I am struggling to understand what Schopenhauer could mean by his definition of free will. Unfortunately, he doesn't give examples or put the way he uses the term in context, so I suspect Wittgenstein would have some difficulty accepting that it is truly meaningful.
I have recently been watching the excellent videos on the philosophy faculty website:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/podcasts/general_philosophy
In part 5 Peter Millican touches on free will a few times, in particular in relation to the mind / body dualism debate. He makes a very interesting analogy. If we try and think about ourselves in terms of a computer, we have hardware (which explains our physical actions in terms of cause and effect) which extends to the physical and chemical constituents of our brains. We also we have software, which is analogous to our minds.
We cannot fully explain our minds by just talking about physical properties or causation. Using this analogy I would maintain that our minds are programmed in such a way that we are free to make moral choices and decisions. I can't explain why this is the case, but I certainly do believe that it is the case.
I think looking at the way we use the words "free will" helps, but Schopenhauer seems to be looking for a metaphysical explanation of what free will is, whereas explaining the terms by how they are used seems to be edging towards an epistemological explanation.
Is it possible to answer metaphysical questions by looking at the philosophy of language?
Showing posts with label Schopenhauer. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Schopenhauer. Show all posts
Friday, May 25, 2012
Monday, May 21, 2012
Schopenhauer and murder
Schopenhauer says we are free to act according to motive (which seems to be self evident) but we are not free to choose our motives because these are determined. His argument is very circular and I guess that is the point since he is trying to prove that we cannot establish free will by introspection.
Whether he is a determinist or not (he could be a soft determinist), I certainly reject the idea that all motives are "caused" by something. I think some motives are "willed". This is not to say that there aren't reasons why we have different motives, again that seems to me to be self evident.
Maybe I am redefining will in terms of "reason for acting" rather than "cause for acting". If we look at it that way, we can see how some actions are not "caused" but are the result of a rational process.
If we take an example - someone asks you "why did you kill that fly?"
There are two ways of looking at this question:
1. what is your motive for killing that fly?
2. what is your reason for killing that fly?
On the first interpretation, I accept that the motive is that I found the fly irritating.
However, my reason for killing the fly is not that I found the fly irritating. My reason (in a moral sense) is that I found the fly irritating and I made a moral assessment that I was entitled to end the fly's life because I don't believe that killing flies is wrong in the current circumstances.
My choice to kill the fly was a moral choice, an exercise of free will and it involved reason as well as motive. Anyone who says it isn't, and is just motive, doesn't seem to be capturing what is going on. They stop their analysis too soon.
Whether he is a determinist or not (he could be a soft determinist), I certainly reject the idea that all motives are "caused" by something. I think some motives are "willed". This is not to say that there aren't reasons why we have different motives, again that seems to me to be self evident.
Maybe I am redefining will in terms of "reason for acting" rather than "cause for acting". If we look at it that way, we can see how some actions are not "caused" but are the result of a rational process.
If we take an example - someone asks you "why did you kill that fly?"
There are two ways of looking at this question:
1. what is your motive for killing that fly?
2. what is your reason for killing that fly?
On the first interpretation, I accept that the motive is that I found the fly irritating.
However, my reason for killing the fly is not that I found the fly irritating. My reason (in a moral sense) is that I found the fly irritating and I made a moral assessment that I was entitled to end the fly's life because I don't believe that killing flies is wrong in the current circumstances.
My choice to kill the fly was a moral choice, an exercise of free will and it involved reason as well as motive. Anyone who says it isn't, and is just motive, doesn't seem to be capturing what is going on. They stop their analysis too soon.
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Schopenhauer
There are a number of reasons why I am not willing to agree with Schopenhauer. The fact that I am not willing to agree is, ipso fact, proof that I have free will!
Perhaps there are three types of reasons why I don't agree with Schopenhauer.
The first set of reasons has to do with the logic of determinism. The fact that we can predict an action, even with almost complete certainty, doesn't necessarily mean that the action is determined. I don't accept that, because at the point of action the subject could not have acted differently, determinism is true. If there is a formal possibility of the agent to act in a number of ways prior to the action, then there is the possibility of a non-deterministic explanation. We can envisage a sate of affairs where the agent acted differently.
The second set of reasons is based on what we mean by the term "free will". Schopenhauer says we can "act what we will" but we cannot "will what we will". This is just wrong in my view. My counter argument is effectively that we can "will what we will". We can will what we will because that is what we mean by the term "will". For you to prove that determinism is true you would need to prove to me that humans don't make choices - for me that is the essence of what I mean by determinism, and Schopenhauer has not proved that this is the case.
Of course you can redefine what I mean by free will and then say that reality doesn't accord with that definition, but all you have achieved is to play semantics with the definition.
The final set of reasons is to do with my conception of what it is to be an independent person or conscience. Schopenhauer has come up with one way of looking at human behaviour, but it doesn't cohere with my conception. Following an action back to its cause seems a very odd way of looking at human actions. When we talk about moral or normative human actions we use the concept of choice, we talk about blame and praise and human responsibility. I don't accept that all of these concepts are either meaningless or mistaken. I don't think the concept of causation (on its own) works very well in the realm of human actions. Human behaviour is not mechanistic, that is the essence of being human. What Schopenhauer is doing from my perspective is redefining what it is to be human.
Perhaps there are three types of reasons why I don't agree with Schopenhauer.
The first set of reasons has to do with the logic of determinism. The fact that we can predict an action, even with almost complete certainty, doesn't necessarily mean that the action is determined. I don't accept that, because at the point of action the subject could not have acted differently, determinism is true. If there is a formal possibility of the agent to act in a number of ways prior to the action, then there is the possibility of a non-deterministic explanation. We can envisage a sate of affairs where the agent acted differently.
The second set of reasons is based on what we mean by the term "free will". Schopenhauer says we can "act what we will" but we cannot "will what we will". This is just wrong in my view. My counter argument is effectively that we can "will what we will". We can will what we will because that is what we mean by the term "will". For you to prove that determinism is true you would need to prove to me that humans don't make choices - for me that is the essence of what I mean by determinism, and Schopenhauer has not proved that this is the case.
Of course you can redefine what I mean by free will and then say that reality doesn't accord with that definition, but all you have achieved is to play semantics with the definition.
The final set of reasons is to do with my conception of what it is to be an independent person or conscience. Schopenhauer has come up with one way of looking at human behaviour, but it doesn't cohere with my conception. Following an action back to its cause seems a very odd way of looking at human actions. When we talk about moral or normative human actions we use the concept of choice, we talk about blame and praise and human responsibility. I don't accept that all of these concepts are either meaningless or mistaken. I don't think the concept of causation (on its own) works very well in the realm of human actions. Human behaviour is not mechanistic, that is the essence of being human. What Schopenhauer is doing from my perspective is redefining what it is to be human.
Saturday, May 19, 2012
Schopenhauer and Free Will
There seem to be two types of argument going on. The first is an argument from causality and is almost a reductio ad absurdum. If you accept in principle that everything must have a cause, then you can follow the chain back ad infinitum and never find a starting point. This strikes me as similar to arguments over the existence of the universe and whether something can come from nothing. Although it's an interesting argument, it doesn't really help because I don't look upon free will as a problem of mechanics. I don't accept that all thoughts have to have a single "cause", the process is far too complex to be suitable to that kind of simplistic reasoning.
The second argument redefines free will in terms of human motivations, Schop. says that we choose to do what motivates us most, and that as we don't choose our motivations, we don't in effect have freedom of choice. I also find this argument very unsatisfactory.
My take on free will is that it is neither a question of cause or of motives but is an issue of absence of limitations on our choices. I accept that we all have motivations, but we are also able to have a rational discussion about these and reach a conclusion, and there seems to be nothing to stop us from doing this, other than facing the consequences of those choices.
No doubt most choices are predetermined in the sense that they stem from motivations, but we seem to have the ability to influence our motivations by lending more weight to some than others. We are not just influenced by motivations, we also take into account what the consequences will be and make a rational judgement about the implications of making one choice or another. For me, free will is a conceptual framework which captures this process using two words.
For there to be free will under Schop.'s definition we would need to be able to break the chain of cause and effect or change the laws that govern the universe and I'm not sure anyone really thinks this can happen or indeed is really what we mean by free will.
It seems that there must be a way to define 'free will' not in terms of the cause or motivation for an action, but instead in terms of the ability to assess the consequences of different choices and attribute moral value to those choices. When we couple this with the lack of constraint on this process, we end up with free will. If a rational person or persons make a normative choice which could have been otherwise (i.e. we can easily conceive of them making a different choice) then that choice has a moral value, it is in effect a case of "free will".
The second argument redefines free will in terms of human motivations, Schop. says that we choose to do what motivates us most, and that as we don't choose our motivations, we don't in effect have freedom of choice. I also find this argument very unsatisfactory.
My take on free will is that it is neither a question of cause or of motives but is an issue of absence of limitations on our choices. I accept that we all have motivations, but we are also able to have a rational discussion about these and reach a conclusion, and there seems to be nothing to stop us from doing this, other than facing the consequences of those choices.
No doubt most choices are predetermined in the sense that they stem from motivations, but we seem to have the ability to influence our motivations by lending more weight to some than others. We are not just influenced by motivations, we also take into account what the consequences will be and make a rational judgement about the implications of making one choice or another. For me, free will is a conceptual framework which captures this process using two words.
For there to be free will under Schop.'s definition we would need to be able to break the chain of cause and effect or change the laws that govern the universe and I'm not sure anyone really thinks this can happen or indeed is really what we mean by free will.
It seems that there must be a way to define 'free will' not in terms of the cause or motivation for an action, but instead in terms of the ability to assess the consequences of different choices and attribute moral value to those choices. When we couple this with the lack of constraint on this process, we end up with free will. If a rational person or persons make a normative choice which could have been otherwise (i.e. we can easily conceive of them making a different choice) then that choice has a moral value, it is in effect a case of "free will".
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