Wednesday, January 25, 2012

Hume's Treastise, Book 1, Part 1

In Section 2 of Book 1, Part 1, Hume starts by examining impressions. He divides them into two kinds: sensations and reflections. The first "arise in the soul originally, from unknown causes". The second "is derived in a great measure from our ideas". They occur in the that order, with the idea being a sort of "copy" of the impression. The latter "may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it". When impressions first strike us, being "vivacious" and "lively", they are objects of memory. When we reflect on them, when we repeat our impressions in the mind, they are objects of imagination and tend to be less vivacious.

In Section 3, Hume explains how memory is more "tied down" than imagination, without the same power of variation. This, Hume argues, is self-evident and does not warrant further exposition. This aspect of Hume's epistemology is discussed in 'Hume’s Theory of Imagination' by Gerhard Streminger, Hume Studies Volume VI, Number 2 (November, 1980). I particularly like this paper as it uses the word "propaedeutic" which I am fairly sure you, like me, will need to look up.

Section 4 is titled "Of the connexion or association of ideas" and is where Hume begins to flesh-out his theory and place further limits on the the extent of human knowledge. Ideas become connected or associated in the mind through three main routes: resemblance, contiguity in time or place and cause and effect. Of these, the strongest and most extensive, is cause and effect, which is going to be the subject of further examination.

At the end of Section 4, Hume describes the three categories of complex ideas which arise through the three forms of association described earlier, these are: relations, modes and substances. They are then described in more detail in Sections 5 and 6.

According to Hume, there are seven different types of (philosophical) relation:
  1. resemblance
  2. identity
  3. space and time
  4. quantity or number
  5. degree of some quality, such as weight or colour
  6. contrariety, such as existence and non-existence
  7. cause and effect
In Part 6, Hume argues that "the idea of substance must...be derived from an impression of reflexion, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."

Part 7 discusses abstract and general ideas and examines "whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them." The conclusion is that "the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degree of each". Hume therefore rejects the notion of abstract ideas. This section is a little complicated. For further discussion I recommend 'Abstract General Ideas in Hume' by George S. Pappas, Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989). To quote, "The main contention of the paper is that the rejection of abstraction and abstract general ideas lies at the very heart of the philosophy of Berkeley, and that pretty much the same may be said for Hume. Berkeley’s defense of a kind of idealism stands or falls with the success of his attack on abstract general ideas, and Hume’s critique of infinite divisibility in matters pertaining to space and time, along with his destructive critique of various metaphysical notions, crucially depends on the successful denial of abstract general ideas."



This takes us to the end of Part 1 of Book 1 of the Treatise. I will continue with Part 2 in my next update.

Monday, January 23, 2012

Hume and the missing shade of blue

I made reference earlier to 'Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed' by John O. Nelson in Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989).

I think I agree with the following paragraph, which it seems to me is a fair basis on which to consider the case of the missing shade of blue as being not fatal to Hume's philosophy as set out in the Treatise. Indeed, when seen in the context described below, the missing shade of blue is not perhaps the 'exception that proves the rule' but rather 'the exception that proves the nature of the rule.

"One might profitably compare Hume's views in the present regard with Descartes' on essence and existence. According to Descartes, essence and existence are always, at least insofar as God is not concerned,“separable.” Thus, in imagining a triangle (says Descartes) he conceives its essence; nonetheless, ”there may nowhere in the world be such a figure outside my thought." In spite of some appearance to the contrary, Hume, I want to say, similarly maintains that ideas and their relations are separable from existence. Thus, what we discover in a thought experiment, like the color concession under discussion, really says nothing about what exists or does not exist in reality; it at most proves that a certain proposition, namely that stating that all simple ideas have correspondent, precedent impressions, is not an apriori, necessary proposition but a synthetic, aposteriori proposition. On the other hand, the proposition stating that all simple ideas have correspondent, precedent impressions, or the first principle of the science of man, does refer to what exists or does not exist in actual reality. Hence, being only in idea or in one’s thought experiment a phenomenon, the phenomenon of the missing shade of blue projects merely the idea of a contradiction to the first principle of the science of man, not an instance of an actual exception to the first principle and, hence, not something actually falsifying that principle. Thus, without real inconsistency but only an apparent one, Hume is able both to maintain that all simple ideas have correspondent, precedent impressions and that a contradictory phenomenon can be conceived."

Hume's Treatise contd.

So far, we have discovered that Hume is intending to employ an empirically based and reasoned approach to his investigation of human nature, or "the ultimate principles of the soul". Hume recognises at the outset that this is not going to be easy. Many others have set out on the same road, only to realise the impossibility the task. Indeed, it may be more prudent not to attempt such an enquiry, and thereby "avoid falling into error"; but we clearly get the impression by this point that Hume is quite willing to give it a try, or even perhaps believes that he has solved the problem.

It seems evident to Hume that we cannot "go beyond experience, or establish any principles that are not founded on that authority"  (i.e. experience). Here we have a clear statement of empiricism. It will be interesting to see why Hume thinks this is self evident, and what conclusions he draws even allowing for such limitations.

Book 1 - Of the Understanding

In Section 1 - Of the Origin of our Ideas, Hume begins to lay the groundwork and first draws a key distinction between two different types of perception: impressions and ideas. The difference between these two types of perception is "the degree of force or liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness."

It is interesting to me that, by starting at this point in his first book on philosophy, Hume has already taken quite a lot for granted. Unlike Descartes in Discourse on the Method, Hume hasn't questioned the concept of self or indeed of perception. It seems to be taken for granted that there is someone who perceives and something being perceived.

Further, we may need to go on to investigate if this distinction between impressions and ideas is the same, or similar, to philosophical dualism; for example, the Cartesian dualism between essence and existence which can be seen in Descartes' writings.

For Hume, impressions are the more vigorous type of perception, and include sensations, passions and emotions. Ideas are described as "fainter images" of these and include thinking and reasoning.

Hume says "I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction." I'm not sure I entirely agree that we can just accept this - a number of objections immediately spring to mind. For example, it is not always the case that emotions strike us more forcefully than reflective thoughts. Also, we have the case of dreams, where the distinction between Hume's impressions and ideas is much less clear-cut. For the time being however, I shall give Hume the benefit of the doubt and move on.

Hume then immediately recognises that the two counter-arguments above may be raised in objection, but concludes that it is nevertheless true that ideas and impressions are "in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads".

Next, Hume draws a distinction between simple and complex perceptions (both ideas and impressions). "Simple perceptions ...are such as admit of no distinction or separation. The complex are the contrary to these." For example, the idea of an apple is complex as it comprises a number of components. The components of the idea of an apple such as smell, taste and colour are simple perceptions.

Again, I think we can see what Hume is getting at, but I'm not convinced that our perceptions can be so clearly categorised. Indeed, objections to this theory can be quite extreme, such as the "compositionally nihilist" view, which renounces the literal existence of complex perceptions*.

Hume does not recognise any other possible distinction between impressions and ideas other than the degree of force and vivacity by which they are perceived. He says the two are remarkably similar in all other respects, indeed many (simple) impressions are subsequently perceived as ideas when we reflect upon or recall them. This lack of flexibility is a little alarming, but just because it doesn't at first pass the "smell test" doesn't necessarily make it unhelpful, we shall see.

In Hume's defence, I think we can all recognise the difference between a 'sense perception' and a 'thought'. If this distinction proves to be useful in formulating a theory of human nature, we should probably give Hume some leeway before rejecting his conclusions as being based on dodgy foundations.

Hume claims next that every simple idea has a simple impression that resembles it and vice versa, but this is not necessarily true for complex ideas and complex impressions.

Hume's "general proposition" which will be more fully examined in the Treatise is stated as follows: "That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent."

From this we take it that all simple ideas are preceded by (and later we find also caused by) a corresponding simple impression.

With regards to this proposition, Hume challenges us to come up with an exception to prove him wrong. I am slightly cheating here because I remember from my student days one exception which Hume examines next, namely the case of the missing shade of blue. If someone has seen lots of different shades of blue, but not one particular shade, it is argued that they could form an idea of this missing shade of blue, even if that they have not previously perceived that shade via a corresponding impression.**

Hume does not find this exception to be fatal, indeed he manages to convince himself that in a way it is the 'exception that proves the rule'. Ideas "produce the images of themselves" in new ideas, but "as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions". Hume believes therefore that his proposition still stands, because in the very rare case where a simple idea is not caused by a corresponding simple impression, that simple idea is in fact caused by copying another simple idea, which in turn was caused by a simple impression.

In the conclusion of section 1, Hume is confident that he has dispensed with any notion of innate ideas***.

I will continue with Section 2 tomorrow.



* See 'Hume on the Individuality of Complex Perceptions' by Jani Hakkarainen (2011) for an  analysis of this issue.
** See 'Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed' by John O. Nelson in Hume Studies Volume XV Number 2 (November 1989)
*** Innatism is a philosophical doctrine that holds that the mind is born with ideas/knowledge, and that therefore the mind is not a 'blank slate' at birth, as early empiricists such as John Locke claimed. It asserts therefore that not all knowledge is obtained from experience and the senses. (from Wikipedia)

Sunday, January 22, 2012

The most important philosopher ever to write in English

I was interested to see that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins its article on Hume as follows: "The most important philosopher ever to write in English."

Another of my intellectual heroes, Christopher Hitchens (1949-2011) was also a fan of David Hume:

Hume's Treatise

The Ninth Edition Britannica article on Hume is written by Robert Adamson, Professor of Logic and Philosophy at Owens College (Victoria University of Manchester) and subsequently at the Universities of Aberdeen and Glasgow.


Adamson argues that, despite Hume's subsequent discounting of his Treatise, through its "freshness and concentrated vigour" Hume is at his best in his first major work. According to Adams, "none of the principles of the Treatise are given up in later writings, and no additions are made to them". While this is debateable, it serves to underline the prominent place that the Treatise must hold for students of Hume.

Hume sent a copy of the Treatise to Butler, who as we have already noted was of some influence to Hume's thinking. Hume ranks Butler alongside Locke and Berkeley as the originators of the experimental method in moral science; Butler warmly commended Hume's essay to his friends. Both share Hume's sceptical conclusions regarding belief in matters of fact. Butler however,  retains confidence in the rational proofs for the existence of God alongside an a priori view of conscience.

I will no doubt return to arguments for and against the existence of God in later posts, but it is interesting to note that Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was published posthumously in 1779, originally with neither the author's nor the publisher's name.

The title page of the Treatise from the 1739 edition contains the following:

A Treatise of Human Nature : Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.
Rara temporum ƒelicitas, ubi ƒentire, quæ velis; quæ ƒentias, dicere licet.

One of the regrets of my comprehensive school education is that I was not given the opportunity to study Latin or Greek. Fortunately, Google came up with the meaning of the quotation from Tacitus: "Rare are the times you can, in turn, feel what you want and say what you feel. Try it."

Introduction to the Treatise

The opening sentence of the Introduction is as follows: "Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them."

The opening sentence might lead one to suspect that Hume is not going to follow this path, but as you read further you realise that in fact, this is exactly what Hume is setting out to do.

"Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself."

So Hume is attempting to come up with a whole system of philosophy, and is not merely commenting on previous attempts. This is why I admire Hume, the scope and originality of his Treatise is very impressive.

Hume goes on to point out that in philosophical debates "'Amidst all this bustle, 'tis not reason which carries the prize, but eloquence....The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers and musicians of the army". Here we get a clear "heads-up" that Hume is going to attempt to cut through the eloquence of his predecessors, which presumably hides their muddled thinking, and shine a light of reason on human nature. I find this amusing, given that Hume himself is so eloquent.

Hume's objective is to address the questions of metaphysics. He acknowledges that this is not going to be easy: "For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse".

Next, Hume stresses the connection between all of the sciences and the science of Man, i.e. Human Nature. By improving our understanding of metaphysics, he will no doubt have a significant influence on all other branches of human knowledge. Again, we begin to see the ambition of Hume's project - he isn't messing about on the periphery! Hume puts this very clearly: "In pretending therefore, to explain the priciples of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security."

Next, Hume introduces the importance of experience and observation, the scientific method: "And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to the science itself must be laid on experience and observation."

Hume recognises that his re-thinking of human nature, based on scientific method, may not be to everyone's taste. He stresses the credit that will come to England by advancing the frontiers of philosophy and appeals for moderation by praising the English traditions of toleration and liberty. At this point we begin to understand that his arguments will be somewhat controversial.

In a footnote, Hume gives credit in the introduction to "some late philosophers in England", namely Locke, Shaftsbury, Mandeville, Hutchinson and Butler who have begun to "put the science of man on a new footing" but we begin to suspect that Hume's self-confidence will deliver us something more comprehensive and final.

To be continued.

Saturday, January 21, 2012

What Happened Before the Big Bang? The New Philosophy of Cosmology

The Atlantic - What Happened Before the Big Bang? The New Philosophy of Cosmology

Last May, Stephen Hawking gave a talk at Google's Zeitgeist Conference in which he declared philosophy to be dead. In his book The Grand Design, Hawking went even further. "How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Traditionally these were questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead," Hawking wrote. "Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics."

Is philosophy "dead" or is Stephen Hawking wrong (again)?

David Hume (1711-1776)

If I had to select one, and only one, philosopher to study (which fortunately I don't!) then that philosopher would be David Hume.


Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland and is now recognised as one of the most important figures in Western philosophy, being a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. He is often grouped with John Locke (1632-1704) and George Berkeley (1685-1753), all of whom promoted an empiricist approach to philosophy which is based on evidence and observation (i.e. scientific method) as opposed to a priori ('arm-chair') reasoning.

Hume wrote extensively on philosophy, history and economics. To my mind his essays are surprisingly readable considering they are 270 years old. The National Library of Scotland holds several of his manuscripts, all of which are free to request by library members.

Two of Hume's most famous philosophical works are A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) and Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1777). It is mainly these two works that I will refer to for subsequent posts on Hume.

His talents were perhaps not fully appreciated by his mother, who is reported to have said of her youngest son "Our Davie 's a fine good natured crater, but uncommon wake-minded". He studied at Edinburgh University, "passing the ordinary course of education with success", leaving with at least a fair knowledge of Latin and at least an acquaintance with Greek.

Literary influences at the start of his career include Cicero and Seneca as well as works by Locke, Berkeley and Joseph Butler (1692-1752). From a relatively early age, Hume displayed a passion for literature and investigations into human nature.

The first choice of a profession, that of law, made for him by his relatives who thought it suited his "studious habits, sobriety, and industry", proved unsuccessful. In 1734 he travelled to Bristol with the intention of entering into a "more active" mercantile life. Fortunately for us, he quickly "found the scene wholly unsuitable" and in the same year left for France. He visited Paris, Rheims and settled in La Flèche, famous in the history of philosophy as the school of René Descartes (1596,1650). It was while resident in France that he wrote Treatise.

Treastise comprises three books (i) Of the Understanding, (ii) Of the Passions, and (iii) Of Morals. The first two volumes were published in 1739 with the third following the next year. Their reception was somewhat underwhelming, as Hume vividly describes "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate; it fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a mumur among the zealots". "But, being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country".

The disclaimer of the Treatise in the preface to the Inquiry is famous, but has more to do with his disappointment at the reception of the Treatise than its shortcomings as a work of philosophy. The Advertisement, which is printed at the beginning of the 1777 posthumous reprint of Hume's Collected Essays in 1777 (i.e. the Enquiry), declares the author's desire that "the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles"
I will return to Hume's Treatise in my next post.

To finish, I will just underline the philosophical influence Hume has had by referring to some quotes from other philosophers (from Wikipedia):
  • Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
  • According to Schopenhauer, "there is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart and Schleiermacher taken together". 
  • A. J. Ayer, introducing his classic exposition of logical positivism (Language, Truth and Logic), claimed: "The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume."
  • Albert Einstein wrote that he was inspired by Hume's positivism when formulating his Special Theory of Relativity.
  • Hume was called "the prophet of the Wittgensteinian revolution" by N. Phillipson, referring to his view that mathematics and logic are closed systems, disguised tautologies, and have no relation to the world of experience.
  • David Fate Norton asserted that Hume was "the first post-sceptical philosopher of the early modern period".
  • Hume's Problem of Induction was also of fundamental importance to the philosophy of Karl Popper. In his autobiography, Unended Quest, he wrote: "'Knowledge' ... is objective; and it is hypothetical or conjectural. This way of looking at the problem made it possible for me to reformulate Hume's problem of induction". This insight resulted in Popper's major work The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In his Conjectures and Refutations, he writes: "I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified".

Friday, January 20, 2012

Homer and philosophy

Today's post is based on a Philosophy Bites podcast discussion between Sean Kelly and Nigel Warburton on the question: 'Is Homer, the great poet of antiquity, relevant to philosophy and if so how?'
  • Most philosophers who study the ancient Greeks focus their attentions on Aristotle, Plato and Socrates. Do philosophers overlook Homer, the poet and attributed author of the Iliad and Odyssey.
  • Homer, who is believed to have lived in the 8th century BC, stands at the foundation of the history of the West.
  • In philosophy he is often seen as providing a poor approximation of our modern, better, understanding of what type of beings humans are. The value gained from studying his philosophy can be characterised as providing insights through working out how and in what ways he was wrong about humankind.
  • We tend to believe that humans are beings who can take responsibility for their actions - this view was first made explicit by Kant in the late 18th century. By the mid 20th century, this rationality is at the centre of our conception of mankind.
  • Is it possible that, because Homer didn't have this modern philosophical conception of the type of beings we are, he might have better understood something important about the options that are available to us in thinking about the kind of beings we are?
  • The conception of human beings as, at their best, taking full responsibility for their actions is incredibly demanding -  this view is most clearly described by John Paul Sartre (1905-1980). For Sartre, Kant's freedom becomes an enormous burden.
  • Homer has a very different conception compared to Kant of what Human beings can be, when at their best. Homer says that the best life is the life that recognises an individual's dependence upon the gods.
  • We can interpret this in a very particular way, it is not necessary to believe in the Olympic Gods for us to benefit from this way of thinking. When humans are at their best they experience their activities as having a source that is not from them. Homer says that when his heroes do great things, their activities are drawn out of them by the Gods.
  • The analogy given is of great sportsmen or musicians. People who are really skilled at something, when they are at their best, tend to describe their actions as "not having themselves as their source."
  • There is also a danger in being too rational or over-reflective and this is illustrated by the paradox of Buridan's ass. This is the hypothetical situation wherein an ass is placed precisely midway between a stack of hay and a pail of water. Since the paradox assumes the ass will always go to whichever is closer, it will die of both hunger and thirst since it cannot make any rational decision to choose one over the other.
  • To live a good life sometimes involves just acting and not necessarily having a good reason for doing it.
  • The danger is that this leads us into immoral behaviour, for example the contagious emotion of the Nuremberg rally.
  • How can we hold onto Homer's idea but recognise that it is not necessarily useful in every case? We need to identify when it is appropriate and when not - this is a skill that we can develop.
  • Surely it is not right to avoid all circumstances where we could be drawn into irrational action by the our emotions, for example Martin Luther King's speech in Washington on civil rights helped us make progress in civil rights which was good for political and cultural progress.
  • In conclusion, Homer explains not just how we are but also how we ought to be - he gives a normative account of how men behave when at their best. Homer helps us avoid or resist the threat of not being able to recognise which action is most important - Friedrich Nietzsche's (1844-1900) nihilism, and Homer thereby remains interesting to today's philosopher.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

epistemology and æsthetics

Before proceeding with further considerations on the meaning of 'philosophy', I need to define epistemology, which is a term that appears frequently in philosophical writing.

Given that Wikipedia is down today, in protest at the United States' 'Stop Online Piracy' and 'Protect Intellectual Property' Bills, I turn to the Stamford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry."

Andrew Seth argues in Britannica that there is frequently confusion between psychology and the theory of knowledge. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is credited with first clearly making the distinction between the two, repeatedly insisting that his Critique of Pure Reason was not to be taken as a psychological enquiry. He defined his problem as the quid juris or the question of the validity of knowledge, not its quid facti, or the laws of the empirical genesis and evolution of intellection.


Britannica has a wonderful paragraph which brings this all together as follows:
"Appearing thus, first, as the problem of perception (in Locke and his English successors), widening its scope and becoming, in Kant's hands, the question of the possibility of experience in general, epistemology may be said to have passed with Hegel into a completely articulated "logic," that claimed to be at the same time a metaphysic, or an ultimate expression of the nature of the real. This introduces us to the second part of the question we are seeking to determine, namely, the relation of epistemology to metaphysics".

"These are ultimately two sides of the same enquiry. But it is not every thinker that can see his way with Hegel to assert in set terms the identity of thought and being. Hence the theory of knowledge becomes with some a theory of human ignorance."

I think this brings us neatly back to Wittgenstein.

Now I move on to æsthetics, which, according to Britannica may be treated as a department of psychology or physiology, which is the most frequent mode of treatment in England.
To what peculiar excitation of our bodily or mental organism, it is asked, are the emotions due which make us declare an object beautiful or sublime?

From Britannica:
  • A mere reference of these emotions to the mechanism and interactive play of our faculties cannot be regarded as an account of the nature of the beautiful
  • In the case of a beautiful object, the resultant pleasure borrows its specific quality from the presence of determinations essentially intellectual in their nature, though not reducible to the categories of science
  • We have a prima facie right, therefore, to treat beauty as an objective determination of things
  • The question of æsthetics would then be formulated - What is it in things that make them beautiful, and what is the relation of this aspect of the universe to its ultimate nature, as that is expounded in metaphysics
I suspect that the study of æsthetics (in a philosophical, not artistic, sense) has fallen somewhat out of fashion, but this interests me so I will post more on this topic in the future.

The remaining sections of the Britannica article which I have not commented on relate to ethics, or moral philosophy as it tends to be referred to in modern times. There is clearly a huge amount of thinking to be done on moral questions such as what is good, the principle of duty, the issue of free will and ultimately the laws of morality. I am very much looking forward to exploring these questions.
You may want to check out the excellent video series 'Justice' recorded at Harvard University with Michael Sandel for an introduction to some of the questions addressed by moral philosophy.

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

What is philosophy Part 3

Yesterday, I made some progress by starting to look at the Ninth Edition of Britannica. Given the quantity and depth of the Britannica article*, it was more than I could absorb in one sitting, so this post will continue from where I left-off yesterday.
From Britannica:
  • The way we commonly speak of "facts" is calculated to convey a false impression
  • The world is not a collection of individual facts existing side by side and capable of being known separately
  • A fact is nothing except in its relations to other facts
  • Moreover, every statement of fact involves certain general notions and theories
  • It is the office of philosophy, or theory of knowledge, to submit such conceptions to a critical analysis, with a view to discover how far they can be thought out, or how far, when this is done, they refute themselves, and call for a different form of statement, if they are to be taken as a statement of the ultimate nature of the real
On reading this section I am reminded of the opening of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) first book on philosophy.


When I first read Tractatus, or TLP as the 'professional' philosophers call it, it didn't make a lot of sense. I don't think I was alone**. Here is the opening section:

1       The world is all that is the case.
1.1    The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11  The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
1.12  For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
1.13  The facts in logical space are the world.

I think Wittgenstein is saying something similar to Andrew Seth, but much more obtusely, as is his style. Where Wittgenstein ends up in the final section of TLP is that certain things cannot be said meaningfully:
7       What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
No doubt we will return to this later but in the meantime I will continue with Britannica:
  • The nature of any fact is not fully known unless we know it in all its relations to the system of the universe, or in Spinoza's phrase "sub specie æternitatis"***
  • The sciences, one and all, deal with a world of objects, but the ultimate fact as we know it is the existence of an object for a subject
  • Subject-object knowledge, or more widely, self-consciousness with its implicates - this unity in duality is the ultimate aspect which reality presents
  • It has generally been considered, therefore, as constituting in a special sense the problem of philosophy
I have to confess that I find the above quite difficult to understand. I will try and clarify what this means in my next post. I was keen today to find out more about æsthetics, but it looks like that will have to wait for a future blog entry!



*Older editions of Britannica contain proper long articles, probably because they were written before the widespread intellectual dumbing down of Western society which has been noticeable since the Second World War.

** At the urging of Ramsey and others, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929. Keynes wrote in a letter to his wife: "Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 5.15 train." Despite this fame, he could not initially work at Cambridge as he did not have a degree, so he applied as an advanced undergraduate. Russell noted that his previous residency was sufficient for a PhD, and urged him to offer the Tractatus as his thesis. It was examined in 1929 by Russell and Moore; at the end of the thesis defence, Wittgenstein clapped the two examiners on the shoulder and said, "Don't worry, I know you'll never understand it." Moore wrote in the examiner's report: "I myself consider that this is a work of genius; but, even if I am completely mistaken and it is nothing of the sort, it is well above the standard required for the Ph.D. degree." Wittgenstein was appointed as a lecturer and was made a fellow of Trinity College. (from Wikipedia)

*** Wittgenstein deliberately borrowed the expression "sub specie aeternitatis" from Spinoza (Notebooks, 1914-16, p. 83) (from Wikipedia). This is interesting, could it be the case that Wittgenstein read the Ninth Edition Britannica article before he started on TLP or was he just well versed in Spinoza (1632-1677)?

Monday, January 16, 2012

What is philosophy Part 2

Not satisfied with the OED definition, let's take a look in the bible for looking-things-up pre the Internet era, Encylopædia Britannica.

The Ninth Edition of Britannia is a wonderful publication. Published in 1885, it contains articles written by some of the leading academics of the day. I was lucky enough to find a set in good condition at Barter Books in Alnwick in Northumberland many years ago.

Britannica has a five page article on the subject of philosophy. Consulting the List of Contributors in the Index we can see that the article was written by Andrew Seth MA, Professor of Logic at St Andrews University*
Extracts from EB:
  • The meaning and scope of the term philosophy has varied considerably according to the usage of different authors and different ages
  • Helpful introduction is to look at the historical use of the term in the history of Greek thought
  • The tradition which assigns the first use of the word to Pythagorus "has hardly any claim to be regarded as authentic" [I love the use of language in old editions of Britannica]
  • First used as a Greek verb by Herodotus and Thucydides, implying the pursuit of knowledge
  • A specific sense of the word firsts meets us in Plato, who defines the philosopher as one who apprehends the essence or reality of things in opposition to the man who dwells in appearances and the shows of sense
  • Logic, ethics, and physics, psychology, theory of knowledge, and metaphysics are all fused together by Plato in a semi-religious synthesis
  • It is not until we come to Aristotle - the enclopædist of the ancient world - that we find a demarcation of the different philosophic disciplines, corresponding, in the main, to that still current [in 1885 that is]
  • The earliest philosopher, or physiologers, had occupied themselves chiefly with what we may call cosmology; the one question which covers everything for them is that of the underlying substance of the world around them
  • In Socrates and Plato, the start is made from a consideration of man's moral and intellectual activity; but knowledge and action are confused with one another, as in the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge
  • To this correspond the Platonic confusion of logic and ethics and the attempt to substitute a theory of concepts for a metaphysic of reality
  • Aristotle separated the different aspects of reality here confounded, and became the founder of logic, psychology, ethics and æsthetics as separate sciences - while he prefixed to all enquiries the investigation of the ultimate nature of existence
  • By the gradual sifting out of the special sciences, philosophy came to embrace primarily the inquiries grouped as "metaphysics" or "first philosophy" i.e. ontology proper (or the science of being as such) with its branch sciences of rational psychology, cosmology and (rational or natural) theology
  • Subsidiary to metaphysics stand the sciences of logic and ethics, to which may be added æsthetics
  • These are the three normative** sciences, which do not, primarily, describe facts, but rather prescribe ends
  • It is with the ultimate synthesis that philosophy concerns itself, the sciences may be said to furnish philosophy with its matter, but philosophical criticism reacts upon the matter thus furnished, and transforms it
More from Britannica tomorrow, in particular delving further into the meaning of æsthetics

*According to the St Andrews University's website:
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931) was born in Edinburgh. He was professor of philosophy at University College, Cardiff (1883-87), and then professor of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews (1887-91) and at Edinburgh (1891-1919). He added Pringle-Pattison to his name in 1898 to meet the conditions of a bequest. He was an influential teacher, and in his writings he examined philosophy through critical interpretations of the great philosophers. He wrote Scottish Philosophy: a comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume (1885), Hegelianism and Personality (1887), Man's Place in the Cosmos (1897), The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy (1917), The Idea of Immortality (1922), and Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (1930).

**In philosophy, normative statements affirm how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, which actions are right or wrong. Normative is usually contrasted with positive (i.e. descriptive, explanatory, or constative) claims when describing types of theories, beliefs, or propositions. Positive statements are factual statements that attempt to describe reality. (from Wikipedia)

Sunday, January 15, 2012

What is metaphysics?

I have just listened to Kit Fine in conversation with Nigel Warburton on the Philosophy Bites website on this very topic.

The key points are:
  • the term was first used by an editor of Aristotle to describe a collection of his writing but it is not a term that Aristotle would have used. Metaphysics by Aristotle
  • notoriously difficult to define
  • meta means "beyond" or "after", but the term has a deeper meaning than "after physics"
  • differs from scientific knowledge as metaphysical knowledge is "a priori", i.e. independent of observation / experience
  • an example of a metaphysical issue in philosophy is the question of causation
  • David Hume (1711-1776) held that we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events, and it is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation (this is now referred to as the Regularity Theory of Causation)
  • An alternative view on causation is that there is some kind of necessary connection between one thing following another in the world
  • The true nature of causation is not an empirical question, it cannot be proved scientifically, and hence it is a metaphysical issue
  • Another example of a metaphysical question is the nature of a person
  • What is a person - what is their very nature?
  • Is a person a body, a soul, a combination of both or merely a collection of experiences?
  • 'What is free will' and 'what is the nature of space and time' are other examples of questions that are metaphysical
  • What is a number - are they the same as the signs for numbers (numerals), are they something abstract, existing in some form of Platonic realm independent of us, or are they a kind of mental construction akin to a fictional character made up by an author
  • Metaphysics operates at a very general level and doesn't deal with specifics
  • Metaphysics deals with the nature of things in themselves.
  • There are similarities between mathematics and metaphysics in the use of a priori reasoning, but mathematics is a narrower subject
  • In the 20th century, metaphysics came under attack, principally from the logical positivist movement
  • For example AJ Ayer in Language Truth and Logic (1936) deployed the verification criterion of meaning to argue that metaphysical statements are meaningless
  • It is only recently that metaphysics has recovered from these attacks and it is now flourishing

Starting with the basics...

The Oxford English Dictionary defines philosophy as:

"1. The love, study or pursuit of wisdom, or of knowledge of things and their causes, whether theoretical or practical.
2. That more advanced study, to which, in the mediæval universities, the seven liberal arts were introductory; it included the three branches of natural, moral and metaphysical philosophy, commonly called the three philosophies."

natural philosophy = science (the knowledge or study of natural objects and phenomena)
moral philosophy = ethics  (the knowledge or study of the principles of human action or conduct)
metaphysics = that department of knowledge or study that deals with ultimate reality, or with the most general causes and or principles of things

Metaphysics gets the prize here for being the least clear definition. I will return to this topic later.

Inaugural post

Philosophy Explained will share my progress undertaking an online study course 'Introduction to Philosophy' from the Oxford Department for Continuing Education.

Starting in April 2012 and lasting for ten weeks, the objective of the course is described as follows:
"Even as our knowledge continually expands, philosophical questions asked since the time of the Ancient Greek philosophers continue to perplex us. This course offers students the opportunity to explore four topics in philosophy - knowledge, reality, free will and morality. Through a series of guided readings, and participation in discussions and other online events, you will not only learn how philosophers have tackled these topics, but learn how to tackle them for yourselves."

Prior to the official kick-off in April, I'm going to have a look at the reading list and share some thoughts on general philosophical matters. If all goes to plan, I aim to update my blog daily.

As an undergraduate I studies PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) at Oxford. To misquote George Bernard Shaw, education is wasted on the young (I probably spent a little too much time on the river) so I'm hoping that a bit of life experience will help me get the most from the course. Who knows, maybe it will lead to something more.

It will also be interesting to me to see how the Internet adds to the experience of studying an academic subject - perhaps this can be  topic for a future blog post.

For my degree I took five philosophy papers:
  • general philosophy
  • moral and political philosophy
  • continental philosophy
  • the philosophy of Kant
  • Russell and Wittgenstein
As the course progresses, I would like to revisit these subjects and see if I can get to grips with some of the concepts and issues which I never mastered previously.

I hope you enjoy reading my blog and would welcome questions, comments and feedback.