Is an unexamined life worth living?

Today's assignment was to read Bertrand Russell's Problems of Philosophy, 'Chapter XV: The value of philosophy' and the section from Plato's Apology where Socrates gives a speech defending himself against the charges of "corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel".

We were then asked to post on the question "Is an unexamined life worth living?".

My response was as follows:

To answer this question I believe it is helpful to explain what we mean by "worth". For a life to be worth living it has to either have a purpose and go some way to achieve that purpose, or have some value to someone / something.

On both these points I don't see why in principle an unexamined life could not have either purpose and/or value.

Before addressing the question of whether life has to be examined before it has worth, I would like to consider whether life has any purpose in itself.

Survival machines
Richard Dawkins argues that the universe has no purpose, at least not one that we know about. In his book 'The Selfish Gene' he argues that the fundamental purpose of life is really the survival of our genes. Our bodies are "survival machines" for our genes. He writes "survival machines began as passive receptacles for the genes, providing little more than walls to protect them from the chemical warfare of their rivals and the ravages of accidental molecular bombardment". In this sense, the purpose of life is to propagate our genes, an as such an unexamined life has as much worth as an examined life. What matters is survival.

Purpose and value is a human construct
As an atheist, I do not believe that life has any purpose other than the purpose we provide for it ourselves as rational, sentient, reflective and emotional creatures.

Dawkins goes on to explain how humans have evolved into social beings. Our brains have grown to give us the ability to think and reflect. We have gained the power to overcome our mechanistic history and organise ourselves into societies that ascribe purpose, worth and value to different things.
Socrates comes across as intellectually arrogant in The Apology. He argues that "daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living". Yet he gives us little support for this proposition, other than his eloquence.

As an example of an unexamined life that I believe is worth living I would argue that great musicians or great sportsmen who do not reflect on life, but do provide great pleasure for others, are leading lives that are worth living.

What is philosophy?

Today I was posed the following question, following my contribution yesterday on the issue 'What is philosophy?'

"Lawrence is quite right about philosophy being characterized by specific questions (paying attention to logic etc. is definitely part of it, but as you say, this is not specific to philosophy). My question to you both then is, what is really specific about philosophical questions? (traditional or otherwise)"

This is my response:
"I agree that this is a very interesting - and also difficult question. I have to confess that I'm struggling to provide a good answer.

A few months ago I read an article about philosophy and theoretical physics discussing the 'philosophy is dead' argument that Simon mentions. This time the antagonist was Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, Stephen Hawking. I have to confess that ever since I tried to read Hawking's unintelligible 'Brief History of Time' I have taken everything he says with a pinch of salt, but it does raise some interesting questions relevant to the current debate.
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/what-happened-before-the-big-bang-the-new-philosophy-of-cosmology/251608/

The topic of the article is 'What happened before the big bang?' Hawking argues that philosophy / philosophers can no longer contribute to these enquiries. He writers:
"How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Traditionally these were questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead," Hawking wrote. "Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics."

In support of Hawking's point of view I briefly discussed the interaction between philosophy and physics with Oxford's Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics Frank Close when he was in Edinburgh recently attending the Edinburgh International Science Festival. I asked Professor Close if he, as a theoretical physicist, worked alongside philosophers and believes that philosophy can contribute to his discipline. Professor Close explained that there is a joint undergraduate school of physics and philosophy at Oxford, but also agreed that to "do" theoretical physics, students have to be comfortable with high-level mathematics.

This got me thinking about the difference between theoretical physics, mathematics and philosophy. The key difference between all three is the type of questions they address, but I'm still struggling to define this difference other than by listing the questions for each discipline.

We can't simply say that philosophy is unique in addressing the 'big' questions, because theoretical physics addresses some of the biggest questions of all. Unless, of course, we say that by addressing these questions physicists are doing philosophy....which seems to be a bit circular.

Is it true that philosophers no longer tend to try and construct all-consuming theories about the way that mankind understands the world, along the lines of Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein? If it is true then do we have to accept that philosophy is, if not dead, at least very different from how it was in previous centuries?

I'm looking forward to reading some more recent philosophy as we proceed through the course to try and provide an answer to this."

Introduction to Philosophy Course Begins

Sorry for the radio-silence, have been busy at work etc. I will return to David Hume in due course.

The introduction to philosophy online course began last Wednesday and will last 10 weeks.
Week one is about general introductions and starting to hit the reading list / join in the forum discussions.

First assignment was to make a post on the subject "What is philosophy?" and then to begin the reading list. My answer to the question is as follows:

"I sometimes think it is easier to define philosophy in terms of what it isn't rather than what it is. It isn't a pure science such as physics or biology or a pure art such as painting or writing music. It isn't a practical skill such carpentry or computer programming or a game such as football or chess. It isn't a set of faith-based beliefs such as religion or a set of political beliefs such as socialism.
Finally, for me philosophy isn't even a way of doing something, even thinking.
For me philosophy is an enquiry, even a search, and is defined by the type of questions it addresses.
Philosophy enquires into fundamental questions of knowledge and belief. What do or can we have knowledge of? What do we believe about ourselves and the world around us and how can we justify these beliefs? What is truth? What is good? What is just? For all of these questions philosophy tries to find answers but most of all philosophy tries to find better ways of providing answers to these questions."

First item on the reading list is the introduction to Simon Blackburn's 'Think', which I am currently reading.

Hume's Treastise, Book 1, Part 1

In Section 2 of Book 1, Part 1, Hume starts by examining impressions. He divides them into two kinds: sensations and reflections. The first "arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes". The second "is derived in a great measure from our ideas". They occur in the that order, with the idea being a sort of "copy" of the impression. The latter "may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it". When impressions first strike us, being "vivacious" and "lively", they are objects of memory. When we reflect on them, when we repeat our impressions in the mind, they are objects of imagination and tend to be less vivacious.

In Section 3, Hume explains how memory is more "tied down" than imagination, without the same power of variation. This, Hume argues, is self-evident and does not warrant further exposition. This aspect of Hume's epistemology is discussed in 'Hume’s Theory of Imagination' by Gerhard Streminger, Hume Studies Volume VI, Number 2 (November, 1980). I particularly like this paper as it uses the word "propaedeutic" which I am fairly sure you, like me, will need to look up.

Section 4 is titled "Of the connexion or association of ideas" and is where Hume begins to flesh-out his theory and place further limits on the the extent of human knowledge. Ideas become connected or associated in the mind through three main routes: resemblance, contiguity in time or place and cause and effect. Of these, the strongest and most extensive, is cause and effect, which is going to be the subject of further examination.

At the end of Section 4, Hume describes the three categories of complex ideas which arise through the three forms of association described earlier, these are: relations, modes and substances. They are then described in more detail in Sections 5 and 6.

According to Hume, there are seven different types of (philosophical) relation:

1. resemblance
2. identity
3. space and time
4. quantity or number
5. degree of some quality, such as weight or colour
6. contrariety, such as existence and non-existence
7. cause and effect

In Part 6, Hume argues that "the idea of substance must...be derived from an impression of reflexion, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."

Part 7 discusses abstract and general ideas and examines "whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them." The conclusion is that "the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degree of each". Hume therefore rejects the notion of abstract ideas. This section is a little complicated. For further discussion I recommend 'Abstract General Ideas in Hume' by George S. Pappas, Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989). To quote, "The main contention of the paper is that the rejection of abstraction and abstract general ideas lies at the very heart of the philosophy of Berkeley, and that pretty much the same may be said for Hume. Berkeley’s defense of a kind of idealism stands or falls with the success of his attack on abstract general ideas, and Hume’s critique of infinite divisibility in matters pertaining to space and time, along with his destructive critique of various metaphysical notions, crucially depends on the successful denial of abstract general ideas."

This takes us to the end of Part 1 of Book 1 of the Treatise. I will continue with Part 2 in my next update.

Hume and the missing shade of blue

I made reference earlier to 'Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed' by John O. Nelson in Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989).

I think I agree with the following paragraph, which it seems to me is a fair basis on which to consider the case of the missing shade of blue as being not fatal to Hume's philosophy as set out in the Treatise. Indeed, when seen in the context described below, the missing shade of blue is not perhaps the 'exception that proves the rule' but rather 'the exception that proves the nature of the rule.

"One might profitably compare Hume's views in the present regard with Descartes' on essence and existence. According to Descartes, essence and existence are always, at least insofar as God is not concerned,“separable.” Thus, in imagining a triangle (says Descartes) he conceives its essence; nonetheless, ”there may nowhere in the world be such a figure outside my thought." In spite of some appearance to the contrary, Hume, I want to say, similarly maintains that ideas and their relations are separable from existence. Thus, what we discover in a thought experiment, like the color concession under discussion, really says nothing about what exists or does not exist in reality; it at most proves that a certain proposition, namely that stating that all simple ideas have correspondent, precedent impressions, is not an apriori, necessary proposition but a synthetic, aposteriori proposition. On the other hand, the proposition stating that all simple ideas have correspondent, precedent impressions, or the first principle of the science of man, does refer to what exists or does not exist in actual reality. Hence, being only in idea or in one’s thought experiment a phenomenon, the phenomenon of the missing shade of blue projects merely the idea of a contradiction to the first principle of the science of man, not an instance of an actual exception to the first principle and, hence, not something actually falsifying that principle. Thus, without real inconsistency but only an apparent one, Hume is able both to maintain that all simple ideas have correspondent, precedent impressions and that a contradictory phenomenon can be conceived."