Wednesday, September 26, 2012

statues of Daedalus

Was Plato right to say that knowledge is better than true belief?
The difference between knowledge and true belief is that knowledge is justified and is not obtained through "luck".
I have already considered whether knowledge can be said to have intrinsic value. The general consensus I think is that is is often difficult to identify what (if any) intrinsic value there is to knowledge. I will therefore try and answer the question by considering whether knowledge has, by its nature, greater extrinsic (i.e. instrumental) value compared with true belief.
Pritchard, along with Plato, seems to think that knowledge does have more instrumental value because it is less likely to change. I think that the ability to justify true belief must also add to the level of conviction of the believer. If we are more confident that our belief is justified, then we are more likely to "leverage" this knowledge and thereby exploit its instrumental value.
For example, David Hume points out that we we cannot (and should not) take a sceptical view of causation in relation to "everyday life", since we would be paralysed by uncertainty. By justifying our beliefs about cause and effect in terms of scientific theories which are supported by evidence, we can overcome this scepticism and thereby provide support to the many "rules of thumb" which we rely on. In science, the "natural laws" which we have developed provide a framework by which we can predict the future and  understand (even control) our environment. I see these natural laws as a type of justified true belief (i.e. knowledge) which compares to a world view which comprises merely true belief, where we would not be able to benefit from scientific advances to anything like the same degree.

Monday, September 24, 2012

Can propositional knowledge be intrinsically valuable?

I'm not sure I can give an example of knowledge that is intrinsically valuable. It depends on your moral value system - the system by which you ascribe "value" to things.

If I take a purely Utilitarian view then it can be argued that only things which promote happiness have value, and in this respect knowledge would have to have some practical or instrumental value for it be valuable.

There are plenty of other schools of philosophy which place value on non instrumental or at least non directly instrumental things, such as truth, beauty, friendship and wisdom.

The example given elsewhere of potentially intrinsically valuable knowledge is friendship. Can it be said that I would get value from the knowledge that someone is my friend, even if it is of no instrumental value at all, for example I know x is my friend (this is a justified true belief) but I never have any subsequent contact with x so they don't do me any favours, or support me emotionally?
Could it not be the case that because I know I have a friend I in effect do get some instrumental value because it makes me happy?

What do we mean by wisdom?

To me "wisdom" implies the ability to bring to bear appropriate knowledge at the appropriate time. I don't thing there is anything "in" the knowledge that makes the knower wise.

People talk of "deeper" truths, which implies that someone who is wise has access to different bits of knowledge (the deeper ones) than others who don't.

I don't really think this is how it works. Someone who is wise, because for example they have more life experience, has merely collected more knowledge that is appropriate to the questions or problems being posed.

I'm not disputing that wisdom involves the way we use the knowledge that we have as well as the quantity of knowledge, but that is different from saying that there is something inherently different about the knowledge.

Does a wise person really know a different type of proposition is true compared to a less wise person? That would be an interesting discussion point I think.

There is more to wisdom than what is known, there are skills possessed by the wise that aren't possessed by the less wise, but these skills don't constitute propositional knowledge, which is what I am trying to explore here.

Would you say that to be classified as wise a person needs "emotional intelligence", i.e. they have to be more "self aware". If we do think that wisdom implies a different type of propositional knowledge then what what are those types of propositions?

Is a society based on myhts and conventions inferior to one based on knowledge?

A society based on myths and conventions is not necessarily bad, but human nature being what it is, it is very likely that such a society would lack human dignity and freedom. Those with power will use their power for selfish reasons and then we get into the realm of propaganda, secrecy and oppression.

Borrowing again from Richard Dawkins, the best reason to believe that something is true is evidence and not tradition, authority or revelation. Pre-Enlightenment societies maintained their conventions not on scientific enquiry and openness but on tradition and authority.

There is something valuable in being confident that what you assert is in fact true. This means also that you need to admit that you don't know everything! By placing a value on the truth this emancipates members of society, since anyone with a brain and the power to reason can draw their own conclusions about what to believe and what not to believe based on the evidence.

Furthermore, for markets to work efficiently the market participants need to have knowledge, which in turn necessitates that what they know is true. An economic system based on lies and misconceptions is doomed to failure (there are plenty of examples).

Friday, September 21, 2012

The instrumental value of true belief

To what extent is knowledge (true belief) instrumentally valuable? Is it always instrumentally valuable or is this not the case?

Knowledge has instrumental value when it serves a purpose, in philosophical terms this would be expressed in terms of 'teleos'.

I will first look at the question from a practical standpoint and then consider some other arguments for and against the intrinsic value of knowledge.

On a practical level, there may be cases where having knowledge can be counter-productive. Prichard gives the example of someone needing to jump across a ravine to get to safety. If they have the knowledge that they are unlikely to make it then they are less likely to succeed if they hesitate as a result of having this knowledge. However, I think this example is an exception which needs further examination. In almost all cases it would be better to know if you were able to jump the ravine. Furthermore, if the knowledge of your slim chance of success was also accompanied by a knowledge of the psychological effect that this knowledge causes, then it is possible that the person could overcome their nerves. This is to argue that knowledge is not harmful if it is accompanied by sufficient additional knowledge. Furthermore, if they really had complete insight they would never have got themselves into the dangerous situation in the first place!

The phrase 'Ignorance is bliss' expresses the thought that it is sometimes better not to know. If one takes a utilitarian view of life in terms of the Greatest Happiness Principle, then it is apparent that some knowledge is better to be left undiscovered. Both on a personal level and on a societal level we can all think of examples of knowledge which detracts from the sum of total happiness. It might be thought that mankind would be better off in the long run if it never acquired the ability to destroy the world - for example the knowledge required to manufacture nuclear warheads and to convert fossil fuels into energy on a massive scale.

I also think that it can be argued on a deeper level that not all knowledge is intrinsically valuable. Learning for learning's sake expresses the view that there is some value in acquiring knowledge for its own sake. It could however be the process of acquiring knowledge that is useful and not the knowledge itself.

It seems to be human nature to want to acquire knowledge, whether this is driven by 'nature' or 'nurture' it seems to be part of the human condition that we value knowledge over ignorance. There are however cases where knowledge is not valued. It could be argued that many religious beliefs are very highly valued but are the antithesis of knowledge, since they cannot on the whole be classified as justified true beliefs.

In order to adequately answer the question of whether all knowledge has instrumental value I believe it is first necessary to agree what is the purpose of life. This is of course an almost impossible question. My own view is that life does not have a purpose, over and above any purpose we ascribe to it. Richard Dawkins expresses this view very elegantly. He asks why we suppose that life should have a purpose any more than why a mountain or the colour blue has purpose.

Thursday, September 20, 2012

Theory of Knowledge course started

My second online course with Oxford University Continuing Education commenced this week. There seem to be 25 or so students on the course, from many different countries. The first week involves making introductions, reviewing the material concerning the online method of study and beginning to get to grips with some epistemology.

The set text used throughout the course is What is This Thing Called Knowledge by Duncan Pritchard.

The first formal question I have been tasked with addressing is as follows:
"say what you think about the instrumental value of true belief? Is it always for example, instrumentally valuable?"