, I think we can all recognise the difference between a 'sense perception' and a 'thought'. If this distinction proves to be useful in formulating a theory of human nature, we should probably give Hume some leeway before rejecting his conclusions as being based on dodgy foundations.
Hume claims next that every simple idea has a simple impression that resembles it and vice versa, but this is not necessarily true for complex ideas and complex impressions.
Hume's "general proposition" which will be more fully examined in the Treatise is stated as follows: "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."
From this we take it that all simple ideas are preceded by (and later we find also caused by) a corresponding simple impression.
With regards to this proposition, Hume challenges us to come up with an exception to prove him wrong. I am slightly cheating here because I remember from my student days one exception which Hume examines next, namely the case of the missing shade of blue. If someone has seen lots of different shades of blue, but not one particular shade, it is argued that they could form an idea of this missing shade of blue, even if that they have not previously perceived that shade via a corresponding impression.**
Hume does not find this exception to be fatal, indeed he manages to convince himself that in a way it is the 'exception that proves the rule'. Ideas "produce the images of themselves" in new ideas, but "as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions". Hume believes therefore that his proposition still stands, because in the very rare case where a simple idea is not caused by a corresponding simple impression, that simple idea is in fact caused by copying another simple idea, which in turn was caused by a simple impression.
In the conclusion of section 1, Hume is confident that he has dispensed with any notion of innate ideas***.
I will continue with Section 2 tomorrow.
* See 'Hume on the Individuality of Complex Perceptions' by Jani Hakkarainen (2011) for an analysis of this issue.
** See 'Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed' by John O. Nelson in Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989)
*** Innatism is a philosophical doctrine that holds that the mind is born with ideas/knowledge, and that therefore the mind is not a 'blank slate' at birth, as early empiricists such as John Locke claimed. It asserts therefore that not all knowledge is obtained from experience and the senses. (from Wikipedia)
Sunday, January 22, 2012
Hume's Treatise
The Ninth Edition Britannica article on Hume is written by Robert Adamson, Professor of Logic and Philosophy at Owens College (Victoria University of Manchester) and subsequently at the Universities of Aberdeen and Glasgow.
Adamson argues that, despite Hume's subsequent discounting of his Treatise, through its "freshness and concentrated vigour" Hume is at his best in his first major work. According to Adams, "none of the principles of the Treatise are given up in later writings, and no additions are made to them". While this is debateable, it serves to underline the prominent place that the Treatise must hold for students of Hume.
Hume sent a copy of the Treatise to Butler, who as we have already noted was of some influence to Hume's thinking. Hume ranks Butler alongside Locke and Berkeley as the originators of the experimental method in moral science; Butler warmly commended Hume's essay to his friends. Both share Hume's sceptical conclusions regarding belief in matters of fact. Butler however, retains confidence in the rational proofs for the existence of God alongside an a priori view of conscience.
I will no doubt return to arguments for and against the existence of God in later posts, but it is interesting to note that Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was published posthumously in 1779, originally with neither the author's nor the publisher's name.
The title page of the Treatise from the 1739 edition contains the following:
One of the regrets of my comprehensive school education is that I was not given the opportunity to study Latin or Greek. Fortunately, Google came up with the meaning of the quotation from Tacitus: "Rare are the times you can, in turn, feel what you want and say what you feel. Try it."
Introduction to the Treatise
The opening sentence of the Introduction is as follows: "Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them."
The opening sentence might lead one to suspect that Hume is not going to follow this path, but as you read further you realise that in fact, this is exactly what Hume is setting out to do.
"Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself."
So Hume is attempting to come up with a whole system of philosophy, and is not merely commenting on previous attempts. This is why I admire Hume, the scope and originality of his Treatise is very impressive.
Hume goes on to point out that in philosophical debates "'Amidst all this bustle, 'tis not reason which carries the prize, but eloquence....The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers and musicians of the army". Here we get a clear "heads-up" that Hume is going to attempt to cut through the eloquence of his predecessors, which presumably hides their muddled thinking, and shine a light of reason on human nature. I find this amusing, given that Hume himself is so eloquent.
Hume's objective is to address the questions of metaphysics. He acknowledges that this is not going to be easy: "For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse".
Next, Hume stresses the connection between all of the sciences and the science of Man, i.e. Human Nature. By improving our understanding of metaphysics, he will no doubt have a significant influence on all other branches of human knowledge. Again, we begin to see the ambition of Hume's project - he isn't messing about on the periphery! Hume puts this very clearly: "In pretending therefore, to explain the priciples of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security."
Next, Hume introduces the importance of experience and observation, the scientific method: "And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to the science itself must be laid on experience and observation."
Hume recognises that his re-thinking of human nature, based on scientific method, may not be to everyone's taste. He stresses the credit that will come to England by advancing the frontiers of philosophy and appeals for moderation by praising the English traditions of toleration and liberty. At this point we begin to understand that his arguments will be somewhat controversial.
In a footnote, Hume gives credit in the introduction to "some late philosophers in England", namely Locke, Shaftsbury, Mandeville, Hutchinson and Butler who have begun to "put the science of man on a new footing" but we begin to suspect that Hume's self-confidence will deliver us something more comprehensive and final.
To be continued.
Adamson argues that, despite Hume's subsequent discounting of his Treatise, through its "freshness and concentrated vigour" Hume is at his best in his first major work. According to Adams, "none of the principles of the Treatise are given up in later writings, and no additions are made to them". While this is debateable, it serves to underline the prominent place that the Treatise must hold for students of Hume.
Hume sent a copy of the Treatise to Butler, who as we have already noted was of some influence to Hume's thinking. Hume ranks Butler alongside Locke and Berkeley as the originators of the experimental method in moral science; Butler warmly commended Hume's essay to his friends. Both share Hume's sceptical conclusions regarding belief in matters of fact. Butler however, retains confidence in the rational proofs for the existence of God alongside an a priori view of conscience.
I will no doubt return to arguments for and against the existence of God in later posts, but it is interesting to note that Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was published posthumously in 1779, originally with neither the author's nor the publisher's name.
The title page of the Treatise from the 1739 edition contains the following:
A Treatise of Human Nature : Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.
Rara temporum ƒelicitas, ubi ƒentire, quæ velis; quæ ƒentias, dicere licet.
One of the regrets of my comprehensive school education is that I was not given the opportunity to study Latin or Greek. Fortunately, Google came up with the meaning of the quotation from Tacitus: "Rare are the times you can, in turn, feel what you want and say what you feel. Try it."
Introduction to the Treatise
The opening sentence of the Introduction is as follows: "Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them."
The opening sentence might lead one to suspect that Hume is not going to follow this path, but as you read further you realise that in fact, this is exactly what Hume is setting out to do.
"Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself."
So Hume is attempting to come up with a whole system of philosophy, and is not merely commenting on previous attempts. This is why I admire Hume, the scope and originality of his Treatise is very impressive.
Hume goes on to point out that in philosophical debates "'Amidst all this bustle, 'tis not reason which carries the prize, but eloquence....The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers and musicians of the army". Here we get a clear "heads-up" that Hume is going to attempt to cut through the eloquence of his predecessors, which presumably hides their muddled thinking, and shine a light of reason on human nature. I find this amusing, given that Hume himself is so eloquent.
Hume's objective is to address the questions of metaphysics. He acknowledges that this is not going to be easy: "For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse".
Next, Hume stresses the connection between all of the sciences and the science of Man, i.e. Human Nature. By improving our understanding of metaphysics, he will no doubt have a significant influence on all other branches of human knowledge. Again, we begin to see the ambition of Hume's project - he isn't messing about on the periphery! Hume puts this very clearly: "In pretending therefore, to explain the priciples of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security."
Next, Hume introduces the importance of experience and observation, the scientific method: "And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to the science itself must be laid on experience and observation."
Hume recognises that his re-thinking of human nature, based on scientific method, may not be to everyone's taste. He stresses the credit that will come to England by advancing the frontiers of philosophy and appeals for moderation by praising the English traditions of toleration and liberty. At this point we begin to understand that his arguments will be somewhat controversial.
In a footnote, Hume gives credit in the introduction to "some late philosophers in England", namely Locke, Shaftsbury, Mandeville, Hutchinson and Butler who have begun to "put the science of man on a new footing" but we begin to suspect that Hume's self-confidence will deliver us something more comprehensive and final.
To be continued.
Saturday, January 21, 2012
David Hume (1711-1776)
If I had to select one, and only one, philosopher to study (which fortunately I don't!) then that philosopher would be David Hume.
Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland and is now recognised as one of the most important figures in Western philosophy, being a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. He is often grouped with John Locke (1632-1704) and George Berkeley (1685-1753), all of whom promoted an empiricist approach to philosophy which is based on evidence and observation (i.e. scientific method) as opposed to a priori ('arm-chair') reasoning.
Hume wrote extensively on philosophy, history and economics. To my mind his essays are surprisingly readable considering they are 270 years old. The National Library of Scotland holds several of his manuscripts, all of which are free to request by library members.
Two of Hume's most famous philosophical works are A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) and Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777). It is mainly these two works that I will refer to for subsequent posts on Hume.
His talents were perhaps not fully appreciated by his mother, who is reported to have said of her youngest son "Our Davie 's a fine good natured crater, but uncommon wake-minded". He studied at Edinburgh University, "passing the ordinary course of education with success", leaving with at least a fair knowledge of Latin and at least an acquaintance with Greek.
Literary influences at the start of his career include Cicero and Seneca as well as works by Locke, Berkeley and Joseph Butler (1692-1752). From a relatively early age, Hume displayed a passion for literature and investigations into human nature.
The first choice of a profession, that of law, made for him by his relatives who thought it suited his "studious habits, sobriety, and industry", proved unsuccessful. In 1734 he travelled to Bristol with the intention of entering into a "more active" mercantile life. Fortunately for us, he quickly "found the scene wholly unsuitable" and in the same year left for France. He visited Paris, Rheims and settled in La Flèche, famous in the history of philosophy as the school of René Descartes (1596,1650). It was while resident in France that he wrote Treatise.
Treastise comprises three books (i) Of the Understanding, (ii) Of the Passions, and (iii) Of Morals. The first two volumes were published in 1739 with the third following the next year. Their reception was somewhat underwhelming, as Hume vividly describes "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate; it fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a mumur among the zealots". "But, being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country".
The disclaimer of the Treatise in the preface to the Inquiry is famous, but has more to do with his disappointment at the reception of the Treatise than its shortcomings as a work of philosophy. The Advertisement, which is printed at the beginning of the 1777 posthumous reprint of Hume's Collected Essays in 1777 (i.e. the Enquiry), declares the author's desire that "the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles"
I will return to Hume's Treatise in my next post.
To finish, I will just underline the philosophical influence Hume has had by referring to some quotes from other philosophers (from Wikipedia):
Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland and is now recognised as one of the most important figures in Western philosophy, being a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. He is often grouped with John Locke (1632-1704) and George Berkeley (1685-1753), all of whom promoted an empiricist approach to philosophy which is based on evidence and observation (i.e. scientific method) as opposed to a priori ('arm-chair') reasoning.
Hume wrote extensively on philosophy, history and economics. To my mind his essays are surprisingly readable considering they are 270 years old. The National Library of Scotland holds several of his manuscripts, all of which are free to request by library members.
Two of Hume's most famous philosophical works are A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) and Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777). It is mainly these two works that I will refer to for subsequent posts on Hume.
His talents were perhaps not fully appreciated by his mother, who is reported to have said of her youngest son "Our Davie 's a fine good natured crater, but uncommon wake-minded". He studied at Edinburgh University, "passing the ordinary course of education with success", leaving with at least a fair knowledge of Latin and at least an acquaintance with Greek.
Literary influences at the start of his career include Cicero and Seneca as well as works by Locke, Berkeley and Joseph Butler (1692-1752). From a relatively early age, Hume displayed a passion for literature and investigations into human nature.
The first choice of a profession, that of law, made for him by his relatives who thought it suited his "studious habits, sobriety, and industry", proved unsuccessful. In 1734 he travelled to Bristol with the intention of entering into a "more active" mercantile life. Fortunately for us, he quickly "found the scene wholly unsuitable" and in the same year left for France. He visited Paris, Rheims and settled in La Flèche, famous in the history of philosophy as the school of René Descartes (1596,1650). It was while resident in France that he wrote Treatise.
Treastise comprises three books (i) Of the Understanding, (ii) Of the Passions, and (iii) Of Morals. The first two volumes were published in 1739 with the third following the next year. Their reception was somewhat underwhelming, as Hume vividly describes "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate; it fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a mumur among the zealots". "But, being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country".
The disclaimer of the Treatise in the preface to the Inquiry is famous, but has more to do with his disappointment at the reception of the Treatise than its shortcomings as a work of philosophy. The Advertisement, which is printed at the beginning of the 1777 posthumous reprint of Hume's Collected Essays in 1777 (i.e. the Enquiry), declares the author's desire that "the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles"
I will return to Hume's Treatise in my next post.
To finish, I will just underline the philosophical influence Hume has had by referring to some quotes from other philosophers (from Wikipedia):
- Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
- According to Schopenhauer, "there is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart and Schleiermacher taken together".
- A. J. Ayer, introducing his classic exposition of logical positivism (Language, Truth and Logic), claimed: "The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume."
- Albert Einstein wrote that he was inspired by Hume's positivism when formulating his Special Theory of Relativity.
- Hume was called "the prophet of the Wittgensteinian revolution" by N. Phillipson, referring to his view that mathematics and logic are closed systems, disguised tautologies, and have no relation to the world of experience.
- David Fate Norton asserted that Hume was "the first post-sceptical philosopher of the early modern period".
- Hume's Problem of Induction was also of fundamental importance to the philosophy of Karl Popper. In his autobiography, Unended Quest, he wrote: "'Knowledge' ... is objective; and it is hypothetical or conjectural. This way of looking at the problem made it possible for me to reformulate Hume's problem of induction". This insight resulted in Popper's major work The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In his Conjectures and Refutations, he writes: "I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified".
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