Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Hume and causation

My post today are my initial thoughts on the question as to whether two things that are distinct and separate could be necessarily connected, taking the premises of an argument and its conclusion as the  example of two distinct and separate things.

So, the question becomes, is the conclusion of an argument necessarily connected with its premises?

My thoughts on this example, is that arguments which take the form of premises and a conclusion are not, in themselves, "matters of fact" as Hume defines them, but are "relations of ideas". The argument may be about a matter of fact, but the nature of the argument itself is a relation of ideas and depends on the logical structure of the argument and the meanings of the words used. I therefore think that Hume would say that the form of an argument can be known a priori, but the conclusion of an argument about a matter of fact can never be known a priori.

I will try and clarify this with an example. Take the argument "if the water in the glass is freezing then the temperature must be at or below zero degrees centigrade".

The argument is about a matter of fact, but we cannot tell from the premise that the conclusion necessarily follows. Even where the argument employs a law of nature such as 'water freezes at or below zero degrees centigrade', Hume would argue that conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premise if it is a contingent fact, and it could just as easily be otherwise (logically speaking).

If we assume that the law of nature in question is universal, then the conclusion does follow. Hume would say that this assumption is just that, a contingent idea which results from the constant conjunction of freezing temperatures with frozen water.

I am struggling to formulate why I think Hume may not be right in the instance of laws of nature, because my personal view is that when they are employed in arguments, there is some form of necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion - either because language has petrified certain truths (as Wittgenstein might say) or because the connection is innate (as Descartes might say), or because reason has super-imposed the necessary connection of cause and effect (as Kant would say).

Sunday, February 24, 2013

The distinction between particulars and universals


The philosophical ‘problem of universals’ is an ancient one, which continues to be debated in the modern-day. The problem concerns the ontological status of properties and relations. To solve the problem we need to address a fundamental question about universals: do they ‘exist’ as mind independent entities, and if so, what is their nature? In order to examine this problem, we need to be clear about the distinction between particulars and universals.

A ‘particular’ is an individual entity such as a specific blade of grass or a specific tree. Particulars are (in most cases) things we can point to, or that can be observed by at least one of the senses.  Particulars can exist over time, but they can only be in one place at a time, they are ‘non-repeatable’ entities.

It is necessarily true that all particulars must have at least some properties (or qualities), for example the colour of a blade of grass or the smell of a piece of bark. Particulars also stand in relation to other particulars, for example one tree is to the left of another tree, or one specific tree is taller or older than another specific tree. These properties (e.g. green-ness) and relations (e.g. to the left of) can be seen to be in more than one place at one time, they are repeatable. The abstract noun ‘tree’ can be used to describe many items and is also repeatable.

The philosophical question is how can properties exist in more than one place at one time? If lots of things are green do they all share in the same green-ness? What is green-ness? Does green-ness exist independently of the particular items that are green? These questions extend to relations and abstract nouns. If one tree is taller than another tree, what is the nature of tall-ness? When we talk about ‘trees’ in general (i.e. abstract as opposed to concrete noun) what are we referring to? We can also extend the investigation to cover non-physical abstract nouns such as ‘justice’ and ‘goodness’.

These questions - how individual properties can be shared, how one quality or relation can be the same as another and what it is that we refer to when we use abstract nouns, are referred to as the problems of qualitative identity and resemblance. The solution, at least for some, is to posit entities called ‘universals’.

Linguistically, proper names stand for particulars whereas adjectives, verbs and prepositions stand for universals. Thus ‘London’ (proper noun) is a particular, whereas the adjective ‘green’ in the phrase ‘the green apple’ and the verb ‘like’ in the phrase ‘I like apples’ and the preposition ‘on’ in the phrase ‘the apple on the table’ are all universals. We know what the proper name London stands for, but what do universals stand for?

Universals, if they exist as entities, may be thought to be mind-independent. For Plato, they are immaterial ‘Forms’ which are transcendent, they exist in an abstract realm and can only be known by reason. For others, such as Aristotle, they are in the world, they reside in individual items. For Armstrong, universals are features of the world that are instantiated by particulars.

There are therefore a number of competing theories which attempt to solve the problem of universals. By no means all philosophers believe that universals do in fact exist as distinguishable entities, for them the world is made up only of particulars.

Laws of nature

I have been reading the Stanford Encyclopædia article on the subject of laws of nature. The concept of universal laws is relevant to the philosophical problem of induction, and also comes into other metaphysical problems including epistemology and the philosophy of propositions.

It is interesting to try and define what "makes" a universal law. The account which I particularly like explains universal laws in terms of deductive systems, with strength and simplicity being the key characteristics of a universal law.

Another approach employs the philosophical concept of universals to analyse laws of nature. This view was set out by Armstrong as follows:
"Suppose it to be a law that Fs are Gs.F-ness and G-ness are taken to be universals. A certain relation, a relation of non-logical or contingent necessitation, holds between F-ness and G-ness. This state of affairs may be symbolized as‘N(F,G)’"

According to Stanford, the majority of contemporary philosophers are realists about laws; they believe that some reports of what the laws are succeed in describing reality. There are, however, some antirealists who disagree. More on that later.

Friday, February 22, 2013

Sam Harris on free will


Harris presents his arguments fairly well, but on this topic I don't agree with him at all.
His basic argument is hard determinism re-hashed. He says every event is either caused by a prior chain of cause and effect, or it's random.

I am still intrigued by why a determinist would believe in randomness, it seems completely contradictory to me. And he gives no justification in the lecture for why the only other option is physical cause and effect. He just accepts this as a given, missing the entire point of the argument for free will. Harris seems to look upon the brain as merely a physical machine, taking no account of consciousness and the power of reason at all.

It's a shame that Christopher Hitchens is no longer with us, he could point us in the direction to the most intelligent way of looking at the problem....

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Free will vs. determinism

What I believe (is obviously true) is that there is interaction between the mental world, where we have free will and the physical world, where the mental act leads us to influence the physical world. Once the physical world starts "moving", then laws of causation apply.

So if I decide to scratch my nose, I send signals to the muscles in my arm which raise my hand to my nose. If my hand then brushes a fly away, it's flight path is subject to the laws of cause and effect.
My free decision to scratch my nose was not pre-determined, it is not random, and it is the result of a free choice which is the origin of a string of cause and effect.

Hard determinists must find it impossible to discipline their children. If they have no free will then how can they blame them for bad behaviour?

The truth is that no-one really believes in hard determinism, they can't. That I think is why Peter Strawson starts his essay with the admission that he does not really understand what determinism is.
Philosophers who defend determinism often resort to a fallacious argument along the lines of "everything must have a physical cause" and then use a regress argument to show that free will cannot be the original cause. They come across like Berkeley did arguing for idealism, using rules they make up themselves (B.'s ideas must resemble their cause) to justify their chain of reasoning and ending up with a result which is contrary to common sense and denies the very nature of humanity.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

Strawson and compatibilism

P.F. Strawson makes a case for a kind of compatibilism in his 1962 essay 'Freedom and Resentment". Strawson argues that, for any discussion of human morality, determinism is in effect not significant.
In order to be treated as moral agents, we need to be said to have free will, otherwise we remain blameless for our bad actions and gain no credit for good actions.This is in fact how we all behave (unless we are mentally abnormal).

Strawson admits that he does not understand exactly what is meant by determinism, but takes the view that if it is true, it is not significant for any debate about human freedom. Hence he is in effect taking a psuedo-compatibilist stance.

One of Strawson's key points is that there are reasons for regarding praise or blame as inappropriate attitudes for people to hold about other people, but the truth of determinism is not one of those reasons and hence determinism is not significant. Determinism is never a reason for suspending our "reactive attitudes" and we cannot imagine having no reactive attitudes at all.

So in effect Strawson's approach is not to attempt to prove or disprove determinism, but to show that it is irrelevant to the discussion of human behaviour.

I agree with the thrust of Strawson's argument but he is only a psuedo-compatibilist. He does not reject determinism, he bypasses it.

Free Will

My initial view is that as humans we (effectively) have free will. Having free will is part of the core definition of a human, so if I voted otherwise I would be claiming that we are not in fact human.
I do believe in universal laws, such as gravity and the speed of light in a vacuum. But there is a point where the human brain can decide to act in a certain way that is not predetermined.
I accept that the choices we make (the vast majority of which are subconscious) are influenced by our environment, but we are not machines subject to the absolute rule of causality. The brain is much much too complicated for this, and the influence of random events is influential in deciding the way we behave.

Berkeley and idealism contd.

I have been re-reading the extract from Berkeley to try and pick out some of the flaws in his arguments.

B. states that to reject the principles and theorems of science is not equivalent to denying the existence of a material world, since the theorems of science are "intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter". B. has misunderstood what it means to deny a theorem. It is not the same to deny that theorems exist as it is to deny the conclusion of a theorem. The theorems of science posit things about the natural (real or external) world and to deny them is exactly to deny the existence of the external world. B. cannot claim the "common sense" position without absurdity.

When talking about secondary qualities, B. moves from the argument that "To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another" to the position that whatever we perceive cannot be the same as what exists (in the case of different temperatures being felt by two hands and in the case of pain) and from this to the rejection of material things existing at all. What B. is missing is the explanation that things appear differently at different times and under different circumstances. All B. has proved by the hands in water example is that we have a point of view of reality.

B. uses the example of the same objects appearing to be different sizes at the same time to different animals as an argument to reject primary qualities as existing in objects. I don't really follow B.'s argument unless he is suggesting that for something to exist it must appear exactly the same under every point of view, which is the argument he used for secondary qualities and is false.
B.'s mis-step then is to knock down the straw man that he puts up, but the straw man is not a good one. In order for there to be an external world it is not necessary that existence is exactly the same as perception.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Berkeley and idealism

I think Dr Johnson has a point, and agree with him, perhaps this is because I am a direct (or naive) realist. Admittedly, Dr Johnson makes the point with some theatrics and unlike Berkeley doesn't take many pages to do it, but he is still making a philosophical point.

Berkeley's argument is clever, but flawed. The key sign that he is not onto a winner is when he appeals to the existence of a supernatural being that we can never experience, or even form a clear idea of, to support his metaphysics. Being a Bishop will do that to people smile I will try and pick apart his argument in a slightly more sophisticated manner in a different post, but there is so much wrong with it that I want to marshal my thoughts first.

I think we are entitled to start from the assumption that the world is real, it is an abductive argument perhaps, but it fits so well compared to Berkeley's fantasy.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Dr Johnson and Bishop Berkeley

After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of
Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and
that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall
forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty
force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- "I refute it
thus."


Dr Johnson's argument is a very good one, and puts philosophers in their place. A more sophisticated argument for common sense is 'Here is a hand" by GE Moore.

I often wonder if a 'Moorean Shift' is in order with all of this discussion of qualia and epiphenomenalism?

I am a direct realist - I think that what we see is real, and it just appears to us the way it appears to us. The fact that appearances are not consistent is not an argument against realism, it is actually an argument in support of direct realism. To say that we can't perceive the real object behind the appearance of the object is, to me, unhelpful and confusing.
If we make the assumption that the world is real and we are independent of it, and we accept the common sense and scientific explanation of the world, then we would expect the world to appear different to different people. So realism is coherent, common sense, justified by our experiences and the best explanation we have.

Being wrong about colour

I think there can be two ways in which we can be wrong about a colour. One is if we subsequently realise that we were experiencing an optical illusion. The other is if other people convince us that we were experiencing an illusion.

In both cases what matters is coherence - a yardstick by which we can establish objective truth. Other people can only convince us that we were mistaken if their account is more coherent than our initial account.

So objective truth for me does not depend on the existence of an external world at all, but on the coherence of our views about the world.

Objectivity

Apologies but I am a bit behind this week due to workload in my day job. I'm intending to catch up over the next few days.
 
My initial thoughts about objective truth, without having read anything on this week's topic other than the introduction, is that in order for something to be capable of being objectively true there could be two scenarios:

1. There is only one consciousness. Under this scenario then 'states of affairs' which are coherent and justified by 'evidence' become objectively if they indicate the existence of an external (to the single consciousness) world that is governed by universal laws. Whether or not there is in fact a world that is external to the single consciousness is perhaps uncertain, but from the point of view of the single consciousness it probably doesn't matter so long as it seems that way.
2. There are multiple conscious entities and they agree on certain states of affairs (at least by their apparent behaviour). Again, the existence of an external physical world is probably not important. What is important is that the beliefs are coherent and indicate the existence of universal laws or at least apparent consistency in the way that the external world is.

Friday, February 8, 2013

Epiphenominalsim

Epiphenomenalism is the view that some ideas are epiphenomenal - that some ideas come about in the brain but have no effect on the physical world. This is closely related to the debate between materialists and idealists.

According to Stanford, "The central motivation for epiphenomenalism lies in the premise that anything that can causally contribute to a physical event must itself be a physical event. If a mental event is something other than a physical event, then for it to make any causal contribution of its own in the physical world would require a violation of physical law."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/

The original argument that Jackson devised in Mary's room (explained in the Philosophy Bites podcast 'What Mary Knew') to show that materialism is inadequate to explain the way the world is concerned Mary, who even though she knew everything about the colour red in physical terms without actually having perceived it, would in effect not know what seeing red was actually like.
So the perception of red, or at least the qualia red, is a mental activity which is unrelated to physics in a sense.

So the red rose isn't really red at all (under a physicalist view), it is only when we perceive it that we get the qualia red in our mind (the idea). To tie this into Locke, under an epiphenomenalist view the rose doesn't cause the perception of red as Locke argued.

Saturday, February 2, 2013

More on universals

One major idea behind medieval nominalism is that universals are not entities but concepts or general names (lat. nomina) that we use to pick out certain features of particulars.

I am in favour of the medieval approach smile

I see universals such as "red", "hot" and "north" as concepts which tie together the common properties of particulars, which are then named. So "north" becomes the concept which means closest to the north pole (of a magnet or of the Earth). I can't get my head round how north could be an entity in any other manner than a concept which describes a spacial relation or a rule for help in navigating. It may then acquire other meanings in language, but the first people to use the term north must have used it as a rule to describe that spacial relation, or perhaps to point to a particular place that is north of another place.

I have been trying to imagine a world without any people, to think through what implications that might have on my opinion about particulars and universals. In such a world I think we would still have particulars, but I'm not sure if we would have universals. As soon as we bring sentient beings into the world I think they must create universals, which implies to me that they must be man made.

However, picking up on Armstrong's view about scientific laws, I then thought that perhaps I am wrong! In a world without people we would still have "gravity" as a universal law, and so I switched back to thinking that universals are things which are, quite literally "universal". This may sound naive, it certainly does as I type it.

My only conclusion is that we can probably define "universal" to mean whatever we want. Since it is not an object we can point at, no-one can truly (or perhaps helpfully) say "No, your wrong, you don't actually mean what you just said".

From my previous course, I came down on the side of believing that there is some form of contradiction when we reject a universal law. Whether this contradiction is imposed by our understanding (Kant) or by our language (Wittgenstein) or is innate, I'm not sure. Perhaps it is all three.

I want to come down on the side of a simplistic approach, and say that universals apply to universal "things" such as either laws of nature, or concepts which apply everywhere and at every time (such as north, red, hot and even horse).

I like Armstrong's focus on truth-makers, but I think this allows for a large number of universals.
Whether these universals are man-made or "in" nature is still up for grabs. Hume would argue that we can never know whether they are "in" nature, and it does seem to be that you have to have an omniscient point of view in order to know the truth. This becomes an epistemological question.
From a metaphysical standpoint I want to say that universals exist as concepts, but I'm not sure whether we can say more about their ontological status.