The distinction between particulars and universals

The philosophical ‘problem of universals’ is an ancient one, which continues to be debated in the modern-day. The problem concerns the ontological status of properties and relations. To solve the problem we need to address a fundamental question about universals: do they ‘exist’ as mind independent entities, and if so, what is their nature? In order to examine this problem, we need to be clear about the distinction between particulars and universals.

A ‘particular’ is an individual entity such as a specific blade of grass or a specific tree. Particulars are (in most cases) things we can point to, or that can be observed by at least one of the senses.  Particulars can exist over time, but they can only be in one place at a time, they are ‘non-repeatable’ entities.

It is necessarily true that all particulars must have at least some properties (or qualities), for example the colour of a blade of grass or the smell of a piece of bark. Particulars also stand in relation to other particulars, for example one tree is to the left of another tree, or one specific tree is taller or older than another specific tree. These properties (e.g. green-ness) and relations (e.g. to the left of) can be seen to be in more than one place at one time, they are repeatable. The abstract noun ‘tree’ can be used to describe many items and is also repeatable.

The philosophical question is how can properties exist in more than one place at one time? If lots of things are green do they all share in the same green-ness? What is green-ness? Does green-ness exist independently of the particular items that are green? These questions extend to relations and abstract nouns. If one tree is taller than another tree, what is the nature of tall-ness? When we talk about ‘trees’ in general (i.e. abstract as opposed to concrete noun) what are we referring to? We can also extend the investigation to cover non-physical abstract nouns such as ‘justice’ and ‘goodness’.

These questions - how individual properties can be shared, how one quality or relation can be the same as another and what it is that we refer to when we use abstract nouns, are referred to as the problems of qualitative identity and resemblance. The solution, at least for some, is to posit entities called ‘universals’.

Linguistically, proper names stand for particulars whereas adjectives, verbs and prepositions stand for universals. Thus ‘London’ (proper noun) is a particular, whereas the adjective ‘green’ in the phrase ‘the green apple’ and the verb ‘like’ in the phrase ‘I like apples’ and the preposition ‘on’ in the phrase ‘the apple on the table’ are all universals. We know what the proper name London stands for, but what do universals stand for?

Universals, if they exist as entities, may be thought to be mind-independent. For Plato, they are immaterial ‘Forms’ which are transcendent, they exist in an abstract realm and can only be known by reason. For others, such as Aristotle, they are in the world, they reside in individual items. For Armstrong, universals are features of the world that are instantiated by particulars.

There are therefore a number of competing theories which attempt to solve the problem of universals. By no means all philosophers believe that universals do in fact exist as distinguishable entities, for them the world is made up only of particulars.

Laws of nature

I have been reading the Stanford Encyclopædia article on the subject of laws of nature. The concept of universal laws is relevant to the philosophical problem of induction, and also comes into other metaphysical problems including epistemology and the philosophy of propositions.

It is interesting to try and define what "makes" a universal law. The account which I particularly like explains universal laws in terms of deductive systems, with strength and simplicity being the key characteristics of a universal law.

Another approach employs the philosophical concept of universals to analyse laws of nature. This view was set out by Armstrong as follows:
"Suppose it to be a law that Fs are Gs.F-ness and G-ness are taken to be universals. A certain relation, a relation of non-logical or contingent necessitation, holds between F-ness and G-ness. This state of affairs may be symbolized as‘N(F,G)’"

According to Stanford, the majority of contemporary philosophers are realists about laws; they believe that some reports of what the laws are succeed in describing reality. There are, however, some antirealists who disagree. More on that later.

Berkeley and idealism contd.

I have been re-reading the extract from Berkeley to try and pick out some of the flaws in his arguments.

B. states that to reject the principles and theorems of science is not equivalent to denying the existence of a material world, since the theorems of science are "intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter". B. has misunderstood what it means to deny a theorem. It is not the same to deny that theorems exist as it is to deny the conclusion of a theorem. The theorems of science posit things about the natural (real or external) world and to deny them is exactly to deny the existence of the external world. B. cannot claim the "common sense" position without absurdity.

When talking about secondary qualities, B. moves from the argument that "To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another" to the position that whatever we perceive cannot be the same as what exists (in the case of different temperatures being felt by two hands and in the case of pain) and from this to the rejection of material things existing at all. What B. is missing is the explanation that things appear differently at different times and under different circumstances. All B. has proved by the hands in water example is that we have a point of view of reality.

B. uses the example of the same objects appearing to be different sizes at the same time to different animals as an argument to reject primary qualities as existing in objects. I don't really follow B.'s argument unless he is suggesting that for something to exist it must appear exactly the same under every point of view, which is the argument he used for secondary qualities and is false.
B.'s mis-step then is to knock down the straw man that he puts up, but the straw man is not a good one. In order for there to be an external world it is not necessary that existence is exactly the same as perception.

More on universals

One major idea behind medieval nominalism is that universals are not entities but concepts or general names (lat. nomina) that we use to pick out certain features of particulars.

I am in favour of the medieval approach

I see universals such as "red", "hot" and "north" as concepts which tie together the common properties of particulars, which are then named. So "north" becomes the concept which means closest to the north pole (of a magnet or of the Earth). I can't get my head round how north could be an entity in any other manner than a concept which describes a spacial relation or a rule for help in navigating. It may then acquire other meanings in language, but the first people to use the term north must have used it as a rule to describe that spacial relation, or perhaps to point to a particular place that is north of another place.

I have been trying to imagine a world without any people, to think through what implications that might have on my opinion about particulars and universals. In such a world I think we would still have particulars, but I'm not sure if we would have universals. As soon as we bring sentient beings into the world I think they must create universals, which implies to me that they must be man made.

However, picking up on Armstrong's view about scientific laws, I then thought that perhaps I am wrong! In a world without people we would still have "gravity" as a universal law, and so I switched back to thinking that universals are things which are, quite literally "universal". This may sound naive, it certainly does as I type it.

My only conclusion is that we can probably define "universal" to mean whatever we want. Since it is not an object we can point at, no-one can truly (or perhaps helpfully) say "No, your wrong, you don't actually mean what you just said".

From my previous course, I came down on the side of believing that there is some form of contradiction when we reject a universal law. Whether this contradiction is imposed by our understanding (Kant) or by our language (Wittgenstein) or is innate, I'm not sure. Perhaps it is all three.

I want to come down on the side of a simplistic approach, and say that universals apply to universal "things" such as either laws of nature, or concepts which apply everywhere and at every time (such as north, red, hot and even horse).

I like Armstrong's focus on truth-makers, but I think this allows for a large number of universals.
Whether these universals are man-made or "in" nature is still up for grabs. Hume would argue that we can never know whether they are "in" nature, and it does seem to be that you have to have an omniscient point of view in order to know the truth. This becomes an epistemological question.
From a metaphysical standpoint I want to say that universals exist as concepts, but I'm not sure whether we can say more about their ontological status.

Particulars and Universals

A few initial thoughts, as this is a new topic to me.

I am inclined to agree that universals do not have any kind of supernatural existence in a non physical / temporal realm. They also don't "exist" in time and space in terms of being something we can point to, because if that were the case they would be particulars.

But, as we saw in the previous modules, we can talk about things that don't exist in space and time in a meaningful way, and so they must have some kind of subsistence.

My initial reaction, having thought about how I would describe universals, is that they seem to be (or at least have their origin in) some kind of "rule" for describing things (either properties or relations).
We can all understand what someone means by "higher" or "redder". These are terms which help us to talk about particulars, and to understand what we mean when we want to convey complex ideas. So the universal "red" is a rule which allows us to ascribe a subjective sense experience (or perhaps a particular wavelength of light).

The universal "red" only seems to be of use in communication of some form. Without communication I'm not sure that universals serve much purpose.

Plato's Forms

Plato develops his theory of Forms in order to try and explain how things that we experience are the way they are.

Plato's theory has an extremely wide scope - it is aimed at addressing a number of fundamental metaphysical questions including:

• how do we explain resemblance?
• the problem of universals (the question of whether properties exist, and if so, what they are)?
• what do we mean by matter and substance?
• what is change?

Plato's answer to these questions is a concept he calls "Forms". Forms transcend experience, are permanent and never changing. It is "from" Forms that the material world is the way it is. Forms therefore help explain the material world. The process by which this takes place is very obscure, necessarily so since the Forms are not objects of experience.
The argument for the existence of Forms seems to be abductive, inference to the best explanation.
The key issue for me in debating Forms is to try and understand what Plato actually thinks they are, this is not an easy question!