In a recent speech on the economic crisis George Soros makes some interesting comments about the cause of the financial crisis.
http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/
It's interesting to read his remarks in the light of the debate on free will, for example:
"Scientific method needs an independent criterion, by which the truth or validity of its theories can be judged. Natural phenomena constitute such a criterion; social phenomena do not. That is because natural phenomena consist of facts that unfold independently of any statements that relate to them. The facts then serve as objective evidence by which the validity of scientific theories can be judged. That has enabled natural science to produce amazing results. Social events, by contrast, have thinking participants who have a will of their own. They are not detached observers but engaged decision makers whose decisions greatly influence the course of events. Therefore the events do not constitute an independent criterion by which participants can decide whether their views are valid. In the absence of an independent criterion people have to base their decisions not on knowledge but on an inherently biased and to greater or lesser extent distorted interpretation of reality. Their lack of perfect knowledge or fallibility introduces an element of indeterminacy into the course of events that is absent when the events relate to the behavior of inanimate objects. The resulting uncertainty hinders the social sciences in producing laws similar to Newton’s physics."
Soros thereby gives us two reasons why he thinks determinism does not apply to the social sciences: incomplete knowledge and fallibility. When human beings make decisions they base these decisions on an incomplete picture and they sometimes make mistakes, they do not assess complex situations correctly.
I think most people will accept that both of these statements are true - and I think this is a good basis to argue for lack of determinism in human actions. Could it be that by "free will" what we actually mean is that we do not, and cannot, ever know all of the facts relevant to a situation and also that our human judgement is sometimes faulty?
If we did have perfect knowledge and never made mistakes then it seems much more plausible that free will might not exist, but can we accept that neither of these conditions is likely ever to persist?
Sunday, June 17, 2012
Realism
Is the statement that "we cannot abstract out our own perspective from our view of the external world" a fatal blow to realism?
Even if the statement were true, it would not speak "conclusively" to truth or falsity of an external world. The statement is not a metaphysical statement but an epistemological statement. It says "we cannot know if an external world exists", rather than "an external world does not exist". I do not believe it is possible to reach such a fundamental metaphysical conclusion based on this epistemological proposition.
I also believe that the statement is incorrect. I believe it is possible, in one very important sense, to abstract our own perspective from our view of the external world.
What we think we know about the world is not just taken from our own experience or perspective. Our knowledge of the world is built from the shared experiences of millions of people, written down and recorded over history. The process of scientific discovery is by its very nature the process of abstracting our own perspective from our view of the external world.
We don't just passively experience things in real-time through our five senses and then later recall these experiences via our memory. We are also blessed with the power of reason. I think that by our powers of reason we provide structure to the external world and that the only coherent explanation of why and how this works is that the external world must have structure and exist independently of us.
I think a realist approach is the only credible and coherent approach to take - I look upon rejections of realism as somewhat "trivial" attempts to twist logic and reason into reaching an absurd conclusion.
It is my view that the burden of proof lies with those that reject realism - is there any good reason to think that the external world does not exist? The subjectivity of secondary qualities is easily explained, and rather than casting doubt on the existence of things in themselves, it lends support to the common-sense realist approach that the external world does exist.
Even if the statement were true, it would not speak "conclusively" to truth or falsity of an external world. The statement is not a metaphysical statement but an epistemological statement. It says "we cannot know if an external world exists", rather than "an external world does not exist". I do not believe it is possible to reach such a fundamental metaphysical conclusion based on this epistemological proposition.
I also believe that the statement is incorrect. I believe it is possible, in one very important sense, to abstract our own perspective from our view of the external world.
What we think we know about the world is not just taken from our own experience or perspective. Our knowledge of the world is built from the shared experiences of millions of people, written down and recorded over history. The process of scientific discovery is by its very nature the process of abstracting our own perspective from our view of the external world.
We don't just passively experience things in real-time through our five senses and then later recall these experiences via our memory. We are also blessed with the power of reason. I think that by our powers of reason we provide structure to the external world and that the only coherent explanation of why and how this works is that the external world must have structure and exist independently of us.
I think a realist approach is the only credible and coherent approach to take - I look upon rejections of realism as somewhat "trivial" attempts to twist logic and reason into reaching an absurd conclusion.
It is my view that the burden of proof lies with those that reject realism - is there any good reason to think that the external world does not exist? The subjectivity of secondary qualities is easily explained, and rather than casting doubt on the existence of things in themselves, it lends support to the common-sense realist approach that the external world does exist.
Locke and Berkeley
Does Locke or Berkeley give a better account of the primary/secondary property distinction?
I think neither Locke nor Berkeley give a wholly satisfactory explanation of primary and secondary qualities but tend towards Locke having a slightly more coherent view.
In favour of Locke, I can understand the distinction he draws between those qualities which are less prone to subjective "distortion". Physical extension, number, motion and even place in time seem to be "qualities" which are of a somewhat different nature from taste, smell, colour etc. Secondary qualities tend to be highly subjective and depend very much on the "point of view" of the subject.
I reject however, Locke's belief that secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves". There is something (a physical quality) in objects over and above a "power" to produce certain sensations in sentient beings. I believe that our sensations are in fact caused by physical properties of objects and we directly perceive that quality, but the precise nature of our perception depends on the circumstances under which we perceive it.
Locke thinks that a sharp pin having the power to cause the idea of pain is analogous to a tomato having the power to cause the idea of red. I don't think these two example are really comparable in the way Locke does. Pain is not a quality of a pin - sharpness is the quality of the pin which compares to the redness of a tomato.
Berkeley does not make a convincing case for either his epistemological or metaphysical claims. I flatly reject his claim that we cannot abstract qualities. I also reject his proposition that all ideas are entirely dependent on minds. He thinks that ideas are caused by God whereas are more coherent view is that ideas are caused by the external world. Berkeley has no clear conception of what God is, and whether there is only one God or many. Since we cannot have an idea of what God is other than the cause of all ideas I think it makes more sense to replace God with an external world. I accept that in a very strict sense this is an assumption, but feel that the burden of proof lies with those that claim the external world does not exist.
I think neither Locke nor Berkeley give a wholly satisfactory explanation of primary and secondary qualities but tend towards Locke having a slightly more coherent view.
In favour of Locke, I can understand the distinction he draws between those qualities which are less prone to subjective "distortion". Physical extension, number, motion and even place in time seem to be "qualities" which are of a somewhat different nature from taste, smell, colour etc. Secondary qualities tend to be highly subjective and depend very much on the "point of view" of the subject.
I reject however, Locke's belief that secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves". There is something (a physical quality) in objects over and above a "power" to produce certain sensations in sentient beings. I believe that our sensations are in fact caused by physical properties of objects and we directly perceive that quality, but the precise nature of our perception depends on the circumstances under which we perceive it.
Locke thinks that a sharp pin having the power to cause the idea of pain is analogous to a tomato having the power to cause the idea of red. I don't think these two example are really comparable in the way Locke does. Pain is not a quality of a pin - sharpness is the quality of the pin which compares to the redness of a tomato.
Berkeley does not make a convincing case for either his epistemological or metaphysical claims. I flatly reject his claim that we cannot abstract qualities. I also reject his proposition that all ideas are entirely dependent on minds. He thinks that ideas are caused by God whereas are more coherent view is that ideas are caused by the external world. Berkeley has no clear conception of what God is, and whether there is only one God or many. Since we cannot have an idea of what God is other than the cause of all ideas I think it makes more sense to replace God with an external world. I accept that in a very strict sense this is an assumption, but feel that the burden of proof lies with those that claim the external world does not exist.
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