what is knowledge?

A few more thoughts on what we are doing when we do philosophy, particularly in the context of trying to describe/understand/define propositional knowledge.

There seem to be two key questions about knowledge:
1. What is knowledge?
2. What can we know (and conversely what can't we know)?

Question 2 gets into the realm of scepticism, which is coming up later in the course so I will hold my fire for now.

On question 1, so far in the discussion we have tried to define which characteristics of knowledge are both necessary and sufficient. We largely agree that for a proposition about the world to be counted as knowledge it has to be true belief. We then added the requirement for justification. We then saw that perhaps we can have justified true belief that does not count as knowledge and considered what else is necessary beyond JTB.

The justification arm of the definition seemed to me to be the most interesting at first. There are lots of theories about what counts as justification, I for one am reluctant to rule any of them out.
Discussions on epistemology are interesting because the very act of trying to define knowledge by necessity involves assessing and deploying the very concepts we are trying to define. We say things such as "knowledge requires justification for it to count as knowledge" but then someone could quite reasonably say "justify why knowledge requires justification". We seem to be trapped in some kind of loop. We are then struck with the is/ought reversal.

There are two main threads which I am beginning to see emerge from the conversations. My initial reaction to the question 'what is knowledge?' was that to be counted as knowledge, a proposition had to describe or somehow match something that is true about the world. This might tend us towards a foundationalist account. If knowledge is "fixed" then the role of the philosopher is not only to be very clear about the definition but to explain how it is fixed.

But we saw that what counts as knowledge changes over time. For me this tends us towards a coherentist account (which allows us to fix the leaks in the ship as we proceed) and also brings in normative considerations. We still need to be very clear about the definition, but we also need to consider what we ought to count as knowledge under different circumstances.

In laying down the rules we need to be logically consistent. An argument is not a proper argument if it's logically flawed. But what are the truths of logic truths of? Why is knowledge only knowledge if it is based on logically sound arguments? Is it just a question of being meaningful and playing by the rules (i.e. our language has to make sense) or is there some kind of transcendental truth which, amongst other things, makes logic logical.

So I have come back full circle and am now back considering what we mean by truth....

coherentism v foundationalism v infinitism

On the whole I tend towards the coherentist explanation of knowledge. An item of knowledge that is 'coherent' to one person may not be to another, either because they have a wider/smaller circle of knowledge or because they place more weight on some beliefs than on others.

Coherentism would deny that there is foundational knowledge (such as the belief in the truth of a loving God) but I don't think it would deny that people have differently constructed belief systems. NB a coherentist could believe in God, but would not hold this as a foundational belief.

A foundational item of knowledge is held (justified true belief) without further support or appeal to other items of knowledge, either because it is innate (existing from birth) or self-evident. Descartes is a good example of a classical foundationalist because he traces his knowledge back to the foundation of the knowledge of his own existence. I think he would argue that this foundation is self evident, through the power of reason.

Coherentism would also deny infinitism, where the support for a particular item of knowledge is always another item of knowledge (ad infinitum).

The problem with foundationalism seems to me that it is impossible to identify and agree on foundational knowledge or to explain how we come by it. Self evidence isn't really a great argument since, as has already been pointed out it seems to assume quite a lot, to take quite a lot for granted.

Moorean shift

I have been struck when looking at some of the reading on knowledge that GE Moore yet again provides a very valuable insight into "common sense" approaches to philosophy. In my previous Introduction to Philosophy course I was taken by the "Moorean shift" response to scepticism, and again Moore expresses some important points on epistemology.

By common sense he doesn't just mean "what is commonly believed", it is a little more sophisticated....

Wikipedia explains the "common sense" response well;
"The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions. When one tries to support one’s assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions. Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not assume those things that are most obvious: the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts.
"Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur. Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or "I am conscious and alive right now". These are all the absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up common sense.
This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism. In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny.
If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted. They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense. They can get around Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no infinite regress or circle of reasoning, because the buck stops with (see also idiom) the principles of common sense."

Gettier's criticism of justified true belief

On the whole I am impressed but not entirely convinced by the Gettier criticism of justified true belief (JTB) as a good definition for knowledge. It seems possible to define the justification criteria to exclude Gettier cases as being true knowledge, and that feels intuitively the right approach to take. I can't believe it is necessary to add lots of additional caveats or criteria to exclude Gettier cases from qualifying as knowledge, instead we need to be clearer about what we mean by justification.

I think perhaps Gettier examples are "reasonable assumptions" but not "knowledge".

So to be justified, knowledge needs to be based on reasoning that takes account of chance, luck, misapprehension, illusions etc. This is why Descartes came to the conclusion that there was only one bit of knowledge of which he could be entirely sure - the fact that he existed!

Of course the amount of justification required depends on the circumstances and the use to which the knowledge is being put. If someone asks you the time because the want to catch a train, the justification needed is less conclusive than if they need the time to calculate the longitude of a ship crossing the ocean.

So in conclusion there are certainly different standards by which we would assess propositions as being knowledge, and these standards vary significantly depending on the circumstances in which the statements are made.

the problem of the criterion

I find the problem of the criterion very interesting. My take on the problem is that we have a concept of "knowledge" which most people seem to understand. The question is how do we come to understand what we mean when we use the term "knowledge". Can we understand the meaning without resorting to instances?

When we develop language I think it is fair to say that basic concepts are "taught" by pointing to examples and saying "that is an example of x". The subject then begins to recognise what is common between all of the different instances and thereby how to use the term in meaningful language.
If we accept that there is a definition of knowledge which comprises several other concepts such as belief, truth and justification, then is it the case that our understanding of these concepts must precede our understanding of knowledge?

Could there in fact be a concept of knowledge which exists independently of any cases of knowledge or independently of language?

It does seem odd that we have a gut feeling that the term "knowledge" is something more than just a label.

I realise I am asking a lot more questions than I am answering!