Berkeley and idealism contd.

I have been re-reading the extract from Berkeley to try and pick out some of the flaws in his arguments.

B. states that to reject the principles and theorems of science is not equivalent to denying the existence of a material world, since the theorems of science are "intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter". B. has misunderstood what it means to deny a theorem. It is not the same to deny that theorems exist as it is to deny the conclusion of a theorem. The theorems of science posit things about the natural (real or external) world and to deny them is exactly to deny the existence of the external world. B. cannot claim the "common sense" position without absurdity.

When talking about secondary qualities, B. moves from the argument that "To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another" to the position that whatever we perceive cannot be the same as what exists (in the case of different temperatures being felt by two hands and in the case of pain) and from this to the rejection of material things existing at all. What B. is missing is the explanation that things appear differently at different times and under different circumstances. All B. has proved by the hands in water example is that we have a point of view of reality.

B. uses the example of the same objects appearing to be different sizes at the same time to different animals as an argument to reject primary qualities as existing in objects. I don't really follow B.'s argument unless he is suggesting that for something to exist it must appear exactly the same under every point of view, which is the argument he used for secondary qualities and is false.
B.'s mis-step then is to knock down the straw man that he puts up, but the straw man is not a good one. In order for there to be an external world it is not necessary that existence is exactly the same as perception.

Berkeley and idealism

I think Dr Johnson has a point, and agree with him, perhaps this is because I am a direct (or naive) realist. Admittedly, Dr Johnson makes the point with some theatrics and unlike Berkeley doesn't take many pages to do it, but he is still making a philosophical point.

Berkeley's argument is clever, but flawed. The key sign that he is not onto a winner is when he appeals to the existence of a supernatural being that we can never experience, or even form a clear idea of, to support his metaphysics. Being a Bishop will do that to people  I will try and pick apart his argument in a slightly more sophisticated manner in a different post, but there is so much wrong with it that I want to marshal my thoughts first.

I think we are entitled to start from the assumption that the world is real, it is an abductive argument perhaps, but it fits so well compared to Berkeley's fantasy.

Dr Johnson and Bishop Berkeley

After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of
Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and
that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall
forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty
force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- "I refute it
thus."


Dr Johnson's argument is a very good one, and puts philosophers in their place. A more sophisticated argument for common sense is 'Here is a hand" by GE Moore.

I often wonder if a 'Moorean Shift' is in order with all of this discussion of qualia and epiphenomenalism?

I am a direct realist - I think that what we see is real, and it just appears to us the way it appears to us. The fact that appearances are not consistent is not an argument against realism, it is actually an argument in support of direct realism. To say that we can't perceive the real object behind the appearance of the object is, to me, unhelpful and confusing.
If we make the assumption that the world is real and we are independent of it, and we accept the common sense and scientific explanation of the world, then we would expect the world to appear different to different people. So realism is coherent, common sense, justified by our experiences and the best explanation we have.